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Abstract  
 
Claims that a specific chemical, technology or activity is a false negative or a false 
positive are often made and used as an argument either for or against the application 
of the Precautionary Principle in the future. False positives could be defined as risks 
where actions were taken in the face of incomplete knowledge on the basis of a 
precautionary approach that later turned out to be unnecessary. The purpose of this 
study is to identify false positives and to analyze these to learn lessons from the past 
that can be valuable for future regulatory decision-making regarding human health 
and the environment. The environmental and health literature was examined for 
proclaimed “false positives” often said to be diverting scarce resources from real 
risks or even worse creating new more problematic risks. This review was narrowed 
down to false positives seen in the light of today’s knowledge and recognized 
uncertainty. Four cases were identified: the Southern Corn Leaf Blight, the Swine 
Flu affair, saccharin, and food irradiation in relation to consumer health. The 
identified cases were analysed to identify when and why actions were initially taken, 
when and why it was realized that the believed risk was false and what the overall 
socio-economic costs and benefits were. The study shows that the actual number of 
false positives is very limited and that a great deal of the cases often mentioned in the 
literature are not real “false positives”, but fall into a wide variety of different risk 
categories. Seen from a public health and environmental perspective, the false 
positives generally did not have great impact, either positive or negative. From a 
socio-economic perspective false positives did have an impact, mostly on the 
industry directly affected by regulatory action, but the overall impact was not always 
negative since it sparked innovation within industry, science and government. This 
leads to the conclusion that fear of false positives is not a reasonable argument 
against future application of the Precautionary Principle.    
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“Explicating or exercising a Precautionary 
Principle inescapably involves value judgements 
and choices. The principle itself resides in the 
tension between type I and type II errors” 
[Needleman 2003:143]. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the beginning of the eighties there has been a great shift in both the nature of the public 
health and environmental problems, which we face as a society, and in our recognition of 
these problems. A large part of these problems have changed from being visible and 
incontestable local problems to become invisible, uncertain and potential irreversible global 
risks [Page 1978, Ruckelhaus 1985, Kasperson and Kasperson 1991, Tickner 2001].  
Previously, when the problems were more clearly defined and more obvious, science 
was able to explain these and identify causal links and uncertainties. Thereby science 
provided regulating authorities with essential information upon which it could base its 
regulatory decisions and justify its decision to the public. The complexity of the problems 
society faces today makes it difficult for science to identify causality and provide clear 
answers immediately (if ever), but still these problems demand regulatory response without 
unnecessary delay [Weinberg 1985, Ruckelhaus 1985, Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, 
Harremoës 2003].  
As a result, decision-makers are faced with the constant dilemma of balancing the 
freedom and rights of individuals, industry and organisations with the need to prevent and 
reduce the risk of adverse effects to human health and the environment [European 
Commission 2000]. Adding to the pressure on decision-makers, the public has become 
increasingly aware of the potential risk they and their surrounding environment are exposed to 
[European Commission 2000]. It could seem that there are more and more risks, which 
require some kind of response. Every day, the news are filled with newly discovered risks, 
statements that dismiss proclaimed risks and even rediscovered risks to our health and 
surrounding environment.  
Which ones of the proclaimed risks should we believe in, and which ones should be 
regulated has become an important question. All governments bear the direct and indirect 
responsibility for protecting their people against risks, but because of lack of knowledge the 
proper regulatory response is not always obvious.  
In recognition of this dilemma, which Weinberg [1985] calls “the regulator’s dilemma” 
new ways to govern and regulate issues concerning public health and the environment have 
been sought. In West Germany, the Precautionary Principle emerged as one of several 
principles in order to prevent and avoid environmental damage, minimize risks, and finally 
plan for the future protection of the environment [Wynne 1992, von Moltke 1996, RSC 2001, 
Tickner 2001]. In the literature, the Precautionary Principle (or Precautionary decision-
making) is often said to entail four different elements: 1) taking preventive action in the face 
of uncertainty, 2) shifting the burden of proof onto proponents of potentially harmful 
activities, 3) exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions, 4) increasing 
public participation in decision-making [Raffensperger and Tickner 1999, Raffensperger et al. 
2000, Kriebel et al. 2001, Tickner 2001, 2003, Martuzzi and Bertollini 2003]. 
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Even though the Precautionary Principle could seem as common sense, there has been a lot of 
controversy over the principle since it first entered international policy. It is a controversy that 
seems to have grown with the increasing number of treaties, declarations and laws in which 
the principle has been included. Much of the controversy concerns two basic questions - When 
the Precautionary Principle should be used, and how the principle should be used (once it has 
been decided to use it) [Bodansky 1991, European Communication 2000, Stirling 2001, 
Majone 2002]. It is by no means easy to answer these two questions, because they again 
involve a great deal of underlying and very complex questions, involving scientific, political, 
judicial, economical and ethical issues. 
When the European Communities began to apply the Precautionary Principle as a legal 
principle (for instance in order to ban hormones in imported beef from the US, and to put a 
moratorium on the approval of genetically modified foods) an international dispute about the 
principle started. Especially the US government has been very reluctant to accept the 
Precautionary Principle arguing that the principle is arbitrary, ill-defined, and disguised 
protectionism [WTO Appelate Body 1998, USEU 2000a, 2000b, Cohen 2001, EEA 2001, 
Graham 2004]. Despite this, there are several elements of precaution in American laws and 
regulation, especially - but not only - in relation to public health and the environment [USEU 
2000a, CECNA 2003, Applegate 2000, Wildavsky 1995, Tickner 2001, Wiener 2003].  
As a response to these arguments and with the purpose of being an input in the debate, 
the European Commission issued a Communication on the Precautionary Principle in 
February 2000 [European Commission 2000] which was later endorsed by the Council of the 
European Union [Council Resolution 2000] and established as a legally binding document by 
the European Court of First Instance [Case T-13/99 Pfizer (2002) ECR II-3305, Case T-70/99 
Alpharma (2002) ECR, II-3495].  
The purpose of the Communication was to outline the Commission’s approach to 
applying the Precautionary Principle and to establish guidelines for using the principle, 
without it being a disguised form of protectionism. The Commission differentiates between 
risk assessment, risk management and risk communication and argues that the Precautionary 
Principle belongs to the risk management part [European Commission 2000]. In the 
Communication it is stated that the Precautionary Principle can be applied if the scientific 
information is inconclusive or uncertain and if there are indicators of a potentially dangerous 
risk that is inconsistent with the chosen level of protection. Application requires a scientific 
risk assessment, as complete as possible, based on the principles of excellence, independence 
and transparency [Case T-13/99 Pfizer (2002) ECR II-3305, Case T-70/99 Alpharma (2002) 
ECR, II-3495]. And furthermore, the decision to apply the Precautionary Principle is no 
excuse to derogate from the general principles of risk management. This means that the 
decision to apply the Precautionary Principle should include additional considerations as to 
proportionality, non-discriminating, consistentency and the decision has to include an 
examination of potential benefits and costs of action and lack of action, and should be subject 
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to review in the light of new scientific development [European Commission 2000, Case T-
13/99 Pfizer (2002) ECR II-3305, Case T-70/99 Alpharma (2002) ECR, II-3495].  
Although the EU Commission might have hoped that the Communication would help to 
clarify when and how the principle applies, this has not been the case. The US government 
had numerous additional comments and questions to the Communication. Among others, the 
US government asks for a clear definition of the Precautionary Principle and how and where 
exactly the principle differs from “general principles of risk management” [USEU 2000b].  
The Communication was furthermore criticized heavily in the literature, both by proponents 
and opponents of the Precautionary Principle [Bergkamp 2002]. The condition that 
precautionary action should only be taken after experts have prepared an “objective” 
quantitative risk assessment was heavily criticized by proponents [Tickner 2001]. Opponents 
criticized the lack of a clear definition of the Precautionary Principle and the lack of a clearly 
defined evidentiary standard which scientifically could satify the demand for “safety” [Miller 
and Gonko 2001, Graham and Hsia 2002, Graham 2004].  
Proponents of the Precautionary Principle often call for a more widespread use of the 
principle, and not only as a part of the current risk assessment and cost-benefit paradigm in 
specific risk situations pervaded by uncertainty. Instead, they see the principle as an 
overarching principle and a more precautionary way of making decisions in general, regarding 
human health and the environment [Lyons et al. 2000, Raffensperger et al. 2000, Tickner 
2001].  
Whereas opponents of the Precautionary Principle continue to argue that the principle is 
ill defined, arbitrary, etc. they furthermore accuse it of being anti-science, anti-technology, 
and anti-innovation [Smith 1997, 2000, Morris 2000, 2001, Mitra 2000, Bailey 2001, Bate 
2001, Miller and Conko 2001, Bergkamp 2002, Graham 2004, Keene 2004, Mazur 2004].  
Some arguments in that regard have been rather farfetched. According to the chairman 
of the American Conservative Union, David Keene, the principle is in contradiction with the 
“American spirit” and he argues that environmentalists probably would have advised God not 
to put man on earth [Keene 2004]. John D. Graham [2002, 2004], who is the Administrator of 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the very influential US Office of 
Management and Budget1, argues that the Precautionary Principle is a threat to technological 
innovation. Graham insinuates that technological-innovations, such as for instance electricity, 
the internal combustion engine, plastics, pharmaceuticals, the Internet and finally cell phones, 
would have been stopped if the Precautionary Principle had been adopted in 1850.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Office of Management and Budget oversees the Federal regulations and information requirements, and 
develops policies to improve government statistics and information management. In this function they demand 
detailed justification of regulations, including a cost-benefit analysis and thus policies of this office can have 
substantial consequences for environmental regulations [Cranor 1993, Samet and Burke 2001, Weiss 2004]. 
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Since others have dealt extensively with these accusations2, this thesis will only partially deal 
with them.  
The focus of this thesis will be on a less explored argument - that the Precautionary 
Principle will lead to unnecessary precautionary regulation - an argument that is often used by 
opponents of the principle. 
 
 
1.1 Research field and research questions 
 
One of the fears among opponents is that a widespread regulatory application of the 
Precautionary Principle will lead to over-regulation of minor risks, regulation of non-existing 
risks and a general overestimation of possible risks. This would be due to public concern, lack 
of scientific knowledge and scientific uncertainty associated with new technologies, 
chemicals, activities or policies. They argue that this would lead to a ban of these new 
technologies etc. when these could in fact benefit not only the economy but also human health 
and the environment. Furthermore they concern that unnecessary regulation would divert 
scarce resources and create new more dangerous risks [Smith 1997, Bate 2001, Bergkamp 
2002, Graham 2004, Smith FB 2000, Within Worldwide 2000, Sunstein 2002-2003]. 
Generally, there seems to be a lot of fear among opponents of the Precautionary Principe that 
applying the principle will lead to many so called “false positives” defined as cases  
 
                                                 
2
 See for instance Santillo et al. [1998], Sandin et al. [2002], Barett and Raffensperger [1999], Stirling [2001], 
Tickner and Raffensperger [1999a], Tickner [2003], Grandjean [2003]. 
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 “…Where action was taken on the basis of a precautionary approach that 
 turned out to be unnecessary… ” [EEA 2001:12].  
 
History definitely shows that precautionary action was applied too late in several cases [EEA 
2001] and these cases have been very costly to society in terms of costs to health and the 
environment and to the economy. However, does history also show many false positives, 
which could justify this fear, and in that case, what can we learn from them?  
In this thesis I will investigate these questions and related issues and try to give some answers.  
          These considerations lead to the following Research Questions: 
 
 Should we as a society fear unnecessary precautionary action when applying the 
 Precautionary Principle? 
• Are there many false positives occurring in the regulation of public 
health and the environment? 
• Are false positives always bad for society? 
 
 What lessons can be learned from cases where unnecessary precautionary 
 action was taken in the past?  
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2. Methodology 
 
In this chapter the methodology of this thesis will be presented and the arguments behind the 
choices made in this thesis will be presented and discussed.    
 
 
2.1 Precaution and false positives in regulation of public health and the 
environment 
  
Both proponents and opponents of the Precautionary Principle occasionally use case studies to 
illustrate their different viewpoints. In the literature, some cases are labelled as false negatives 
or false positives and sometimes the same case is labelled both by opponents and proponents 
of the Precautionary Principle respectively (see for instance the case of diethylstilbestrol 
(DES) in Lieberman and Kwon [1997] and EEA [2001]). Besides, showing how controversial 
regulation in the face of uncertainty is, this also indicates that the terminology concerning 
precautionary regulation is ambiguous. The terms false positives and false negatives originate 
from science and are used to describe a wrongful rejection or acceptation of the null-
hypothesis of a scientific experiment. It could seem strange that the term false positives are 
also used in a social context to describe unnecessary precautionary action concerning public 
health issues and the environment. This shows that it is relevant to explore the terminology 
behind false positives and false negatives. This will be done through a study of the literature 
and the relationship and interactions between the Precautionary Principle and false positives 
in the regulation of public health issues and the environment will be established and 
discussed.  
 
 
2.2 Defining false positives 
 
Whether or not a proclaimed false positive actually is a false positive very much depends on 
the definition of the term false positive. In the European Environmental Agency’s report 
“Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000” from 2001, false 
positive was defined as a case  
 
 “…Where action was taken on the basis of a precautionary approach that 
 turned out to be unnecessary… ” [EEA 2001:7].  
 
This definition leads to some questions, which need to be considered and clarified. The first 
evolves around how definition of precautionary action is defined and the second concerns 
when action can be considered to be unnecessary.  
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In their Communication on the Precautionary Principle from 2000 the European 
Commission argue that all regulatory measures are available for the appropriate authority 
when it decides to apply the Precautionary Principle - also initiating a research study 
[European Commission 2000].  
So it could be argued that precautionary action is every regulatory measure you can 
think of, but “only” initiating a research study in a specific risk situation could seem to define 
“precautionary action” a bit too broad. There is a fine line between using the argument of 
more and better research as an excuse for postponing precautionary action, and the legitimate 
wish of supporting additional research to reduce uncertainties. The first reason is contrary to 
the purpose of the Precautionary Principle and it is often hard to tell the difference between 
these two [Graham 2001, Smith C 2000]. No matter which reason lies behind the wish for 
additional research, such research can be very expensive and time consuming and potentially 
unnecessary if the risk turns out to be a false positive (or for that matter a false negative). 
Furthermore delaying regulatory action in the hope that new information will resolve or 
reduce uncertainty is in itself an interim decision [Bodansky 1991, Cranor 1993]. Therefore 
every regulatory measure - also initiating and funding a research study - will be considered a 
precautionary action in this thesis. 
Another element in the definition of false positives that needs clarification is the term 
“unnecessary”. To decide if and when precautionary action can be considered to be 
unnecessary is extremely difficult, especially in cases of scientific uncertainty. Not only 
unnecessary regulatory action could be seen as a false positive, but also obviously 
disproportional regulatory action, which makes the matter even more problematic. In some 
cases, it is hard or impossible to estimate whether or not action taken was proportional, 
because no one knows what would have happened had less strict regulatory measures been 
implemented [Pacala et al. 2003].  
To give some perspectives on the issue it might help to define the ideal false positive. 
Say for instance that a substance was generally believed by the scientific community, the 
politicians and the public to be carcinogenic and that several scientific studies supported that 
belief. Therefore regulatory precautionary actions were implemented to eliminate or reduce 
exposure to that substance. After a period of time there is a shift in belief because scientific 
studies are beginning to show that the substance was not truly carcinogenic. For this case to 
be ideal, two things would have to happen. First the scientific evidence showing no harm 
would have to be consistent and verified by additional studies and science would have to be 
able to explain why the original studies showed a risk. Second, it would have to become 
generally believed that the precautionary actions initially taken had been unnecessary. It 
would probably be naive to expect to find several ideal false positives in practice due to a 
number of reasons.  
First of all, there is the methodological problem that it is impossible to prove no risk, 
which makes it extremely difficult to identify and document that an activity is not harmful - 
i.e. a false positive. Just one counter-example is necessary to falsify the claim [Popper 1968].  
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Second, if one study originally indicated an effect, it is impossible to put a definite 
number on how much knowledge and how many studies showing the opposite there would be 
necessary before the original study would be considered a false positive.  
Third, in balancing the evidence for or against something being a risk the scientific 
knowledge is often inconclusive and experts frequently disagree over the validity of the 
evidence or how it should be interpreted [Webb and Lang 1990].  
Fourth, there will always be some people in the public, scientific community or some 
politicians who do not consider one risk or another as being unreal or who did not believe in 
the risk being real in the first place.  
And finally there is of course always the possibility that new scientific knowledge or a 
better understanding will change the present perception of a given risk once again. 
 
 
2.3 Standard of proof for false positives 
 
Defining term like “precautionary action” and “unnecessary” is difficult, and because of the 
reasons mentioned above a number of criteria would have to be met before a given case can 
be said to be a false positive. 
With the definition of false positives in mind, some kind of precautionary regulatory 
action would have to be taken before these actions turn out to be unnecessary. Another 
criterion could be that it is generally believed in the scientific and regulatory community that 
the specific case in question is a false positive. One way to determine if actions are generally 
believed to be unnecessary would be to investigate whether or not the precautionary actions 
originally implemented have been withdrawn or no longer are in force. This cannot be set 
forward as an ultimate criterion because it seems much easier to get a regulatory measure 
implemented than it is to have it withdrawn. This is something that might be due to the 
institutional defensive strategy of “avoiding loss of face” [Funtowicz and Ravetz 2001].    
Another question is which type of proof and how much proof would be needed before a 
given case can be said to be a false positive. The standard of proof would have to take the 
specific circumstances in the given case into consideration, which makes it difficult to set a 
specific threshold of knowledge. But to put in general terms, having proof of “no risk” or 
“beyond a shadow of a doubt” would be to prefer, but, sadly enough, impossible to obtain. 
Therefore it would be setting the bar too high as a standard of proof. Setting the standard of 
proof at “more likely than not”, “substantial” or “circumstantial” would be to set the standard 
to low, so setting the standard of proof somewhere between “beyond reasonable doubt” and 
“clear and convincing evidence” seems appropriate (see table 2.1).  
This means that there will be a bias towards identifying some false positives which 
would not have been identified had a higher standard been applied.  
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Tabel 2.1: The standard of proof set in this thesis [Cranor 1999, Harremoës 2003, Ashford 2003] 
 
 
To summarize the following criteria have to be fulfilled for a case to be a false positive: 
 
1. Precautionary action was taken when the risk was believed to be real; 
2. It has generally been realized that the risk is not real, seen in the light of present 
knowledge; 
3. There is “clear and convincing” scientific evidence of no harm towards public 
health and/or the environment. 
  
There is always an element of subjectivity involved, not only in which criteria are set forward, 
but also in how the scientific evidence for and against some proclaimed risk is interpreted. 
This means that somebody else, when looking and interpreting the evidence, might argue that 
they are not false positives, maybe because they think the risk is real.  
In deciding whether or not a specific case is a false positive or not, emphasis will be 
placed on the opinion of international organizations, scientific consensus panels, etc. If these 
are not available more emphasis will be put on literature reviews and recommendations from 
national governmental institutions and if these are not available either, emphasis will be put 
on peer-reviewed literature. This means that dissenting options will be discussed and some 
dissenting opinions - even from reputable scientists - will be accepted as long as the subjects 
of their criticism have been dealt with in the literature and the opinions of the international or 
national organizations are not conflicting.  
 
 
1. Beyond a shadow of a doubt,  
2. Beyond reasonable doubt,  
3. Clear and convincing 
evidence  
4. Substantial  
5. More likely than not 
6. Circumstantial or vague  
My standard of proof for false positives 
in this thesis 
Ranging of standards of proof 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
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2.4 Identifying cases of false positives 
 
There is a long list of literature concerning proclaimed unnecessary regulation/over-regulation 
because of “flawed science”, scientific uncertainty and biased decision-making - especially on 
the issues of public health and the environment (see for instance Claus and Bolander 1977, 
Whelan 1985, 1993, Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998, Bast et al. 1994, Sanera 
and Shaw 1999, Bailey 2002). The terminology used is ambiguous. Lieberman and Kwon call 
their cases “unfounded health scares”, whereas others use terms like “environmental hoaxes 
and myths” [Martin 1990], “eco-myths” [Bailey 2002], “regulatory abuse” [Cohen and 
Giovanetti 1999] and “false alarms” [Mazur 2004].  
There is a tendency for proponents of the Precautionary Principle to use proclaimed 
false negatives to illustrate their viewpoints and opponents to apply proclaimed false positives 
to illustrate theirs. That is why the cases mentioned by known opponents of the Precautionary 
Principle are used as a starting point in order to identify “false positives” in this thesis. In 
order to identify further possible false positives, the literature on the Precautionary Principle 
in general was skimmed through and leading experts on the Precautionary Principle where 
approached. Finally, contact was established to representatives from academia, industries, 
non-governmental organisations, and a number of different think tanks at a number of 
international conferences3. All of the cases mentioned in the literature and elsewhere, were 
initially considered to be possible candidates of false positives and an initial screen was 
performed. The initial screening consisted of three steps: 
  
• First step was to identify whether or not international consensus panels and/or 
agencies like World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the European Scientific Committees, the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) supported the claim of a case being a false 
positive seen in the light of present knowledge;  
• The second step was only taken if no information was found in the first step or if 
no up-to-date information was available. It involved a search for literature 
reviews and recommendations from national governmental institutions like for 
instance the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (U.S. FDA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(U.S. EPA), California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA), the 
National Academy of Sciences, the EU Commission, etc.; 
                                                 
3
 These conferences were a) SETAC North America 24th Annual Meeting, Austin 9-13 November, 
2003 b) SETAC Europe 14th Annual Meeting, Prag April 18-22, 2004, c) International Symposium: 
Uncertainty and Precaution in Environmental Management, Copenhagen June 7-9, 2004 and d) Ecology in a 
Cost-Benefit Society, Roskilde17-18 June 2004.    
 
 14 
• In cases where these were not available either, a literature review was performed 
in peer-reviewed journals.  
 
After each step it was determined whether or not the evidence supported the claim of a 
specific case being a false positive or not. If the evidence was not found to be “clear and 
convincing” the case was dismissed as a false positive. 
Maybe some of the dismissed cases will be identified as false positives sometime in the 
future, but not all of the cases proclaimed to be false positives turned out to be false positives 
at present time, taking the present scientific knowledge and acknowledged uncertainty into 
consideration. Instead these proclaimed false positives fall into other “risk categories” like for 
instance real risks or risk-risk tradeoffs, which are presented and defined. It would be 
unfeasible, irrelevant and beyond the scope of this thesis to go through all of the cases 
mentioned in the literature and show in depth why they are not false positives. One case 
proclaimed to be a false positive in the literature will be used as an illustrative example of 
each “risk category”, and arguments are presented as to why this particular case is not a false 
positive. For the rest of the proclaimed false positives a short explanation for the reason why 
each identified candidate falls into this category is given in Appendix A.  
Applying the criteria defined above it was possible to identify the following cases, 
which could reasonably be said to be false positives:  
 
1. The Southern Corn Leaf Blight - the decision in the U.S. in 1971 to plant more 
corn in anticipation that the Southern Corn Leaf Blight would return and destroy 
a large part of the harvest; 
2. The Swine Flu affair - the decision in the U.S. in 1976 to mass immunize the 
entire American population in anticipation of a return of the Swine Flu, which 
never reappeared; 
3. Saccharin - the decision to require saccharin to be labelled in the U.S. in 1977 
 because of it was believed to be a human carcinogen; 
4. Food irradiation in relation to consumer health - the reluctance to allow a 
seemly safe and wholesome technology that could help reduce the large number 
for food pathogens and increase shelf life.  
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2.5 Analysis of identified false positives 
 
In order to analyse the different false positives identified, a number of relevant questions were 
put forward and applied as an overall framework. These questions have been identified as 
relevant during the review of literature concerning the relationship and interactions between 
precaution and false positives in regulation of public health and the environment. An 
additional number of questions were put forward in order to investigate and to test whether or 
not some of the arguments most often used against implementing the Precautionary Principle 
were justified in the cases of false positives.  
 
The questions are the following: 
 
1. When and why was it believed that the false positive risk was real? - In order 
to understand and learn from the cases of false positives it is important to 
understand and know the context in which decisions were made;  
2. When and what were the main actions (or inactions) taken by regulatory 
authorities or others to reduce the risk? Given that all the identified cases are 
false positives, meaning that any action taken was unnecessary it is important 
to know which actions actually were taken to reduce the believed risk, in order 
to understand the direct and indirect consequences of the actions taken;  
3. Were alternative courses of action considered and why was one preferred to 
another? Considering that the case was identified as a case of unnecessary 
precautionary regulation implies that other courses of action would have been 
preferred in hindsight. Therefore it becomes highly relevant to know whether 
or not alternatives were considered and why one of them was chosen; 
4. When and why was it realised that the risk was not real or was smaller than 
believed? In order to learn from cases of false positives we need to know what 
changed the belief that a given risk was real. For instance, whether it was new 
scientific experiments, better understanding of experiments done in the past or 
simply a change in the way a given risk is perceived, or whether it was a 
change in the accepted risk level; 
5. What were the resulting monetary costs and benefits from the actions or 
inactions, including their distribution between groups, and across time? 
Opponents of the Precautionary Principle often argue that false positives will 
divert resources away from other known certain risks, that they will be a waste 
of money. It is relevant to investigate whether or not this belief is true; 
6. Were there indirect benefits or negative unintended consequences from the 
false positives? There seems to be some disagreement in the literature whether 
false positives or false negatives are “worst” for society as a whole. Non-
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monetary direct benefits or negative unintended consequences from false 
positives are very important, but often ignored elements in that discussion.  
 
Before applying the framework and answering the identified questions, both the historical 
course of events and the scientific knowledge are presented in order to understand why the 
case is a false positive and why and how the decisions were made. Emphasis in the 
description of these two aspects will be put differently in the different cases, all dependent on 
how important they are to the overall understanding of the case in question. In the case of the 
Southern Corn Leaf Blight, the literature is very scarce, which makes it impossible to analyse 
and answer all the questions in depth, and hence the structure in that specific case will be 
somewhat different.    
Understanding and learning from past mistakes is a key element in order to improve 
decision-making on issues of public health and the environment. There is a considerable 
amount of important lessons, which can be learned in each of the identified cases. Some of 
these are specific as to the subject at hand and cannot easily be transmitted to other risk 
situations. Thus, focus will be on experience that is applicable to other cases and can be 
generalized.  
 
 
2.6 Limitations  
 
The scope of this thesis is limited to issues concerning public health and the environment even 
though false positives occur in other areas of decision-making as well (i.e. Weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq). A number of cases mentioned in the literature fall outside this limitation. 
For instance the “Y2K millennium bug” is mentioned as a possible false positive by the 
European Environment Agency [EEA 2001] and Phillimore and Davison [2002]. An area in 
which one would expect many false positives is in the development and approval of drugs, 
which is known to be very precautionary. Therefore one could expect that there are some false 
positives in drug regualtion [Shorter 2002].  
Most of the opponents of the Precautionary Principle represent institutions that are 
opponents of regulation in general and support deregulation for one or the other reason. One 
could argue that the scope of this thesis should have concerned regulation in general and not 
only precautionary motivated over-regulation. But since the critics in several cases use these 
proclaimed false positives to attack the Precautionary Principle, specific and not regulation in 
general this limitation seems justified.  
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2.7 Thesis Overview 
 
In chapter 3, the terminology behind the term false positives will be explained, and the 
relationship between the Precautionary Principle and false positives in regulation of public 
health and the environmental will be established. Chapter 4 presents the work done in order to 
identify false positives in the light of present knowledge and uncertainty. A large number of 
cases have been proclaimed to be false positives in the literature, but many of these are 
actually not false positives. Instead they fall into other “risk categories”, which are presented 
and defined. In chapter 5-8, the four identified false positives will be presented and analysed. 
In chapter 9 the main points of the analysis will be discussed and conclusions and lessons 
learned are presented in chapter 10.         
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3. False positives and public policy  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the links within public policy between the 
Precautionary Principle and false positives in regulation of public health and the environment.  
 
 
3.1 Origin of false positives and false negatives 
 
The term false positives and false negatives have its origin in science (statistics in particular) 
[Cranor 1993] and the tradition of falsifying hypotheses. Besides environmental sciences, the 
term is also used extensively in medical sciences, e.g. in relation to screening devices (see for 
instance Ozonoff 2003).    
Normally, a hypothesis H1 is put forward (e.g. substance A causes cancer in rats) and 
because of the difficulties of proving effects, the opposite of the original hypothesis is 
formulated as a null hypothesis (H0) (e.g. substance A does not cause cancer). To test and 
confirm the original hypothesis, experiments, which contradict the formulated null hypothesis, 
will have to be conducted again and again [Cranor 1993, Hennekens et al. 1987, Mapstone 
1995, Underwood 1999, Rothman 2002].  
The experiment and the results from a statistical test will lead to either a rejection of the 
null hypothesis or not. If the null hypothesis is rejected in a case where it should have been 
accepted, a type I error has been committed. These errors are also called false positives, 
because the experimental results have positively identified for instance a substance to be 
harmful, when it is in fact harmless. The probability of committing a type I error is normally 
symbolized by  which is a pre-set low value, usually 0.05. If H0 is not rejected when it 
should have been, a type II error has been committed. These errors are called false negatives 
because the experiment has identified a substance as being harmless, when it in fact was 
harmful. The probability of committing a type II error is normally symbolized by  and there 
is a tendency for  to be greater than , i.e. at least 0.20 [Cohen 1982, Hennekens et al. 1987]. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between false positives and false negatives for two 
distributions of a test measure X where C is the decision cut-off value meaning that responses 
to the right of C are declared positive and those to the left declared negative [Cranor 1993]. 
The more to the left the decision cut-off C is placed the higher sensitivity and the less 
specificity, and vice versa the more to right C is placed [Ades 1990]. 
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Figure 3.1: This figure illustrates the relationship between false positives and false negatives for two 
distributions of a test measure X where C is the decision cut-off value [From Ades AE. 1990. Evaluating 
screening tests and screening programs. Archives of Disease in Childhood 65:792-95]. 
 
There are four different outcomes of a statistical test of a given null hypothesis depending on 
“the true state of nature” (see table 3.1).  
 
In science, hypothesis testing operates on the basis of limiting incorrect rejections of the null 
hypothesis e.g. type I errors. Scientist design studies to guard against the influence of all 
possible confounding variables in order to have a high sensitivity (to minimize type I errors), 
and replication is demanded before accepting the results as supporting a particular hypothesis. 
Scientists want to reduce the frequency of committing type I errors to 1 in 20. Therefore  is 
set to 0.05 below which the p value from the statistical test must fall in order to reject the null 
hypothesis. If p is above 0.05, meaning that scientists cannot rule out with greater than 95 % 
certainty that the effect was by chance alone H0 will not be rejected. This threshold is an 
arbitrary historical choice and not necessarily a scientific one [Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 
Shrader-Frechette 1991a, Cranor 1993, 1997, Mapstone 1995, Lemons et al. 1997, Ashford 
2003].  
Most scientists report cases in which they reject H0 at some level of significance , but 
traditionally scientists have paid little attention to committing type II errors (i.e. missing an 
effect) in cases where they fail to reject H0 which leads them to draw unjustified conclusions 
 
 
Table 3.1: The four different possible outcomes of a statistical test of a given null hypothesis 
depending on “the true state of nature” [Hennekens et al. 1987, Underwood 1999:258, Underwood 
and Chapman 2003:51] 
State of nature  Do not reject null 
hypothesis  
(You believe that there 
is an impact) 
Reject null hypothesis 
(You believe that there is 
no impact) 
Null hypothesis actually true 1. Correct (1- ) 2. Type I error () 
Null hypothesis actually false 3. Type II error () 4. Correct (1- ) 
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in many cases [Tversky and Kahneman 1982, Peterman 1990, Cranor 1993, 1997, Bailar 
2003, Grandjean 2003].  
There is a crucial connection between the frequency of type II errors () and the 
statistical power or specificity (Sp.) of a study. Statistical power refers to the probability of 
statistically detecting an effect, which is actually there and correctly rejecting the H0. The 
statistical power or specificity (Sp.) is equal to Sp.=1- [Peterman and M’Gonigle 1992, 
Cranor 1993:33, Underwood 1997:140, 1999:259, Underwood and Chapman 2003]. If a 
statistical analysis fails to reject the H0 and the power is high (i.e. at least 0.8) for some 
specific effect then one can say that there was at least an 80 % chance of rejecting the H0 if 
such an effect had been present (i.e. less than a 20 % chance of not rejecting H0, when it 
should have been, committing a type II error) [Buhl-mortensen 1996, 1997, Buhl-Mortensen 
and Welin 1998].  
As the power of a data set decreases, the risk of committing type II errors increases. A 
statistical test that has a low power has a high , or a large chance of a making type II error, 
i.e. a large probability of missing an effect that is present. However, there is a trade-off 
between type I and type II errors and the statistical power is therefore crucial as to how 
reliable results are [Peterman and M’Gonigle 1992, Cranor 1993, Buhl-Mortensen 1996, 
1997, Buhl-Mortensen and Welin 1998, Ervin et al. 2003].  
The statistical power is a function of four variables: the effect size (), sample size (n), 
sample variability (2) and . The required sample size n and the sample variability 2 are not 
always controllable, whereas ,  and  are conventions [Cranor 1993, Motulsky 1995, 
Underwood 1997, 1999, Buhl-Mortensen and Welin 1998, Sanderson and Petersen 2001, 
Underwood and Chapman 2003]. This means that a small sample size and large sampling 
variability can result in a low statistical power, and due to this low power, a real effect could 
be missed and the H0 may not have been rejected [Hennekens et al. 1987, Peterman 1990, 
Buhl-Mortensen 1996, 1997]. According to Buhl-Mortensen [1996] this is often the case in 
public health and environmental studies because the natural variation is very high. Higher 
power can be achieved through increased sampling size, improved experimental design to 
reduce confounding effects, or more precise sampling methods. But due to limited budgets, 
small samples, natural variability, or imprecise sampling methods, power is often very low in 
environmental studies [Hennekens et al. 1987, Peterman and M’Gonigle 1992, Cranor 1993, 
Underwood 1999]. 
Ideally the hypotheses testing should be a two-steps process. First, a statistical analysis 
will either reject the H0 or not. If H0 is rejected because the statistical test shows a significant 
relationship (and the tested relationship is validated as ecologically relevant), no further 
analysis is needed. But if H0 is not rejected,  or the detectable effect size must be calculated. 
Often the second step is ignored which can be especially dangerous when the analyst 
recommends action based on the conclusion that H0 is true. This de facto assertion that H0 is 
true, even though results show only that H0 has not been falsified, is a logical jump that 
scientists and managers often make, and without knowing the probability of making a type II 
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error it may unjustifiably be concluded that there is no problem [Peterman 1990]. Page [1978] 
calls this problem the “fallacy of false negative” which has been recognized among 
statisticians since the fifties at least [Kimball 1957]. 
Therefore statistical power analysis should be done before the hypothesis is tested and 
action should only be based on the assumption that the H0 is true if the probability of making 
a type II error is acceptably low and power should be stated explicitly [Ozonoff and Boden 
1987, Peterman 1990, Sanderson and Petersen 2001, Lenth 2004].  
But even when the power of a given test is considered to be high when  is 
conservatively set to 0.20, which is four times higher than  which is normally set at 0.05. 
This would mean that the risk of a false failure to reject the null hypothesis is deemed to be 
four times as acceptable as the risk of falsely accepting a null hypothesis [Sanderson and 
Petersen 2001].  
Another problem with standard null hypothesis testing is that it does not confirm that the 
original question (formulated into a null hypothesis) is scientifically valid or has ecological 
relevance. Errors, where the wrong question is asked but the right/accurate answer is given, 
are called type III errors. They are especially relevant in complex ecological systems [Kimball 
1957, Schwartz and Carpenter 1999, Kriebel et al. 2001, Sanderson et al. 2004]. It is 
important to minimize the number of type III errors because providing a right answer to the 
wrong question could give wrongful reassurance, which again may delays the discovery of 
real effects.    
Standard null hypothesis testing is not the only element of scientific experiments that are 
focussed on limiting false positives rather than false negatives. Gee [2004] has investigated a 
number of methodological features of science and found that most of these increase the risk of 
type II errors (false negatives) (see table 3.2). 
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Despite of these numerous methodological features of science that favours false negatives, 
Gray [1990] and Milloy [2001] argue that regulatory actions should only be taken when H0 is 
rejected by standard statistical tests, something that amounts to the principle “absence of 
evidence of harm is equivalent to evidence of absence of harm. Applying this strategy is in 
opposition to the Precautionary Principle because it would increase the risk that an effect will 
not be observed and thus increases environmental and public health risks. Furthermore by 
using  and  values uncritically in their design and in their reporting of data, scientists would 
indirectly make some important social policy decisions [Cranor 1993, Lemons et al. 1997, 
Cairns 1999, EEA 2001, Funtowicz and Ravetz 2001, Collegium Ramazzini 2003, Grandjean 
Table 3.2: On Being Wrong: Environmental and Health Sciences and their directions of Error [Gee 2004]  
 
Scientific Studies 
 
Some Methodological 
Features  
 
Main1 direction of error-
increases changes of detecting a: 
Experimental Studies  
(Animal Laboratory) 
High doses false positive 
 Short (in biological terms) 
range of doses 
false negative 
 Low genetic variability false negative 
 Few exposures to mixtures false negative 
 Few Foetal-lifetime exposures false negative 
 High fertility strains false negative 
(Developmental/reproductive 
endpoints) 
Observational Studies  
(Wildlife and humans) 
Confounders false positive 
 Inappropriate controls false negative/false positive 
 Non-differential exposure 
misclassification 
false negative 
 Inadequate follow-up false negative 
 Lost cases false negative 
 Simple model that do not 
reflect complexity 
false negative 
Both Experimental and 
Observational Studies 
Publication bias false positive 
 Scientific cultural pressure to 
avoid false positives  
false negative 
 Low statistical power (e.g. 
from small studies) 
false negative 
 Use of 5 % probability level to 
minimise chances of false 
positives 
false negative 
1)
 Some features can go either way (e.g. inappropriate controls) but most of the features err in the direction 
shown in the table 
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2003]. By following the procedure of hypothesis testing and trying to minimize the chance of 
making type I errors, scientist inadvertently increase the chances of failing to detect effects 
which may be costly and harmful [Peterman and M‘Gonigle 1990].  
 
 
3.2 False positives in regulation of public health and the environment 
 
According to Peterman and M’Gonigle [1992], statistical power analysis can help to identify 
those cases where precautionary actions may be justified and where they are not. If the power 
is high regulation might not be justified assuming a willingness to accept that level of power 
and probability of making a type II error. If the power is low, precautionary regulation might 
be justified until an acceptable approach with high power is carried out [Peterman and 
M’Gonigle 1990]. Peterman and M’Gonigle [1992] claim that if statistical power had been 
evaluated historically, many past political decisions probably would not have been justified 
and undesirable effect on the environment could have been avoided. They also suggest that 
power calculations can help to identify those cases in which precautionary regulatory actions 
may be justified, i.e. where uncertainties are great. 
Power analysis and the Precautionary Principle can help and guide the regulator, but the 
principle cannot make sure that the precautionary actions taken will not later turn out to be 
unnecessary. The only thing the Precautionary Principle can ensure is that if an error of 
judgement is made, it is made in favour of the protection of public health and the environment 
[Underwood 1997]. If the regulating authority decides not to act, or under-regulates a given 
substance, technology or activity, which is actually harmful, a false negative is committed. 
False negatives can lead to costs in the form of negative impact on health, safety and 
environment [Cranor 1993, Mapstone 1995, Lemons et al. 1997, Ashford 1999, 2003, Cairns 
1999]. 
On the contrary a false positive is committed if a regulatory agency decides to act or 
over-regulates a given subject, because it is suspected to be harmful, and when it later turns 
out to be harmless. This could lead to a needless expense of resources and/or benefits being 
lost [Cranor 1993, Mapstone 1995, Lemons et al. 1997, Ashford 2003]. Other terms than false 
positives and false negatives have also been applied in order to describe on whom the risks 
fall. Wildavsky [1991] applies the terms “Error of Commission” and “Error of Omission” 
whereas Shrader-Frechette [1991a] applies the terms “Industry Risk” and “Public Risk” when 
dealing with these issues.  
According to Shrader-Frechette [1991a], decreasing industry risk might hurt the public 
and the environment whereas decreasing the public risk might hurt the industry directly and 
the public and the environment indirectly. Thus, just as there is a trade-off between type I and 
type II errors in science, there is a trade-off between false positives and false negatives in 
social science. Regulating agencies can be precautionary and guard society against false 
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negatives, but this precaution comes at a cost of increasing false positives. By being less 
precautious, the likelihood of false negatives increases, while false positives decrease [Cranor 
1993, Ozonoff and Boden 1987, Renn and Klinke 2002].     
Just like science current decision-making processes in regulation of public health and 
the environment have focussed on minimizing false positives, which create a high probability 
of making false negatives.  
Shrader-Frechette [1991a] argues that this tendency of preferring false negatives rather 
that false positives is due to that it appears to be more consistent with scientific practice. 
Furthermore many risk assessment and impact analyses are done by those closely associated 
with the technology being evaluated and who are therefore sympathetic to it and to those who 
implement it. In such cases, Shrader-Frechette [1991a] argues that assessors typically 
underestimate risk probabilities at least in part, because it is difficult to identify all hazards 
and because unidentified risks are usually assumed to be zero [Shrader-Frechette 1991a]. 
According to Ozonoff and Boden [1987], there are a number of institutional reasons for why 
agencies tend to favour not to act in response to positive findings of an effect. First, 
acknowledging that there is an effect means that the agency would be expected by the public 
to do something. They might even be accused of not doing enough about the situation in the 
first place. Second, the indicated solutions of the problem at hand often counter to other 
interests for instance economic development. Third, agencies know that the affected industries 
will go after the agency, accuse them of creating hysteria and do anything they can to 
undermine the administration [Ozonoff and Boden 1987].    
Several scholars have drawn a parallel between this regulatory situation and the judicial 
situation, where the use of the higher standard of proof in a criminal prosecution (where the 
evidence has to be “beyond a reasonable doubt”) makes it less likely that an innocent person 
will be convicted (legal type I error). On the other hand it also more likely that a guilty person 
will go free (legal type II error) than if lesser civil standard were used (where the proof need 
only be “on the balance of probabilities”) [Page 1978, Ozonoff and Boden 1987, Peterman 
and M‘Gonigle 1990, Shrader-Frechette 1991a, Cranor 1993, 1999, RSC 2001].  
Scientists usually attach greater loss to accepting a falsehood than failing to 
acknowledge the truth and therefore it is more important to avoid type I errors than type II 
errors. Scientific knowledge is like a house of cards. One piece of knowledge is built on 
another just like one card is built on another in a house of cards. If one piece of knowledge 
turns out to be incorrect the whole house falls apart and the whole house of knowledge would 
have to be rebuilt from scratch. Therefore it makes sense to wait and make sure that each 
piece of knowledge is “true” before adding it to the structure. Even though the reluctance to 
accept new pieces may sometimes slow the scientific process down this is considered a small 
price to pay in contrast to the risk of having to rebuild the whole house all over again because 
one piece is found to be flawed [Cranor 1993]. But the question is whether or not the same 
reasoning is relevant in the administrative regulation of public health and the environment and 
several scholars have argued that it is not the case [Page 1978, Shrader-Frechette 1991a, 1993, 
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Cranor 1993]. This is especially true when considering the balance between false positive and 
false negatives applied in other parts of society, for instance in our legal systems.  
In criminal law, it is considered to be better for ten guilty men to go free rather than for 
one innocent man to be wrongly convicted [Cranor 1993, RSC 2001]. The reason behind this 
is that liberty is a primary good for which there is no adequate compensation [Page 1978]. In 
tort law, the interest at stake between plaintiff and defendant are thought to be approximately 
equal since mistakenly holding an innocent defendant accountable is not thought to be much 
worse than mistakenly failing to compensate a deserving plaintiff [Cranor 1993]. 
There are several reasons why analogies from scientific practice and criminal law are 
not applicable in relation to public health. According to Shrader-Frechette [1991a] societal 
decision-making involves legal rights, duties and ethical consequences that affect the welfare 
of persons, whereas purely scientific decision-making involves largely epistemological 
consequences [Shrader-Frechette 1993].  
The reason for minimizing false positives in the criminal law is to protect the most 
vulnerable person, the accused criminal, whereas in the case of societal risk, say from a 
technology, harm to the public is more serious than harm to industry [Shrader-Frechette 
1993]. As Ricter and Laster argue  
 
 “Tests of statistical significance are criteria for judging the reproducibility of 
 an experimental association between exposure and risk. They are not guides for 
 making decisions about life and death under conditions of uncertainty for 
 assessing either rare catastrophic events or long-term large population risks” 
 [Ricter and Laster 2003:26].   
 
This boils down to the question of whether committing a false negative when regulating 
public health and the environment is worse than committing a false positive in a case of 
uncertainty, and on whom should the risk of regulators’ mistakes fall? [Cranor 1993, Ashford 
1999, Shrader-Frechette 1991a, 1993]. Ought one to run the risk of rejecting a true hypothesis, 
of not using a substance, technology, etc. that is really acceptable and safe or ought one to run 
the risk of not rejecting a false null hypothesis of using a substance, technology, etc. that is 
really unacceptable and unsafe? [Shrader-Frechette 1991a]. It is not easy to answer this 
question and there are various opinions about it in the literature.  
From an ethical perspective, Lemons et al. [1997] and Shrader-Frechette [1991a] have a 
number of arguments why ethical preferences should be given to minimizing false negatives 
in public health and environmental issues and thereby increase the risk of false positives. 
First, it can be argued that it is more important to protect the public from harm than to provide 
for welfare in some positive sense because protection from harm seems to be a necessary 
condition for enjoying other freedoms. Second, the public typically needs more risk protection 
than do the industry or government proponents of the risky technology. The public usually has 
fewer financial resources and less information to deal with societal hazards that affect it, and 
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laypersons are often faced with bureaucratic denials of public danger [Ozonoff and Boden 
1987, Shrader-Frechette 1991a, 1993]. Third laypersons ought to have guaranteed legal rights 
to protection against technological decisions that could threaten their health and physical 
security considering that everyone has both, due-process rights and rights to bodily security. 
And the fourth reason is that failure to minimize false negatives would result in using 
members of public as means to fulfil the needs of industry and society as a whole. This is 
discriminating because these members of public would have to bear a significantly higher risk 
without consent despite the fact that others would receive most of the benefit [Shrader-
Frechette 1991a, 1993].  
Whereas Shrader-Frechette [1991a] and Lemons et al. [1997] have dealt with this issue 
from an ethical point of view others have tried to put a monetary value on committing a false 
positive contra committing a false negative.  
Lave and Omenn [1986] assume that regulatory false negatives cost $ 10,000,000 and 
regulatory false positives $ 1,000,000, but there does not seem to be specific reasoning behind 
the ratio 10 to 1 besides society’s deep concern about false negatives. McBurney and Parsons 
[2002] and Ashford [2003] argue that the costs of committing a false positive/false negative 
differ from case to case and that the costs of being wrong in one instance may be vastly 
different from those of being wrong in another. Smith FL [2000] argues that both false 
positives and false negatives can kill and that mistakes of either kind can create major threats. 
He further argues that applying the Precautionary Principle simply ignores the costs of false 
positives. 
Peterman and M’Gonigle [1992] state, that of course the costs of committing a false 
positive can be high, but that these are mostly limited to one producer or one industry. In 
contrast to this, the effect of committing a false negative is potentially even more costly 
because these also include costs on other industries, public health, and the environment. 
Hrudey and Leiss [2003] argue somewhat the same, stating that we should prefer false 
positives instead of false negatives because the latter is usually more direct and potentially 
more severe. Page [1978] adds that the probability of committing a false negative may be 
substantially higher than the probability of committing a false positive, meaning that we 
should see far more false negatives than false positives. Soskolne [2003] has an interesting 
comment that while false positives are often quickly caught; false negatives have high costs to 
public health and the economy.  
Cranor [1993] compared the total social costs of conventional slower science-intensive 
risk assessment on 369 carcinogens with faster alternatives, which allow more mistakes (false 
positives and false negatives) by simulation. Since it is hard to tell what the specific costs 
ratio is between the costs of under-regulation to cost of over-regulation Cranor [1993] has 
plotted the total social costs against different possible ratios per chemical (see figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: This figure illustrates the ratio of cost of under-regulation to cost of over-regulation per chemical 
plottet against the total social costs for the conventional risk assessment procedure and for three different 
hypothesized approximation alternatives [From Cranor, C. F. 1993, Regulating Toxic Substances A Philosophy 
of Science and the Law, Oxford University Press New York/Oxford]. 
 
The figure shows that conventional risk assessment is much more costly than any of the three 
hypothesized approximation alternatives because it fails to regulate a majority of the 
identified carcinogens. The cost advantage continues for all approximation alternatives until 
the costs of under-regualtion are assumed to be 40 % (1:2.5) of the costs of over-regulation, 
but only for the two alternatives with the highest “error rates”.     
Besides Hrudey and Leiss [2003] none of the scholars mentioned above refer to any 
cases of false positives or false negatives on which they base their assumptions, and Hrudey 
and Leiss [2003] only briefly mention one of each. 
Some false negatives (i.e. fourteen in all) have been analysed by the European 
Environmental Agency (EEA) [2001] with the purpose of providing some “late lessons” for 
future policy making. In this context it is important to stress that the EEA picked a number of 
cases and that the history of public health and the environment was not analysed 
systematically in order to find all the false negatives of the past. The study by the EEA 
showed that lack of action has had costly and unpredicted consequences on human health and 
the environment, and that decision-makers ignored not only early warnings, but also ”severe 
and late warnings”. With several cases with devastating human health and environmental 
impact, in between, the nature of the consequences ranged from several hundred thousand 
deaths (asbestos) globally to total collapse in the fishery stocks in Canada, California and 
Scotland, with devastating effect to the local communities (EEA 2002].  
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On the contrary no systematic analysis of false positives has been conducted until now, 
something, which is illustrated by the question raised by the EEA  
   
 “But are there no “false positives” (…)?” [EEA 2001:12].  
 
This question raised by the EEA is the subject of the next chapter. 
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4. Proclaimed false positives and different risk categories  
 
The question raised by the EEA [2001] of whether there are cases of false positives is the 
main subject of this chapter. First a number of key references in the literature concerning 
proclaimed cases of unnecessary precautionary regulation (i.e. proclaimed false positives) will 
be introduced. A large number of cases have been proclaimed to be false positives in the 
literature (see Appendix A), and a review of the literature on these cases revealed a wide 
variety of different risk categories. These different risk categories will be defined and one 
example of each category will be provided as an illustration of the characteristics of this 
particular category.   
 
 
4.1 Key references 
 
A limited number of references provide the majority of the cases proclaimed to be false 
positives in the literature. Without these key references the number of proclaimed false 
positives would be only 30 instead of 80, and therefore it seems appropriate to introduce these 
key references and their authors. 
 
4.1.1 “Technology Social Shock” by Lawless [1977] 
 
In 1977 Lawless and his team published the book “Technology and Social Shock” which 
presented the results of a study of different episodes, which Lawless [1977] labelled “Social 
Shocks” over technology. “Social Shocks” were defined as episodes of public alarm or strong 
concern over different technologies [Lawless 1977]. All his episodes occurred after World 
War II and have been inspired by major news stories in the media. The purpose of the study 
was two fold. First to illustrate the diverse effects that technologies have on our society by 
compiling a series of short case histories of recent episodes of strong public concern. Second, 
to make an analysis to see which characteristic these cases might have in common and maybe 
what society ought to do differently [Lawless 1977]. In total, Lawless [1977] goes through 
forty-five cases concerning a wide range of subjects for instance reproduction and genetics, 
food and medicine, environmental problems, etc.   
In 2004 the sociologist Mazur re-evaluated the cases mentioned by Lawless [1977] that 
concerned human health with a somewhat different purpose than Lawless. His purpose was to 
identify “hallmarks” that could help predict the truth or falsity of an alleged hazard with 30-50 
years of hindsight. Where the scope of Lawless study was very broad, Mazur’s study is 
limited to threats to human health and does not include threats to animals or the environment, 
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and he states that a false warning about humans may be true regarding wildlife or 
environmental degradation [Mazur 2004].  
Since this thesis concerns the Precautionary Principle and false positives it is appropriate to 
mention that although Lawless [1977] does not mention the Precautionary Principle, Mazur 
does. Just before he draws his conclusion, he states that 
 
 “The pessimist’s guide is the Precautionary Principle, urging restraint on 
 technological innovation in the presence of any plausible warning” 
 [Mazur 2004:107].  
 
This, he argues is a platitude better as a political slogan than a serious principle of public 
policy [Mazur 2004]. 
 
4.1.2 “But Is It True?” by Wildavsky [1995] 
 
In relation to public health and environmental issues, political scientist Wildavsky is probably 
best known for the book “Risk and Culture” which he co-authored with Douglas [Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982]. In “Risk and Culture” Douglas and Wildavsky basically argue that all 
risks are perceived and therefore relative, and they concluded that individuals basically 
choose what to fear to support their way of life. This could be interpreted as if no rational way 
exists to regulate technology and risks, because it could be argued that if all regulatory 
measures are justifiable, none were [Shrader-Frechette 1991b].  
Wildavsky’s book “But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and 
Safety Issues” goes through a number of cases concerning environmental and safety issues. 
These have been selected, not to prove a point, but to make sense of the uses and abuses of 
science in environmental and safety issues. Based on the cases, subject to his study, 
Wildavsky [1995] draws the conclusion that “the truth value of the environmental-cum-safety 
issues of our time is exceedingly low” and that with the exception of the CFCs thinning the 
ozone layer, the charges are false, mostly false, unproven, or negligible [Wildavsky 1995]. If 
the charges put forward in the cases mentioned by Wildavsky are indeed false, these cases 
could be false positives. 
With regard to the Precautionary Principle, his conclusion is to reject the Principle 
because it assumes that there are no health detriments from the proposed regulation. 
Furthermore he argues that it seems to present a choice between health and money or even 
suggests health with no loss whatsoever, for a tangential presumption is, that industry will 
find a better, cheaper, and safer way [Wildavsky 1995].  
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4.1.3 “Facts versus Fears” by the American Council on Science and Health [1998] 
 
A report which has often been quoted in the media4 for analyzing unfounded health scares is 
“Facts versus Fears: A Review of the Greatest Unfounded Health Scares of Recent Times”. 
The report goes through 24 different so-called “great unfounded health scares” and three “not-
quite-great unfounded health scares”.  
It was prepared by Lieberman and Kwon [1998] for the American Council on Science 
and Health (ACSH), which, according to their literature, is a scientific consumer education 
organization consisting of scientists. According to others, ACSH is a long-standing, industry 
funded defender of DDT, dioxin and other chemicals [Rampton and Stauber 2001, Gibbs 
1993, Environmental Working Group 2004].  
The main lesson learned by Lieberman and Kwon [1998] is, that the Precautionary 
Principle fuelled these unfounded scares.   
In the report “great unfounded health scares” is defined as  
 
 “…a scare that received “great public attention in its day and followed its 
 own course to closure in terms of public and regulatory response”  
 [Lieberman and Kwon 1998:48]. 
 
This definition does not look much like the definition of false positives, but nevertheless there 
is some resemblance. A believed risk or “scare”, which gets a great public and regulatory 
attention in its day and then follows it own way to closure, could be a possible false positive.  
Two of the references most frequently used in the report are the books called “Toxic Terror” 
and “Panic in the Poultry” by the President of ACSH, Elisabeth Whelan [1992, 1993], a 
declared opponent of the Precautionary Principle [Whelan 1996].  
 
4.1.4 “Junk Science Judo” by Milloy [2001] 
 
In his book “Junk Science Judo - Self-Defense against Health Scares & Scams” Steven J. 
Milloy mentions several different cases sporadically, which in one or the other way fall under 
his category “Health Scares & Scams” and which are not genuine risks.  
Milloy now works for the Cato Institute, an industry-funded conservative think-tank, 
and he is the publisher of junkscience.com. According to Rampton and Stauber [2001], Milloy 
used to work for the tobacco industry and he was the executive director of The Advancement 
of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC) a coalition which was created by Phillip Morris in order 
to downplay the dangers of tobacco [Rampton and Stauber 2001].  
In his book he argues that “junkscientists” do not like to carry the burden of proof because 
they typically cannot prove anything and therefore they have developed “a clever but faulty 
defence known as the Precautionary Principle” [Millloy 2001].  
                                                 
4
 See for instance Brody [1998]. 
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4.1.5 Other references 
 
A number of books have been published by different industry-funded/conservative think tanks 
like the Cato Institute, The Heartland Institute, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute for 
instance Eco-Sanity by Bast, Hill and Rue [1994], Phantom Risk by Foster, Bernstein and 
Huber (eds.) [1994], Global Warning and Other Eco-Myths by Ronald Bailey (ed.) [2002]. 
 
 
4.2 Risk categories: Definitions and examples 
 
A pattern emerged when reading the different approaches, mentioned above, and investigating 
different cases. First, it was realized that several of the different cases are not false positives, 
but fall into different risk categories. Second, it was realized that many of the different cases 
had similar characteristics, which made it possible to classify them into different risk 
categories. These risk categories are  
 
I. “Too narrow a definition of risk”  
II. Risk-risk tradeoffs  
III. “The jury is still out” 
IV. Real risks 
V. Scientific false positives (Type I errors) 
VI. Non-regulated proclaimed risks  
VII. Cases of “Justified Action - Unjustified Reason” (Type III errors) 
VIII. “Multiples” 
IX. False positives 
 
Some of these risk categories have already been defined in the literature - others have not. In 
this thesis one case will be used to describe the characteristics of each risk category, but a 
screening of the literature has been performed on each of the cases mentioned. This screening 
was done in order to determine whether the case in question could be said to be a false 
positive or not.  
It involved three steps. First it was determined whether or not international consensus 
panels and/or agencies supported the claim of a case being a false positive. The second step 
involved a search of literature reviews and recommendations from national governmental 
institutions and the last step was a literature review, which was performed in peer-reviewed 
journals. 
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Based on this screening, four cases were identified as false positives. See Appendix A 
for explanations for why the rest of the cases are not categorized as false positives and for 
why they instead fall into one of the categories described below. 
 
 
4.3 Risk category I: “Too narrow a definition of risk”  
 
Some cases are proclaimed to be false positives in relation to for instance the environment or 
human health, only by focussing on one element in the illustration and discussion of the case 
in question. It happens for instance that only the environmental effect of a given substance (or 
technology) is presented and discussed without paying attention to the known human health 
consequences of the substance. Another example could be the claim that a given substance is 
a false positive because it has been “proven” that it does not cause pancreatic cancer without 
mentioning that the substance causes other kinds of cancer. 
 
4.3.1 Example: Hair dyes 
 
Lieberman and Kwon [1997] consider hair dyes as one of the 25 “greatest unfounded health 
scares of recent times” and especially the U.S. FDA’s announcement in 1978 that it would 
require all hair dyes containing coal-tar dyes to carry a warning label [Lieberman and Kwon 
1997].  
Lieberman and Kwon argue that there is no evidence of a link between the use of hair 
dyes containing coal-tar chemicals and cancer. Lieberman and Kwon only focus on the 
possible link between the use of hair dyes and cancer, without considering those people who 
are occupationally exposed to hair dyes containing coal tar chemicals like for instance 
hairdressers. 
Epidemiological studies have provided conflicting results for people who use hair dyes 
[Andrews et al. 2004], and in 1993 the WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(IARC) found that the hair colorants “cannot be evaluated as to its carcinogenicity (Group 
3)” [IARC 1993].  
Whereas it might be argued that the carcinogenic risk associated with personal use of 
hair dyes remains uncertain, the increased risk of cancer and especially bladder cancer among 
hair dressers and barbers occupationally exposed to hair dyes is well established [IARC 1993, 
Andrews et al. 2004].  
Because Lieberman and Kwon [1997] only focus on the association between hair dyes 
and cancer for personal use without paying attention to the hair dressers who are 
occupationally exposed to the same chemicals their definition of risk becomes to narrow and 
misleading.    
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4.4 Risk category II: Risk-risk tradeoffs 
 
Risk-risk tradeoffs could be defined as cases where efforts to combat a “target risk” can 
unintentionally foster increases in “countervailing risks”. Other terms that could be used to 
describe “countervailing risks” are “side-effects” or “unintended consequences” of for 
instance injection of a vaccine applying a chemical substance or technology or implementing 
a given policy [Graham and Wiener 1995]. A classical example is banning a substance 
because of its health and/or environmental effects without paying attention to the health 
and/or environmental effects of available substitutes. But it could also be cases where a given 
risk is just relocated between for instance social groups or different parts of the world.  
 
4.4.1 Example: DDT and prevention of Malaria 
 
The ban of DDT in 1972 by the U.S. EPA in the U.S.A is often called the first victory of the 
environmental movement and the birth of environmentalism in the U.S. [Lieberman and 
Kwon 1998, Whelan 1985, Sunstein 2002]. But Lieberman and Kwon [1997] also call DDT 
one of the great unfounded health scares of the 20th century, and Wildavsky [1995:55] and 
several others have since then questioned the decision. They argue that the science behind the 
decision was flawed and that it did not take the benefits of DDT into consideration - 
especially in the prevention of Malaria [Whelan 1985, Lee Ray and Guzzo 1990, Wildavsky 
1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998, Maxeiner and Miersch 1998, Bate 2001, Milloy 2001, 
Bailey 2002].  
It is basically argued that the scientific evidence was inconclusive at the time being and 
still is, and that DDT is wrongly accused of being a hazard that 
  
1. Is a carcinogen; 
2. Causes breast cancer; 
3. Has estrogenic activity; 
4. Endangers the environment; 
5. Is persistent in the natural environment [Whelan 1985, Lee Ray and 
Guzzo1990, Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998, Milloy 2001, Bailey 
2002].  
 
The evidence concerning cancer in general and breast cancer in particular varies depending on 
which kind of cancer we are talking about [ATSDR 2002a]. IARC [1991a] evaluated DDT to 
be a “possible carcinogenic (Group 2B)”, the National Toxicology Program (NTP) of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services classified DDT as “reasonably anticipated to be a 
human carcinogen” [NTP 2002] and finally the U.S. EPA [1991a] classifies DDT as a 
probable carcinogen (B2). However the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) [2002a] of the U.S. Department of Health and Health Services states that the 
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existing information does not support the hypothesis that DDT and its degradation products 
DDE and DDD increase the risk of cancer in humans.  
Several studies indicated a potential association between elevated DDT levels in the 
maternal blood of women and different reproductive end points for instance premature birth 
and low birth weight, and there seems to be little doubt that DDT has estrogenic activity in 
animals [Longnecker et al. 2001, ATSDR 2002a]. Numerous studies have showed that dietary 
exposure to DDT/DDE/DDD is associated with among others: egg thinning and breakage, 
reproductive and developmental effects and finally neurological and behavioural effects on 
mammalian wildlife, amphibians and avian wildlife [ASTDR 2002]. The environmental 
effects of DDT are well established and so is DDT’s persistency, which is one of the reasons 
why it is considered to be a Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) [Turusov et al. 2002].  
Besides arguing that DDT does not cause all the different risks mentioned above, 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] and others argue that the ban of DDT indirectly caused an 
increase in cases of Malaria in many tropical regions of the world and that it would have save 
several millions of those people who have died from malaria since 1972, if it had not been 
banned [Whelan 1985, Wildavsky 1995, Burnett and Matthews 1997, Maxeiner and Miersch 
1998, Avery and Avery 2000, Bailey 2002]. 
Although there is no doubt that malaria is a serious problem and that any measure that 
could minimize the risk of being infected would be very welcome, applying DDT involves a 
long-term risk in itself, not only to humans, but to the environment in which humans live and 
future generations also will have to live [ATSDR 2002a]. 
Furthermore there are several other factors that affect the spread of Malaria like for 
instance an explosion in international travel, changes in land use, global climatic change, 
disintegration of health services, armed conflicts and mass movements of refugees and not 
least the emergence of multi-drug resistant strains of parasites [UN 1999]. Malaria and DDT 
exposure pose a double threat to people and ecosystems, and to portray it as if one single tool 
would solve the malaria problem in a minute would be wrong. 
 
 
4.5 Risk category III: “The jury is still out”  
 
Cases where “the jury is still out” could be defined as cases where the scientific data is 
uncertain, disputed and ambiguous and no final conclusion has been reached yet, either within 
the scientific community or the public. There is a tendency of different actors or parties (both 
within so-called “pro-industry” and “pro-environmentalist” groups) to jump the gun and 
declare that a given chemical substance, technology or policy is “definitely” safe or unsafe 
before any conclusion or consensus has been reached.  
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4.5.1 Example: Breast Implants 
 
In 1992, a moratorium was put on silicone breast implants in the U.S. following a large 
amount of lawsuits filed against the manufactures among them Dow-Corning. At first 
reported adverse reactions were dismissed, either as anomalies or the result of bad medical 
practice, but over the years complaints poured in from surgeons and their patients describing 
implant ruptures, silicone migration, connective tissue diseases and other disorders [Yoshida 
et al. 1993, Angell 1996, Dowie 1998].  
During the course of events that led up to this decision, Dow-Corning had admitted 
misleading the U.S. FDA and the public about its data on the possible problems of implants, 
and other companies had collected no data at all [Nelkin 1994, Angell 1996, Dowie 1998]. 
Because of lack of data, the 1992 U.S. FDA Advisory Panel had to rely on anecdotal evidence 
and individual testimony in order to assess the risk, and the main reason given for the 
moratorium was that too little information existed concerning the safety of silicone breast 
implants [Lamm 1998].  
Graham [2004] calls Breast implants a “scare” and states, that “early studies that 
suggested danger were not replicated in subsequent studies performed by qualified 
scientists”. In a report prepared by Fumento [1996] for ACSH, he argues that the evidence 
against implants is anecdotic and Milloy [2001] argues that there is no credible evidence 
associating implants and connective tissue disease.  
Several epidemiological studies have been performed in order to solve the matter and 
generally these have not indicated any relationship between breast implants and harmful 
effects (see for instance Gabriel et al. 1994, Goldman 1995, Hennekens et al. 1996].  
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) did a review of the safety of silicone breast 
implants. Of 17 epidemiological reports of connective tissue disease in women with breast 
implants the IOM [1999] noted that it was remarkable for the consistency in finding no 
elevated relative risk or odds ratio for an association of implants with disease. Hence they 
found that there was no evidence that they were causing serious disease. However, the review 
did raise concerns about health problems from ruptures, and later studies pointed to links 
between gel implants and fibromyalgia, a type of rheumatism, and increased suicide. 
Furthermore it found that local complications with silicone breast implants were the 
primary safety issue that they have not been well studied, and that information on these 
complications is crucial for women deciding whether or not they want breast implant surgery 
[IOM 1999]. 
In 2003 Inamed Corp. asked the U.S. FDA to approve its silicone-gel implants and the 
U.S. FDA appointed another Advisory panel. The new Advisory panel recommended on a 9-6 
vote, that Inamed Corp. should be allowed to sell implants [Ault 2003, Mechcatie 2003]. In an 
unusual move, the chairman of the advisory panel, Dr. Thomas Whalen of the University of 
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey-Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, asked federal 
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health officials and lawmakers to disregard that advice. Whalen [2003] stated in a letter to 
U.S. FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan and five members of Congress that  
  
 “Long-term safety, the concern that prompted the removal from the market 
 eleven years ago, was clearly not demonstrated and to approve this device poses 
 threats to women that are clearly unknown” [Whalen 2003, Kaledin 2004].  
 
Whalen further stated that all of the data considered by the IOM [1999] had “reflected low-
quality data in the age of evidence-based medicine” [Whalen 2003]. 
In early 2004, the U.S. FDA decided not to approve silicone breast implants made by 
Inamed Corp. Instead it issued a Draft Guidance document calling on manufacturers to 
provide more information on how and how often implants rupture and how to diagnose 
socalled “silent” ruptures, and the consequences of silicone leakage [U.S. FDA 2004a, Ault 
2004]. 
Because of the lack of information on the long-term safety of breast implants, the jury is 
still out on whether or not breast implants are actually safe and precautionary action is 
definitely warranted. 
 
  
4.6 Risk category IV: Real risks 
 
This category includes proclaimed false positives, which are actually real proven risks, where 
the potential adverse effect is well established and the probability is known. Another term 
used in the literature is “false false positives” [Tickner and Gouveia-Vigeant 2003].   
 
4.6.1 Example: Aflatoxins  
 
Referring to estimates made by the FAO/WHO Expert Committee of Food Additives, Majone 
[2002] argues that the European standards for B1 aflatoxins (2 parts per billion) would save 
1.4 lives per billion, i.e. less than one life pr. year in Europe. Majone [2002] states that these 
standards fed fear that the Precautionary Principle might be used as protectionism and raise 
the question whether it is justified that European health standards imposed additional cost on 
the African countries and thereby hurt African farmers.  
There is no doubt that Alfatoxins are carcinogens [IARC 2002, JECFA 1998, NTP 
2002]. According to the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) 
[1998] the estimated population risk (potency × intake) would be 4.1 (and not 1.4 as Majone 
[2002] quotes) cancers per year notably with a range of 0.6 to 10 cancers per year. 
Furthermore the JECFA [1998] states that considering the weight of scientific evidence 
(epidemiological data, laboratory animal studies and in vivo and in vitro metabolism studies) 
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aflatoxins should be treated as carcinogenic food contaminants and that the intake should be 
reduced to levels as low as reasonably achievable.  
Thus aflatoxins are not a false positive, but a real risk. 
 
 
4.7 Risk category V: Scientific false positives (type I errors) 
 
Scientific false positives is defined as cases or scientific experiments where a type I error has 
been committed (i.e. experiments in which the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected when it should 
have been accepted), but where no precautionary regulatory actions were ever implemented 
based on the false results [Peterman 1990, Peterman and M’Gonigle 1992, Buhl-Mortensen 
1996].  
 Scientific false positives are false positives from a scientific point of view, but not from 
a precautionary point of view because no precautionary action was ever taken. These can 
actually be seen as a success of the regulatory system because they chose not to respond to a 
study incorrectly raising concern. 
 
4.7.1 Example: Coffee and pancreatic cancer  
 
The case of coffee and pancreatic cancer is often mentioned as a “scare” [Lieberman and 
Kwon 1997, Consumer reports 2001]. 
In 1981 MacMahon et al. published an epidemiological study in the journal New 
England Journal of Medicine in which they had studied 369 patients admitted to New 
England hospitals with pancreatic cancer and 644 controls admitted for other diseases 
[MacMahon et al. 1981, Lieberman and Kwon 1997]. The purpose of the study was to 
investigate whether alcohol and smoking increased the risk of pancreatic cancer, but instead 
MacMahon et al. [1981] found an unexpected, but strong significant dose-response relation (P 
< 0.001) between pancreatic cancer and coffee consumption in both sexes. The risk of 
pancreatic cancer was elevated 2.1 (95 % confidence intervals, 1.0 to 3.0) times among people 
drinking up to two cups a day and 2.7 (95 % confidence limits, 1.6 to 4.7) times among people 
drinking three cups a day or more [MacMahon et al. 1981]. Even though MacMahon et al. 
[1981] stated that the association they had found should be evaluated with other data they 
“estimate that the proportion of pancreatic cancer that is potentially attributable to coffee 
consumption to be slightly more than 50 percent” in the United States [MacMahon et al. 
1981:633].  
The study sparked a large number of additional studies in order to repeat the results 
found, but most studies have subsequently been unable to confirm these results [IARC 1991b] 
for instance Gold et al. [1985], Mack et al. [1986], Norell et al. [1986], Whittemore et al., 
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[1983], Wynder et al. [1986], Heuch et al. [1983]. In 1986, the same authors conducted a 
second study and failed to confirm its previous results [Hsieh et al. 1986]. 
In this case it could be said that a scientific false positive was committed. Coffee as the 
cause of pancreatic cancer was the hypothesis (H1), which was accepted by MacMahon et al. 
[1981] when it should have been rejected. Even though Americans knew about the results of 
MacMahon et al. [1981], they largely ignored it and it had little impact on America’s coffee 
drinking habits [Samet et al. 1982]. 
Furthermore no precautionary regulatory actions were ever implemented to reduce 
coffee drinking based on the results found by MacMahon et al. [1981] and therefore this case 
is only a false positive from a scientific point of view - not from a precautionary point of 
view.  
 
 
4.8 Risk category VI: Non-regulated proclaimed risks  
 
This category includes cases were a given substance, object, technology or procedure is 
proclaimed to be a risk but where precautionary actions never were taken. It is often a claim 
by a member of the public that something poses a potential risk but it could also be a scientific 
hypothesis or scientific false positives. Since the cases have not been regulated they are not 
false positives seen from a precautionary point of view. This risk category differs only slightly 
from the risk category scientific false positives, but it is important to notice that the scope of 
these cases is broader than just scientific claims of harm. Scientific claims that false positives 
have by definition been rejected by the scientific community, something which is not always 
the case with non-regulated proclaimed risks.  
 
4.8.1 Example: Bendectin  
 
Marchant [2003] mentions Bendectin as an example of excessive precaution and over-
regulation, but fail to mention that Bendectin was never regulated.  
Bendectin is a morning sickness drug, which was widely used prior to 1983 throughout 
the world to treat nausea and vomiting in relation to pregnancy. By 1980, 10 to 25 % of 
pregnant women in the U.S. took Bendectin and it is estimated that the drug was used in 33 
million pregnancies worldwide by 1983 [Holmes 1997, EFPIA 1999]. 
In 1969 the first allegations regarding possible teratogenic effect of Bendectin were filed 
against the manufacturer of Bendectin, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and throughout the 
1970s more lawsuits were filed. Only a small number of these lawsuits were actually won and 
the company never paid any damages in any of those lawsuits because plaintiff victories were 
overturned on appeal. [Lasagna and Shulman 1994, EFPIA 1999, Lundine 2001].  
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By June 1983, Merell Dow voluntarily withdrew the drug from the market due to 
negative media publicity and increasing legal costs and insurance premiums. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals never admitted that the drug had teratogenic effects, but the costs of 
defending itself against the “avalanche of lawsuits was simply too great” according to an 
attorney representing the company [cited in Kaiser 2000] and the outstanding claims were 
settled in a settlement worth US$ 120 million. [Foster et al. 1994, Ornstein et al. 1995, 
Holmes 1997, EFPIA 1999, Mazzota 2000, Ostraff et al. 2000, Lundine 2001]. 
Subsequent studies have failed to associate Bendectin with teratogenic effects [Ornstein 
et al. 1995, McDonald 1994, McKeique et al. 1994, Boneva et al. 1999, Brent 1995]. Hence 
the claims that Bendectin causes teratogenic effects have since been unsubstantiated [Mazotta 
2000, Holmes 1997] and in 2000 the U.S. FDA published a notice in the Federal Register 
stating that Bendectin had not been withdrawn from the market for safety or health reasons 
[Lundine 2001].  
The manufacturer - not the U.S. FDA - withdrew Bendectin from the market in the U.S. 
and it was never banned in any country. It is still sold in Canada under a different name 
(Diclectin) [Lasagna and Shulman 1994, Ornstein et al. 1995, Mazotta 2000]. Therefore it 
would be wrong to argue that the precautionary actions taken against Bendectin were 
unnecessary because no regulatory action was ever taken by a regulatory agency. Since 
Bendectin has not been regulated it cannot be a false positive seen from a precautionary point 
of view. 
 
 
4.9 Risk category VII: “Justified action - unjustified reason” 
 
This category compromise of cases where the regulatory authority took precautionary actions, 
which were unsuccessful in reducing or eliminate the intended potential risk, but instead 
reduced another unintended risk - maybe/often unknown at the time the action was taken. This 
could for instance be the ban of a teratogenic chemical substance because it was believed to 
be carcinogenic.      
 
4.9.1 Example: DEHP 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. EPA has classified DEHP as a B2, probable human carcinogen, 
after carcinogenesis bioassays conducted by the National Toxicology Program had shown that 
DEHP at high doses was a rodent liver carcinogen. As a consequence the Toy Manufacturers 
of America (TMA) voluntarily removed DEHP from different children’s products i.e. baby 
bottle nipples, teethers, and infants’ toys [Wilkinson and Lamb 1999, CERHR 2000, U.S. 
EPA 1993].  
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In 2000 IARC revised its classification of DEHP [Durodié 2000, CERHR 2000] from 
“possibly carcinogenic to humans” to “not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans 
(Group 3)”. But the U.S. EPA [1993] considers DEHP as a probable human carcinogen and 
finally the NTP [2002] state that it is “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen”. 
The reason given by IARC [2000a] was that DEHP caused cancer in rodents by a mechanism 
involving peroxisome proliferation, which is considered not relevant to humans. This was by 
some people regarded as an acquittal of DEHP in relation to cancer [Durodié 2000, Milloy 
2001], whereas it led others to question the independency of IARC [Tomatis 2002, Huff 2002, 
2003, Melnick 2003, Sass 2003, Mirer 2003].  
This ignores however, that DEHP subsequently was recognized to be a developmental 
toxicant, and although DEHP is not considered to be a carcinogen in the U.S. or in Europe, it 
is classified as a developmental toxicant. In Europe, DEHP is listed as toxic to reproduction 
category 2, because it may cause harm to the unborn child and impair fertility [European 
Chemical Bureau 2004]. 
In a recent report, the Center For The Evaluation of Risks to Human Reproduction 
(CERHR) of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [2000] states that the effects on 
reproduction and development in animals are intertwined and CERHR expressed concern that 
DEHP exposure may adversely affect 1) the male reproductive tract development of healthy 
infants and toddlers and 2) the offspring of pregnant or lactating women. Contrary to DEHP 
and cancer species differences in the sensitivity to perixisome proliferator agents was not 
believed to be relevant to the extrapolation of developmental toxicity to humans [CERHR 
2000]. 
Considering that infants and children in the age of 0-4 years have the highest exposure 
levels of DEHP [CERHR 2000], it can hardly be said that the regulatory action taken in 1980s 
was unnecessary, although it might have been for the wrong reason.    
 
 
4.10 Risk category VIII: “Multiples”  
 
The category “Multiples” describes cases that fall into several of the different categories 
mentioned above. Since most cases generally could be said to fall into more than one category 
like for instance “the jury is still out” and “non-regulated proclaimed risk” it seems 
appropriate to have one category for the few exceptional cases, which span over more then 
three or more categories.    
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4.10.1 Example: Alar 
 
In February 1989, the CBS popular television news magazine “60 Minutes” unveiled a report, 
which alleged that agricultural residues in food pose an unacceptable health risk to children. 
The report, which was prepared by the Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC], 
estimated the risk of eight carcinogenic agrochemicals and their metabolites [Roberts 1989, 
Marshall 1991, Brody 1998, Rampton and Stauber 2001].  
One of the eight was Alar (daminozide), a chemical sprayed on apples to regulate their 
growth, keep them from falling off the tree and to enhance their color [Rodgers 1996, Russell 
1990]. Treatment trace amounts of Alar and its metabolites (UDMH), had been found in 
apples, apple juice and other apple products and it was estimated in the report by NRDC that 
Alar could cause one cancer case for every 4,200 children exposed during their first 6 years of 
life [Rodgers 1996, Marshall 1991, Brody 1998, Rampton and Stauber 2001]. Actress Meryl 
Streep got involved as a spokesperson, schools stopped buying apples and there are several 
reports of parents dumping untold gallons of apple juice and bushels of apples, etc. 
The public response following the release of the NRDC report was enormous, and apple 
growers were pleading Congress to take Alar off the marked in a desperate attempt to quell 
the public [Roberts 1989, Marshall 1991, Rosenberg 1996, Brody 1998, Rampton and Stauber 
2001].  
Alar is probably the case most often quoted as being a false positive in the literature 
[Fumento 1990, Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998] and in the media (see Negin 
1996 and Environmental Working Group 2004, Rampton and Stauber 2001), but actually it is 
everything but a false positive. That is why this specific case has been preferred to illustrate 
this category of multiples.  
The case of Alar falls into the category of “too narrow a definition of risk” because the 
problem is not the chemical Alar in itself, but its metabolite, UDMH. More UDMH is 
procuded when Alar is heated and therefore concern was especially with products that 
required heating or cooking during processing in large quantities like apple juice, applesauce 
and peanutbutter [Rosenberg 1996].   
IARC [1999a] evaluated UDMH to be “possibly carcinogenic to humans (Group 2B)” 
and the NTP [2002] also considers UDMH to be “reasonable anticipated to be a human 
carcinogen”. Both IARC and others based their evaluation on sufficient evidence in 
experimental animals. Because of the lack of epidemiological evidence it could be argued, 
“the jury is still out” (see ATSDR 1997a for a review of the available data on hydrazines]. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that UDMH is a real risk because the U.S. EPA 
initially estimated the life time risk of cancer from Alar consumption to be 45 in a million, 
which is 45 times the agency's “negligible” risk level. Although they later revised this number 
to 23 in a million, it still is significantly above the agency’s negligible risk level [Fumento 
1990, Marshall 1991, Environmental Working Group 2004).  
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It could furthermore be argued that no initial precautionary action was taken in the case 
of Alar because it was the manufacturer, Uniroyal Chemical Co. that announced in late June 
1989, that it was voluntarily halting sales and recalling supplies because of the “fear” 
campaign. The U.S. EPA first proposed to phase out all allowable residue levels by June 1991 
although they had unsuccessfully tried to ban Alar prior to 1989 [Marshall 1989, Russell 
1990, Brody 1998]. In 1985, the U.S. EPA had proposed cancellation of the registration for 
Alar, but chose not to follow the decision through, because its own Scientific Advisory Panel 
advised not to. It was later found out that seven out of the eight members of the Scientific 
Advisory Panel had been paid consultants to the chemical industry or to organizations 
supported by the industry while serving on the panel [Rosenberg 1995, 1996].  
A factor often overlooked in the numerous illustrations is that there was a risk-risk 
tradeoff between public health and worker health. The use of Alar had several benefits for 
apple pickers and growers, which disappeared when Alar was banned. Alar kept the apple 
from dropping and without Alar the apples easily got knocked of the three and got bruised. 
Bruised apples are of substantially less value for the growers since they can only be used for 
cider and because the cider price is low. The ban of Alar also put a lot of additional stress on 
the pickers since it reduced the number of days they had to pick the apples. Furthermore it 
made their work more uncomfortable [Rosenberg 1995, 1996].    
 
 
4.11 Risk category IX: False positives  
 
There are two kinds of false positives concerning the application of the Precautionary 
Principle. One is unnecessary regulation of a non-existing risk and the other is 
disproportionate precautionary regulation i.e. over-regulation of a known risk. 
An initial review of all the proclaimed false positives identified the following cases as 
being false positives: 
 
1. The Swine Flu affair;  
2. The Southern Leaf Corn Blight;  
3. Saccharin; 
4. Food irradiation in relation to consumer health. 
 
Even these cases are questionable. Since the rest of this thesis is devoted to an analysis of 
these cases, examples will not be provided here. 
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5. The Swine Flu affair 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In 1976, the government of the United States of American decided to take precautionary 
action and initiate a mass immunization of the entire American population against the Swine 
Flu. The decision was taken because there was a risk for the return of the Swine Flu, but the 
probability and the potential severity was unknown. The mass immunization program failed 
for a number of reasons and the Swine Flu did not return to the U.S. or anywhere else in the 
world. The Swine flu affair could be seen as a case where too much precaution was taken and 
hence it could be considered a false positive [Marchant 2003]. But in order to understand what 
actually happened and to answer the questions put forward in chapter 2 it is vital to know the 
course of events.  
 
 
5.2 Course of events  
 
The main reason of dispute in the Swine Flu affair was not the scientific evidence, but rather 
the question of how to respond properly to what could not be known scientifically. That is 
why it is not as much the scientific background, which is important in order to understand and 
learn from this case, but more an understanding of the events that lead to the decisions being 
made. Therefore, different from the cases of saccharin and food irradiation, the main focus 
will be more on the historical events in this case and not so much on the scientific 
background.  
 
5.2.1 Suspected Outbreak at Fort Dix of the Swine Flu virus 
 
The Swine Flu affair has its beginning in late January 1976, where several soldiers of Fort 
Dix, New Jersey became sick with an upper respiratory infection and one soldier died after 
participating in a forced march.  
The cause of the infection turned out to be the A/Victoria flu virus and a new virus, 
which was closely related to the swine flu influenza virus. The Swine Flu virus had first been 
isolated in the early 1930s and many experts thought that it was responsible for the great 
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spanish influenza pandemic of 1918-19, that circled the world in three successive waves 
killing between 40 and 50 million people during twelve months5 (see figure 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The path of the Spanish Flu of that circled the world 1918-19 [From Nicholson K. G., Webster R. G. 
and Hay A.J. (eds.) Textbook of Influenza, Blackwell Science Ltd. Oxford] 
 
The outbreak at Fort Dix could indicate that a influenza pandemic was in the offing, and a 
number of emergency meetings were held among leading government officials including the 
director of the Center of Disease Control (CDC), Dr. Sencer [U. S. GAO 1977, Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985].  
The participants of the meeting paid special attention to the question of informing the 
public. On the one hand, they were faced with a situation that could be very serious, with 
important implications for the public. On the other hand, nobody wished to incite a panic 
response in the public, especially as the information was still incomplete and many points 
needed reconfirmation [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981]. They decided to wait 
and not to make any announcement before it was confirmed that there really was swine flu at 
Fort Dix. When this confirmation came, Dr. Sencer made a public announcement in which he 
attempted only to provide the facts in order to avoid a picture of “gloom and doom”. The 
comparison to the Spanish flu of 1918 was not made specifically in the announcement, but 
was brought up during the question-and-answer period. The announcement caught the 
attention of some media. Three major television networks made a brief notice about the swine 
                                                 
5
 Most references report that the Spanish flu caused between 15 and 25 million deaths, but recently the death 
toll has gone up considerably (see for instance Potter 1998, Reid et al. 1999, Yewdell and Garcia-Sastre 2002, 
Webster cited in Senior [2001]).  
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flu with a reference to the flu of 1918 [Rosenberg 1976, Seal et al. 1976, Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Reismann and Singh 1978, Silverstein 1981, Reitze 1986, Garrett 1994], and 
the story was also brought in the New York Times by medical reporter Harold Schmeck, who 
at the front page in a most dramatic fashion stated:  
  
 “U.S. calls flu alert on possible return of the 
 epidemic virus” [NY Times February 20, 1977] 
 
And continuing  
 
 “The possibility was raised that the virus that caused 
 the greatest world epidemic of influenza in modern 
 history…the pandemic of 1918-19 may have 
 returned” [NY Times February 20, 1977] 
 
     
5.2.2 The ACIP-Meeting 
 
In order to review the annual vaccine recommendations given in January for the next flu 
season, by the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), a meeting had 
already been prescheduled on March 10 [Boffey 1976, Seal et al. 1976, Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985, Reitze 1986, Dowdle 1997]. Little new 
information was available at this meeting apart from studies of blood samples from other 
recruits at Fort Dix that showed that as many as 500 had probably been infected by the swine 
flu virus since they showed a positive antibody response to this particular strain6 [U.S. GAO 
1977, Dowdle and Millar 1978, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Puretz 1979, Silverstein 1981, 
Reitze 1986].  
The big problem was how to estimate the probability of a pandemic. Nobody at the 
ACIP meeting considered it to be negligible, but to sign a precise number to this probability 
was impossible and would have to be based more on personal judgment than on scientific 
facts [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985]  
ACIP concluded unanimously that the production of vaccine must proceed and that a 
plan for vaccine administration should be developed [U.S. GAO 1977, Dowdle and Millar 
                                                 
6
 Bernstein [1985] raises doubt about the truth of this number. He states that by using loose criteria the CDC 
had extrapolated from 273 suspected cases, based on antibodies - not clinical symptoms - to reach 500. Instead 
he states that 77 out of 625 had probably been infected, fought off the disease and had developed antibodies 
without developing the actual disease. Furthermore he quotes the Goldstein, Chief of Director of the Public 
Health Laboratory in New Jersey for saying that soldiers who had A/Victoria influenza could also show a rise 
in swine flu antibodies so that the rise in the 77 could not prove the presence of swine flu [Bernstein 1985]. 
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1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985]. Only one member, Dr. Russell Alexander, raised the 
question about the possibility of stockpiling the vaccine until a clearer signal emerged before 
its inoculation into people. He felt that one should always be careful about putting foreign 
material into the human body, especially when the number of bodies approached 200 million. 
He also raised the question, at what point do we stop going on with preparations to immunize 
everybody and turn to stockpiling instead - at what point of terms, both of the progress of our 
preparations and the progress of the disease? [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981].  
 
5.2.3 Sencer’s “Action Memorandum” 
 
Based on the ACIP conclusions Sencer prepared a memorandum called “Swine flu - Action”. 
It shortly stated the issue of the case, described the facts about the outbreak at Fort Dix and 
previous influenza pandemics, outlined the assumptions, presented the pros and cons for four 
alternative courses of action and it finally recommended to apply a “Combined Approach” 
[Rosenberg 1976, U.S. HEW 1976a, U.S. GAO 1977, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Reismann 
and Singh 1978, Silverstein 1981, Fottler 1984, Bernstein 1985, Dowdle 1997].  
The “Combined Approach” meant federal purchase of vaccine for all citizens, safety 
and efficacy testing by the Bureau of Biologics (BoB), field trials by the National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and distribution and final immunization of the 
public by a mix of state, local, and private medical services [U.S. HEW 1976a, U.S. GAO 
1977, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981]. The Secretary of U.S. Health, Education 
and Welfare (U.S. HEW), David Mathews approved the memorandum, at a meeting on March 
15, after Mathews had been reassured by Sencer that the ACIP endorsed the program [Fottler 
1984, Bernstein 1985, Reitze 1986]. Meyers (the director of BoB), who was also present at 
the meeting, later recalls telling Mathews that  
 
 “You should recognize that science can only take you so far. It’s a social 
 and political decision” [cited in Bernstein 1985:243].  
 
But Mathews had little doubt and would later recall his reasoning behind the decision  
 
 “As soon as I heard of swine flu and its implication for a pandemic, I 
 realized that the political system would have to respond. There was no 
 way out, as long as all of the scientists supported it. We had to assume a 
 probability greater than zero, and that’s all that we needed to know. You 
 can’t face the electorate later, if the pandemic arrives, and say that the 
 probability was so low that the costs outweighed the benefits. The people 
 would never forgive us” [cited in Neustadt and Fineberg 1978].  
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5.2.4 President Ford and Congress decide to act 
 
President Ford was first notified about the Swine Flu program on March 15 and (among 
others) the President, Mathews, and the director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
agreed to have a full review of the issue in a thirty-minute meeting on March 22. A briefing 
paper was prepared for the President by the OMB, accompanied by a copy of Sencer’s 
memorandum and an attachment entitled “Uncertainties Surrounding a Federal Mass 
Immunization Program”. Among others issues, this attachment raised several questions about 
the real probability of a pandemic occurring, the seriousness of the epidemic, should it come, 
whether such a mass immunization program in 1976 might create precedents for similar 
programs in the future and whether the scientific community fully agreed with the 
recommendation made in Sencer’s “Action memorandum” [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, 
Reismann and Singh 1978, Silverstein 1981]  
No final decision was made at the meeting of March 22, but reading between the lines, it 
was clear according to Silverstein [1981] that the president had decided to act. Later the 
President stated  
 
 “I think you ought to gamble on the side of caution. I would rather be 
 ahead of the curve than behind it” [cited in Neustadt and Fineberg  1978:25]. 
 
So there is no doubt, President Ford was informed about the scientific uncertainty on whether 
the pandemic would come and about the severity of a pandemic, should it occur. 
Before announcing his decision on March 24, the president requested a meeting with the 
nation’s top scientists, on one hand in order to demonstrate that the decision was based on the 
best scientific advice and on the other hand to force scientists to commit themselves to the 
program and to share the blame, should it fail. According to Boffey [1976] and Wecht [1979] 
the scientists were chosen by those proposing the program and could hardly be said to 
represent an independent view. The result was a narrow range of differences at the meeting - 
basically the exclusion of likely dissent, according to Bernstein [1985]. 
According to Cavanaugh, Deputy Director of the Domestic Council [cited in Bernstein 
1985], Sencer told him that there was no dissent among prominent physicians and medical 
scientists and the White House staff had not been able to find any dissenters among the 
experts. Mathews also stated that they had not been able to find anyone who would 
recommend any other course of action than the one the president was taking [cited in Boffey 
1976].  
Many scientists who were present at the meeting noted that the discussions there felt pro 
forma, because the decision had all ready been made; but everybody still voted in favour of 
proceeding with the immunization campaign and no objections were voiced. According to 
Boffey [1976], the journal Science interviewed many of the major participants and according 
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to Science, many of them supported the program because there was little to lose and it was 
better to be safe than sorry. 
Immediately after the meeting, President Ford made the announcement that he would 
ask Congress to appropriate $135 million for the production of vaccine to inoculate every 
man, woman and child in the United States arguing that the cost was only money and that he 
was trading dollars with lives [U.S. GAO 1977, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Bernstein 1985, 
Reitze 1986, Garrett 1994, Dowdle 1997]. 
Congress approved of the funds without much debate and President Ford signed the final 
bill on April 15 [Rosenberg 1976, Silverstein 1981, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Reitze 
1986]. According to Bernstein [1985], the hearings in Congress were also carefully staged, 
and dissent was easily excluded, which could insinuate some kind of plot. Although according 
to Silverstein [1981] there was little question that Congress would respond positively to the 
president’s request in face of unknown and even unknowable dangers. Only a few voices 
questioned the program during the swine flu hearings at the House of Representatives; for 
instance consumer advocate Ralph Nader’s Health Research Group claimed that everyone was 
being overly alarmist, and hinted at some sort of federal-scientific plot to waste the taxpayers’ 
money. Also Liberal Democratic Congressmen Henry Waxman of California and Andrew 
Maguire of New Jersey spoke their voices critically, implying that a potential “ripoff” might 
be in the making, giving huge profits to the vaccine manufacturers [Silverstein 1981, Garrett 
1994].   
 
5.2.5 The Swine Flu Mass Immunization Program  
 
The Swine Flu Mass Immunization Program came off to a good start, but then the program 
ran into one problem and setback after the other. One of the more serious problems concerned 
the field trials of the efficacy of the vaccine. It turned out that the vaccine was not as 
protective, especially to young recipients and children, as had been expected. Therefore it was 
decided to expand the field trials to try out a two-dose regimen on young children, and any 
recommendation concerning immunization of children would have to wait another two 
months. It would have been easy to have trials of two-dose regimen included in the original 
trials, but no one at the NIAID had taken that into consideration, even though outside 
scientists had actually recommended them to do so. Authorities originally had planned with 
one dose per recipient and the need to employ two doses per child would have meant the need 
of additional tens of millions of doses and a further delay in an allready tight schedule [U.S. 
GAO 1977, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Wecht 1979, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985]. 
 The most time consuming problem concerned liability insurance coverage of the vaccine 
manufactures. The insurance industry refused to provide insurance, explaining that never 
before had such a program been mounted in such a short time and that the risk was 
incalculable. The potential costs of liability were enormous and worse - uncertain. The 
problem threatened to end the program even before it could begin. President Ford got 
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involved and a new bill was passed stipulating that all claims arising from the Swine Flu 
program should be made against the federal government [U.S. GAO 1977, Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981]. But despite of these problems the mass immunization 
finally got underway on October 1 and by the end of the first ten days over one million 
Americans had received their vaccination [Silverstein 1981].   
 
5.2.6 The decision to halt the Swine Flu Program  
 
The problem that finally terminated the Swine Flu program was an outbreak of a rare 
neurological disease, Guiallain-Barré Syndrome (GBS). During late November 1976, four 
cases of GBS were reported from Minnesota, one of these was fatal as to the CDC’s 
surveillance center. Another three cases were reported from Alabama and one case from New 
Jersey. A quick survey done by the CDC turned up even more cases, but it was unclear if they 
were in any way related to the swine flu vaccine or could be explained statistically. Between 
four and five thousands people in the U.S. are afflicted by the GBS each year. It causes a 
paralytic nerve disease [U.S. GAO 1977, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, 
Bernstein 1985].  
According to Silverstein [1981], about 5 % of all people who contract GBS die, mostly 
from respiratory problems and a resulting pneumonia and some 10 % are left with a greater or 
lesser degree of residual paralysis. No registration of the number of GBS was recorded before 
1976, so it was hard to know what was normal. This made it impossible for the CDC to say 
with certainty whether the relationship of the disease to swine flu immunization was 
statistically significant [Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985]. 
According to Reitze [1986], the incidence rate of GBS had been one or two cases per 
400 million vaccinations and therefore statistically insignificant. The CDC decided to alert 
doctors to be on the look out for GBS in both immunized and non-immunized groups and by 
mid-December the CDC had received reports of 107 cases, involving six deaths. The cases 
indicated that the incidence of the disease was higher in the part of the population that had 
received the swine flu vaccine (one in a 100,000 to 200,000) compared to those who had not 
(one case in more than a million) [Silverstein 1981].  
Sencer was informed about the findings and he informed Cooper and Mathews, who 
again informed the president [Silverstein 1981, Puretz 1979, Bernstein 1985). After about 40 
million people had received the Swine Fly vaccine the president decided to suspend the Swine 
Flu program and December 16, Cooper announced a moratorium on it  
 
 “…in the interest of safety of the public, in the interest of credibility, and in the 
 interest of the practice of good medicine” [cited in Silverstein 1981:119].  
 
An option was left open to resume immunization if further analysis should show that were 
was no direct link between the swine flu vaccine and GBS, or especially if pandemic of swine 
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flu should in fact appear in the U.S. It did not appear in the U.S., nor did it appear anywhere 
else in the world during the winter of 1976-77 [Silverstein 1981, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, 
Reitze 1986]. 
Cooper and Sencer were replaced as President Ford lost to Carter, and the media’s 
verdict over the Swine Flu Program was harsh [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, 
Bernstein 1985]. For instance editorial writer in the New York Times, Harry Schwartz labelled 
the program a “fiasco” and stated that the decision-makers had acted in self-interest in order 
to impress the nation [NY Times December 21, 1976]. See table 5.1 for an overview of the 
course of events in the Swine Flu affair. 
 
 
 
Outbreak of the Swine Flu virus at Fort Dix 
The Spanish Flu kills between 40 and 50 million people worldwide 
The virus that caused the Spanish Flu is identified as the Swine Flu 
The risk is believed to be real at the second emergency meeting at CDC 
President Ford and Congress decide to act 
The issue of insurance liability causes a major setback to the program  
The Swine Flu Program gets underway 
First cases of GBS are reported  
The Swine Flu program is suspected 
1918-19 
Jan. 1976 
Feb. 1976 
Mar. 1976 
May 1976 
Aug. 1976 
Nov. 1976 
1933 
The insurance liability problem is finally solved 
Dec. 1976 
Apr. 1976 
Table 5.1: An overview of the course of events in the Swine Flu affair 
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5.3 Scientific background  
 
The outbreak was seen as an early warning of a possible pandemic because of several reasons. 
For reasons not well understood at the time, new strains of flu were known to appear in the 
end of one flu season and thereafter disappear, before spreading as a pandemic the next flu 
season with more virulence. So even though no outbreaks had been reported outside Fort Dix, 
the swine flu might be smoldering somewhere in subclinical form, gathering strength and 
virulence, ready to break out any time.  
Since the last major pandemics had been in 1946, 1957 and 1968, a hypothesis that 
major pandemics may recycle at intervals of eleven years had been proposed, meaning that 
the time for another major pandemic was approaching [Silverstein 1981].  
Another theory at the time was that the major influenza strains recycled at intervals of 
sixty or seventy years leading to pandemic spread. This time period matches the time it would 
take the protective antibodies to disappear in the majority of the population, making the 
population as a whole more susceptible. The 1889 pandemic strain reappeared in 1957, and 
the 1900 strain reappeared in 1968, so it seemed reasonable that it might be the swine flu 
strain’s turn in the recurring cycle, since it had been almost sixty years since the great 
pandemic of 1918-1919.  
There was also some evidence that new strains sometimes appear as old ones disappear. 
At that time the A/ Hong Kong Flu was on its ebb insinuating that a new strain could be 
expected [Boffey 1976, Colin 1976, U.S. HEW 1976b, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Kaas 
1979, Wecht 1979, Silverstein 1981].  
And finally, never in the modern history of influenza had a markedly new strain of a 
virus appeared that was not accompanied by pandemic spread [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, 
Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985].  
The main area of scientific uncertainty concerned the probability of a pandemic and the 
potential severity. Assigning a precise number to this probability was considered impossible 
and would have had to be based more on personal judgment than upon scientific facts 
[Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985].  
Likewise there was no way of estimating the severity of a pandemic, should it appear and 
there still isn’t [Cox et al. 2003]. The pandemic of 1918 caused an estimated 40-50 million 
deaths worldwide and the only areas not affected by the Spanish flu were the islands of Saint 
Helena and Mauritius [Kellogg 1976]. The flu killed half a million people in the U.S in 1918, 
about 1 % of those infected, while the death rate of the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 were 
appreciable lower. At Fort Dix one out of twelve cases had died, but these numbers were too 
small to be dependable. Only a few members of the ACIP believed that the pandemic would 
be as fatal as in 1918, but no one was willing to say that this new pandemic would be a mild 
one [U.S. HEW 1976b, Colin 1976, Consumer reports 1976, Rosenberg 1976, Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Wecht 1979, Puretz 1979, Silverstein 1981].  
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Some studies indicated that the virus was not as virulent as had been feared. In England 
six volunteers were injected with swine flu virus and they developed only minor symptoms. 
Of the six, only four became ill and their symptoms were mild. The other two volunteers 
never got sick, even though they were always in close proximity to the four ill volunteers 
[Beare and Craig 1976]. The authors of the study concluded that the virus was not especially 
contagious, a pandemic very unlikely, and mass immunization unnecessary [Beare and Craig 
1976]. These results were supported by a study in the U.S. on monkeys, which suggested that 
the virus would cause only a “mild disease”. [Silverstein 1981, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, 
Edsall 1979].  
Now it is generally assumed that speculations as to the date of a next pandemic are in 
vain and that no pattern of returning cycles of pandemic exists [Nguyen Van-Tam 1998, 
Potter 1998]. Furthermore the evidence that new strains sometimes appear as old ones 
disappear is now considered to be speculative, since the disappearance of the old strain is 
apparent rather then real [Nguyen Van-Tam 1998]. But it does not seem as if that was 
questioned in 1977 even though the assumption that the Swine Flu caused the pandemic of 
1918-19 was already questioned at the time.  
The assumption was that the virus identified in 1976 from Fort Dix was actually the 
virus, which caused the pandemic of 1918-19. Before the Swine Flu affair took its beginning, 
the theory that the pandemic of 1918 was caused by swine flu had come under attack [Brown 
et al. 1969, Rosenberg 1976]. Wecht [1979] argues that it is not certain that the Fort Dix virus 
caused the pandemic of 1918-19, because the virus was first identified in 1933, and Bernstein 
[1985] argues that the evidence was based on shrewed inferences and circumstantial evidence. 
The reason is that the virus of the 1918-19 influenza pandemic had never been isolated 
directly from humans, but many scientists believed that since both pigs and people were ill in 
1918, the virus had been passed on to pigs since 1918 until it was finally isolated by Shope in 
1931. This theory was supported by experiments showing that blood of many people living in 
1918 contained antibodies to the swine flu isolated in 1931 [Rosenberg 1976, Weinstein 1976, 
Wecht 1979, Bernstein 1985], but these experiments have also been questioned by Herrman 
[1980]. The matter was resolved by Reid et al. [1999, 2000], who identified the swine flu 
virus as the cause of the 1918-19 pandemic, using tissues recovered from victims interred in 
Alaskan permafrost [Kolata 2000, Yewdell and Garcia-Sastre 2001].  
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5.4 Analysis of the Swine Flu affair 
 
In the following the questions put forward in chapter 2 will be answered in regard to the case 
of the Swine Flu affair. 
 
5.4.1 When and why was it believed that the false positive risk was real? 
 
It is not easy to say exactly since when the possibility of the Swine Flu returning in fall 1976 
was regarded as a risk, but something seems to have happened between the first and second 
emergency meeting at the CDC. At the first meeting it was decided only to take limited action 
to prepare large amounts of antibody to the swine flu virus in order to assist in a large-scale 
diagnostic procedure. At the second meeting, it was not so much the possibility of an outbreak 
that was discussed, but rather the logistics of influenza vaccine production and distribution. 
After the public announcement by Sencer the mood changed from “What if … ” to “Well, here 
it is!” according to Silverstein [1981] - even though little new information was available.  
There is no doubt that the members of the ACIP believed that the risk was real. Most 
scientists seem to have believed it. Silverstein [1981] states that sentiment in the health and 
scientific community was almost unanimously in favour of proceeding full speed ahead, when 
the President had announced the program. The main decision-makers Sencer, Cooper, and 
Mathews believed in it and also President Ford and the Congress believed that the risk was 
real. Finally the media also believed it. An U.S. HEW press analysis on April 30 showed that 
out of 111 newspapers from 60 cities, 88 % showed a favourable editorial response to the 
National Immunization Program [Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985].  
There were a number of factors leading to this belief. First, it had just been affirmed that 
the flu virus from Fort Dix was not a laboratory contaminant, but indeed related to the Swine 
Flu, which had caused the pandemic of 1918-19. Second, a return of the Swine Flu in autumn 
1976 fit perfectly into what was known about the flu at that time. It was known that new 
strains had a tendency to appear at the end of a flu season to return the following season with 
much more strength and virulence, spreading like wildfire. A return of the Swine Flu in 1976 
would also correspond well with the theory of an eleven-year cycle of major pandemics, the 
theory that major influenza strains recycle at intervals of sixty or seventy years leading to 
pandemic spread and it matched the theory that new strains sometimes appear as old ones 
disappear. Finally, the Swine Flu was a new strain and never in the modern history of 
influenza had a markedly new strain of the virus appeared which was not accompanied be 
pandemic spread.  
None of the scientists and health officials said that the Swine Flu would return, but 
everybody seems to have been convinced that the possibility was real. Putting a precise 
number on the probability and the potential severity would have to be based on personal 
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judgment rather than upon scientific facts, which are two of the characteristics of situations 
where the Precautionary Principle applies.  
There were some critical voices and these can be divided into two groups. One group, 
including for instance Harold Schmeck from the New York Times, Dr. J. Anthony Morris 
from BoB and Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Ralph Nader’s Health Research Group, argued that the 
swine flu would probably not return, that the vaccine was dangerous and that the program was 
a big waste of money.  
The other group of critics, including for instance Dr. Martin Goldstein of the New Jersey 
Health Department, Alexander and Sabin, were in favour the program, but pleaded for 
stockpiling the vaccine and waiting with immunizing people until the Swine Flu had actually 
returned instead of immunizing people right away [Boffey 1976, Consumer reports 1976, 
Wecht 1979, Silverstein 1981, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Bernstein 1985].    
 
5.4.2 When and what were the main actions (or inactions) taken by regulatory 
authorities or others to reduce the risk? 
 
The main action taken to reduce the risk was the decision to initiate a government-sponsored 
program to produce the vaccine against the swine flu virus and to immunize the entire 
American population.   
A lot of smaller regulatory actions were also taken. At the first CDC meeting it was 
decided to prepare large amounts of 1) antibody to the swine flu virus to assist in large-scale 
diagnostic procedures, and 2) swine flu seed virus for possible distribution to influenza 
laboratories and to vaccine manufacturers around the country. Furthermore the CDC prepared 
the special strains of swine flu virus that would be needed for high-yield egg culture for a 
massive vaccination program [Silverstein 1981].      
 
5.4.3 Were alternative courses of action considered and why was one preferred to 
another? 
 
Several alternative courses of action were presented in Dr. Sencer’s action memorandum and 
the pros and cons of each option were elaborated. The first option would have been to take no 
action at all. In favour of this option were among others the facts that the pandemic might not 
occur, and the department would have avoided unnecessary health expenditures. Cons would 
have been that Congress, the media and the American people expected some action and that 
the administration could tolerate some unnecessary health expenditures better than 
unnecessary death and illness [U.S. HEW 1976a, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 
1981].  
Sencer called the second options for “Minimum response”, meaning limited federal role, 
with the government restricted to advising manufactures, stimulating local health 
organizations, and helping to educate the public. Speaking for this option would have been 
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that it would have required minimum federal intervention with high visibility. The burden on 
the federal budget would have been minimal and success would have depended upon 
widespread voluntary action. Against this option would have been that there would have been 
little assurance that vaccine manufactures would undertake the massive production effort and 
there would not have any control over the distribution of vaccines. Poor and elderly would as 
usual have been left out and probably only about half of the population would have become 
immunized [U.S. HEW 1976a, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981].  
Total government involvement and responsibility for a national immunization program 
was the third option illustrated by Sencer [U.S. HEW 1976a]. Government would have taken 
over the purchase and distribution of vaccines to state health departments, and vaccines would 
only have been available through highly publicized governmental programs. On the one hand 
this option would have been the best way to assure widespread availability of vaccine and 
equitable distribution throughout the nation, with access to immunization services not 
dependent upon economic status. On the other hand the cost would have been greater, some 
$190 million, and a totally public government-run program would have been contrary to the 
spirit and customs of health-care delivery in the U.S. [U.S. HEW 1976a, Silverstein 1981, 
Neustadt and Fineberg 1978].  
When considering the fact that flu spread like a wildfire one would expect some 
international response to the threat of another 1918 pandemic. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) was informed after the first meeting in the CDC [Silverstein 1981], but according to 
Colin [1976] they expressed surprise when President Ford announced the mass immunization 
program. In response to being notified about the outbreak at Fort Dix the WHO met on April 
7-8 and considered the implications of the finding. The meeting resulted in three 
recommendations: 1) All countries should increase surveillance in order to detect a possible 
spread, 2) the swine flu be added to the current inactivated vaccines for the protection of those 
at special risk and 3) all countries that had the possibility should stockpile a A/New Jersey/76 
vaccine [U.S. GAO 1977, Silverstein 1981, Garrett 1994]. 
The alternative to produce the vaccine and stockpile it until there had been another 
outbreak of the Swine Flu was not mentioned by Sencer in his memorandum. This option, 
which the WHO would have preferred, was discussed by Sencer and key members of his staff 
the day before the ACIP meeting, March 10 [Boffey 1976, Silverstein 1981]. The opinion was 
that even if all of the vaccine required could be produced by the beginning of the next flu 
season (September-October), it would probably take eight to ten weeks or longer to distribute 
and administer the vaccine. In addition, it would take at least two weeks for the recipients to 
develop protective immunity once the vaccine had been delivered. This meant that the 
program would likely have required more than three months before becoming effective, once 
the signal to immunize the population had been received. Past experience pointed upon that 
the time from introduction of the virus to widespread epidemic occurrence was approximately 
11-12 weeks. For instance the spread of the Asia influenza over the entire world in 1957 took 
only three months [U.S. HEW 1976b, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985, Reitze 1986]. 
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Therefore stockpiling was not considered to be a viable option, because they feared that there 
might not be enough time to organize, distribute and vaccinate people after the first cases of 
swine flu had appeared. Too many people could get sick and perhaps die while the vaccine 
was finding its way through the delivery pipeline [U.S. GAO 1977, Silverstein 1981, 
Bernstein 1985].  
The option of stockpiling was mentioned by Dr. Alexander at the ACIP meeting, but 
was not discussed directly any further. Indirectly, it was actually discussed by Dr. Sencer, and 
others during one of the breaks at the meeting, away from the others and the point was made 
that  
 
 “Suppose there is a pandemic accompanied by deaths. Then it comes out that 
 they had the opportunity to save life; they made the vaccine, and then they put it 
 into the refrigerator! That translates into “they did nothing” and worse, they 
 didn’t even recommend an immunization campaign to the Secretary [of HEW]” 
 [cited in Silverstein 1981:32].  
 
The reason why the option of stockpiling was not closely examined and never really 
considered to be a possibility at the ACIP meeting was according to Neustadt and Fineberg 
[1978] that Sencer chaired the meeting and therefore Dr. Alexander’s recommendation was 
not heard. According to Bernstein [1985], Sencer had been too eager to act. Had he instead 
possessed less confidence in interventionist-preventive medicine and more fear of ill effect, he 
might have re-examined his conclusion or invited open criticism of it.  
Neustadt and Fineberg [1978] make it sound as if the decision of manufacturing the 
vaccine and the decision to distribute it should have been divided into two separate decisions, 
but that it was made into one decision by Sencer. Separating the decisions, had been 
suggested by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller some time before making the public 
announcement of the program on March 24, but President Ford had no interest in pursuing 
this line - the reason is unclear [Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985].  
In June OMB health examiners urged a reversal of policy and a retreat to stockpiling. By 
referring to the editorial in New York Times and the decisions taken by other nations, they 
stated there was no available evidence to demonstrate that the 1976 version of the swine flu 
was any more virulent that any other current strain of flu. This recommendation came to the 
White House, but was rejected. This shows that President Ford was aware of the discussion 
between immunizing and stockpiling. It is not clear, why President Ford rejected the 
recommendation. There is the possibility that he truly believed it was the right decision, but 
the reason might also be that he was in the middle an election campaign. According to Wecht 
[1979] and Bernstein [1985] President Ford could not easily reverse himself and halt the 
program without injuring his political image and his primary campaign.  
The “Combined Approach” was preferred over the other alternatives for several 
reasons.  
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• Lessons from the past with widespread flu pandemics in 1957 and 1968 in the 
U.S. spoke in favour of a producing and distributing the vaccine as fast as 
possible (see box 5.1);   
• These lessons also spoke against relying on the marketplace and private 
enterprise alone to determine production and distribution;  
• A combined approach involving both public and private sectors was considered 
to be the only way to successfully immunize the whole U.S. population in three 
months;  
• It would provide a practical, contemporary example of government, industry, and 
private citizens cooperating to serve a common cause; 
• The availability of vaccine to all citizens would be independent of socio-
economic factors; 
• Most scientists thought that the vaccine had no risks, which makes the decision 
about whether or not to stockpile less important;  
• The cost of the “combined approach” would have been approximately $135 
million, which would be a small amount compared with the human and the 
economic costs of the past pandemics[U.S. HEW 1976a, Neustadt and Fineberg 
1978, Wade 1978, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 1985, Dowdle 1997]. 
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Sencer’s “Action Memorandum” shows that alternatives were considered, but the question is 
whether they actually where considered with an open mind. Neustadt and Fineberg [1979] 
state that three of the options were framed so that they automatically would be rejected by the 
reader, with the fourth the one desired by the writer. In the memorandum, Sencer calls the 
situation a situation of “go or no-go” and he further states that “A decision must be made 
now” [U.S. HEW 1976a, Silverstein 1981], without mentioning that the decision could have 
been divided into two separate decisions of production of vaccine and going through with the 
vaccination. It is often said that Sencer held a gun to President Ford’s head in the way he 
wrote the memorandum, leaving him no other choice than to go along with the program 
[Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Wade 1978, Silverstein 1981].  
Alternatives not mentioned or considered could have been using social alternatives in a 
broader perspective. Bartels [1985] criticizes the mass immunization program for being a 
technological fix. Instead of using social alternatives such a keeping people warm, making 
sure that they were well-nourished and economically secure enough to stay at home when 
Box 5.1 
The pandemics of 1957 and 1968 
 
In 1957, the U.S. first undertook a nationwide program to contain an impending pandemic. The 
American Medical Association and others had wanted the government to let the marketplace determine 
the production and distribution of vaccine. Therefore pharmaceutical manufacturers were urged to 
produce as much vaccine as possible. Health, hospitals and medical authorities were urged to mobilize 
and plan for an impending emergency and a national surveillance of flu was established. Vaccine 
production reached 10 million doses by the first of October and about forty-nine million doses were 
produced, but only about a quarter were used before the massive outbreaks of October and only half of 
them were ultimately used. Still the program failed, not just because the pandemic came much earlier than 
expected (June, July and August instead of October), but also largely because of problems in the 
administration. It seemed to be a case of “too little too late”. Had the decision to embark on a major 
program of vaccine manufacture been made in May and not in early July or had the epidemic been 
delayed a few weeks probably 50 million or more doses could have been produced and administered in 
time [Langmuir and Schoenbaum 1976:54-55, Seal et al. 1976:715, Dowdle and Millar 1978:1048, 
Langmuir 1979, Bernstein 1985:237]  
In 1968 a pandemic had come too soon for any preventive actions to be taken, because it was not 
realized at first that a new strain had appeared and there was also a shortage of embryonated eggs, which 
are essential for vaccine production. Furthermore only 10 million of the 20 million doses produced were 
actually distributed [Langmuir and Schoenbaum 1976:56, Bernstein 1985:237].  
The 1957 pandemic caused about 45 million cases of influenza and cost about 70,000 lives. In 
addition the total economic costs in terms of death and disease, of health care cost, and of productive time 
were $7 billion. The pandemic in 1968 was estimated to have caused 50 million incidents of influenza and 
cost some 33,000 lives and $3.9 billion in medical expenses and lost work [Boffey 1976:638, Colin 
1976:382, HEW 1976b:343, Hinman et al. 1976:556, Consumer reports 1976:495, Seal et al. 1976:715, 
USGAO 1977:3, Dowdle and Millar 1978:1048, Silverstein 1981:17, Bernstein 1985:237].  
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sick. She argues that money spent on these alternatives would not have been wasted in 
absence of an epidemic, because they would have raised the general health of the population 
[Bartels 1985:72]. Bernstein [1985] mentions somewhat the same, when he states that 
evidence indicates a significant relationship between poverty - with defective nutrition, great 
stress, crowded living conditions, and often inadequate heating - and great illness (and 
presumable death) from influenza and other respiratory diseases [Bernstein 1985].  
 
5.4.4 When and why was it realised that the risk was not real or was smaller than 
believed? 
 
Although there were several critical voices arguing that the risk was never real, this was not 
realized definitely before after the flu season of 1976-77 [Boffey 1976]. The Swine Flu 
program was put to a halt in December 1976, not because the risk was thought not to be real at 
the time being. The reason was that the unknown risk of a return of the swine flu was 
outweighed by the known risk of side-effects plus GBS. When it was realized that the vaccine 
probably caused GBS the scale tipped because the possible benefits did not outweigh the now 
known risks.   
 
5.4.5 What were the resulting monetary costs and benefits from the actions or inactions, 
including their distribution between groups, and across time? 
 
It is always difficult to assess the direct and indirect costs of any action taken. This is also true 
for the Swine Flu affair. Besides the costs in life and personal injuries due to the vaccine side 
effects, U.S. HEW spent over $100 million directly on the program. State and local agencies 
are estimated to have spent $ 24 million of their own funds [U.S. GAO 1977, Silverstein 
1981]. CDC purchased 156 million doses of swine flu vaccine and had 90 million unused 
doses in storage when the program was terminated, but the cost of this is included in U.S. 
HEW’s $100 million [Silverstein 1981]. 
A large number of law suits followed the Swine Flu affair and these suits allege not only 
that the vaccine had caused GBS, but also that it was responsible for various other illnesses, 
including rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, polymyositis, transverse myelitis, and 
encephalitis [Kurland et al. 1984, Reitze 1986]. According to Reitze [1986], Christoffel and 
Teret [1991] and Garrett [1994], more than 4100 claims were ultimately filed. Of these some 
2800 were denied, some 1600 led to lawsuits and two thirds resulted in dispositions 
favourable to the government. The government settled 372 cases for $35,208,225 and in 52 
cases, where liability was stipulated, totalled $16,999,856 [Reitze 1986]. With some 167 cases 
still pending in 1985, the total amount paid by the government was $83,233,714 plus the costs 
of administering the claims and law suits and the judicial costs of handling the law suits 
[Reitze 1986]. Probably the same as the entire budget for the Swine Flu Program alone.  
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Contrary to what Liberal Democratic Congressmen Henry Waxman of California and 
Andrew Maguire of New Jersey expected, the vaccine manufacturers did not make much 
profit on manufacturing the vaccine [Puretz 1979, Silverstein1981]. This was partly due to the 
initial law concerning the Swine Flu program [Puretz 1979]. It states that any procurement by 
the United States of Swine Flu vaccine from a manufacturer of such vaccine shall be subject 
to renegotiation to eliminate any profit realized from such procurement [Public Law 94-380 
cited in Silverstein 1981, Garrett 1994]. This condition could be interpreted as Congress 
saying that they do not want manufacturers making a profit on the vaccine, when Government 
assumed liability [Zimmerly 1976]. Providing insurance for the manufactures in suit initiated 
by the Government did give the insurance companies about $ 8.65 million profit [U.S. GAO 
1977].  
Rosenberg [1976] had argued that vaccination of the entire U.S. population represented 
a huge expenditure of public health resources, which at best could prevent non-fatal illness in 
some. Silverstein [1981] finds that $135 million seemed like only a modest sum to gamble on 
the politically sensitive issue of the health of the American people with a national budget 
measured in hundreds of billions of dollars [Silverstein 1981]. Silverstein [1981] sees 
preventive medicine programs to become a kind of an insurance policy where you pay a 
premium each year. He further argues that it does not make sense to indict a program 
designed to prevent an illness in the general population because of some individual illness or 
to question a program because of the failure of the disease to appear at all.  
Whether or not $135 million dollars is a lot of money compared to the potential costs of a 
swine flu pandemic7 or compared to the total U.S. national budget is one thing. But when the 
swine flu did not return at all, it is hard to argue against voices saying that the money could 
have been used better elsewhere. There is no doubt that the decision-makers were aware of 
this when the program was discussed. For instance in the senate, Senator Magnuson stated  
 
 “If we are wrong [about the swine flu being a real threat] then we might have 
 wasted some scarce federal dollars that could have been used in other areas. If 
 we are right, then the funds will save lifes, prevent a great deal of human 
 suffering, and save billions of dollars in medical costs” [cited in Silverstein 
 1981:73].  
 
Rosenberg [1976], who was highly critical of the program, had argued that the program would 
divert scarce public health resources from already under funded preventive and public health 
programs like family planning, material and child care, tuberculosis, and venereal disease 
surveillance [Rosenberg 1976]. This actually happened, because the Federal Government had 
given insufficient money to the States to administer the program. Therefore the States had to 
divert resources from other immunization programs. The immunization rates dropped on other 
                                                 
7
 It was estimated that the total cost would be $ 6 billion and $3 billion for those in the high risk group should 
the pandemic occur and no prevention has made [Fottler 1984] 
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serious and preventable pathogens primarily affecting children. Congress was made aware of 
this by the U.S. HEW and Congress responded to it by giving $23 million and $35 million to 
that same purpose in the fiscal year of 1978 and 1979 [Fielding 1978]. No adverse effects of 
these diversions were measured according to the U.S. GAO [1977]. 
 
5.4.6 Were there indirect benefits or negative unintended consequences from the false 
positives? 
 
One of the unintended consequences was the cases of GBS. By March of 1977, 843 cases of 
GBS had been reported and analysed. 51 % had occurred in persons immunized with the 
swine flu vaccine and 49 % had occurred in persons who had not been immunized. 
Comparing these numbers with the number of people involved the incidence of GBS, proved 
to be 8.3 cases per million per month in people immunized compared to 0.7 cases in people 
not immunized. This is a relative risk of GBS 12 times greater than the normally expected 
rate. The relative risk was revised to about 10 [Langmuir 1979] and later again to around 7.1 
[Safranek et al. 1991]. 
There were 34 cases of death associated with GBS, 17 among the people immunized and 
17 among those not immunized. Again comparing these numbers with the number of people 
involved, show an increased risk of death by GBS among the immunized part of the 
population [Silverstein 1981]. Compared with the background incidence rate of GBS among 
the unvaccinated, there is a strong peak for a few weeks after the vaccination. In other words, 
there is a clear association between vaccination and GBS, provided the onset of GBS is within 
the first five-six weeks of vaccination [Schonberger et al. 1979, Greenstreet 1984, Langmuir 
1979, Langmuir et al. 1984, Freeman 1999]. From the sixth to the tenth week of vaccination, 
the association seems unlikely and after the tenth week, the association between the vaccine 
and GBS was negative [Greenstreet 1984].   
In a Court ordered investigation of all the reported cases of GBS, Langmuir et al. [1984] 
found that the data suggested a causal relationship between the disease and the vaccine, but 
whether or not the association is in fact causal is disputed. No excess risk for GBS was 
observed in the children under the age of 18, in American military personnel, or with previous 
vaccines much like the swine flu vaccine [Wiselka 1998, Freeman 1999]. 
Neither, statisticians, epidemiologists nor health officials could explain why the swine flu 
vaccine had caused these cases of GBS. Foreseeing GBS was virtually impossible, since the 
medical literature on its association with vaccines was limited. One study had reviewed 1,100 
cases of GBS and found 32 cases occurring in the course following vaccination in general and 
only one case following influenza vaccine in specific. These numbers have to be compared 
with 638 cases of GBS following infection diseases of all kinds [Leneman 1966].  
GBS was clearly not associated with a contaminant introduced in the manufacturing of the 
vaccine. Each of the four manufacturers had employed different procedures and had produced 
a large number of different batches of vaccine, and the cases of GBS were not restricted to 
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any one manufacturer or any specific lots of vaccine8 [Kaas 1979, Silverstein 1981, Bernstein 
1985, Reitze 1986, Asbury 1990].  
Another unintended consequence could have been that the image and credibility of the 
CDC, U.S. HEW and preventive medicine was damaged. Sencer and the staff at the CDC 
were aware of the serious consequences a large-scale campaign could have for the CDC and 
that its image was threatened. On the one hand, if the pandemic would appear and, as was 
quite likely, the program would be behind schedule, millions of people might be screaming 
for vaccine and might blame the CDC for the foul-up. On the other hand, if the pandemic did 
not appear, they would be accused by the public of wasting government money, and it might 
also cost them the loss of the hard earned goodwill, and respect they had built up among the 
colleagues in state and local departments. This is interesting because this is exactly what 
happened. The pandemic did not appear, and CDC and especially Sencer were accused of 
several different things and for having all kinds of other motives for their actions than to 
protect the public health of the American people [Silverstein 1978, Wecht 1979, Bernstein 
1985, Reitze 1986].  
Furthermore Sencer and the staff at the CDC was aware that involvement in a program 
of such a scale would draw resources from other diseases disrupting not only CDC programs 
but also ongoing programs with state health offices [Silverstein 1981, Neustadt and Fineberg 
1978]. 
In the aftermath of the Swine Flu affair, Miike [1978] reports other consequences, i.e. 
that tests of a Russian flu vaccine were running into difficulties because people were 
unwilling to participate in field trial tests and in May, 1977, the National Immunization 
Conference reported that there was a rapid increasing need for mass polio, measles, and other 
inoculations both worldwide and in the U.S.A. which could not be met. People were not being 
vaccinated, because the Swine Flu affair had soured physicians as well as patients and made 
them suspicious towards all government-sponsored vaccination programs [MWN 1977a]. 
Actually several references [Fielding 1978, Fottler 1984] mention this concern, but do no 
more than speculate. A study by Northcott [1978] of the public opinion towards government 
sponsored immunizations programs does not support that speculation. It appears that even 
though there was an increased negative response to the Swine Flu program specific (almost 
double the initial opposition towards the program), public opinion favoured the general idea 
of immunization programs in the face of a potential epidemics (67.2 %) and supports the idea 
of government sponsorship of these programs (85.3 %) [Northcott 1978]. Dowdle and Millar 
[1978] also quote a recent poll conducted one year after the Swine Flu program was put to a 
                                                 
8
 Since 1976 there has been no clear association between GBS and influenza virus vaccines. During the 
1979-80 and 1980-81 flu seasons the relative risk was 0.6 and 1.4 respectively and a group of researcher have 
furthermore found that the relative risk was 1.7 for the 1992-93 and 1993-94 flu seasons, meaning that the risk 
of developing GBS after an influenza vaccination is one to two cases per million persons vaccinated [Nichol 
1998, Lasky et al. 1998, Seneviratne 2000].   
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halt. It showed that the public attitude regarding vaccination in the case of a pandemic was 
virtually unchanged. 58 % of those responding indicated they would take such a vaccine if it 
were offered compared to 53 % before the Swine Flu program started [Garrett 1994]. 
On the positive note, much was learned about preparation, standardization and 
administration of vaccine. Much was also learned about adverse reactions, whole and split 
vaccines and the adjustment of dosage according to age, and besides that, some of the more 
puzzling findings from previous vaccine studies were clarified [Dowdle 1997]. After the 
events of 1976, research was stimulated on the causes and possible therapy to the fairly rare 
disease GBS, in medical institutions throughout the country [Silverstein 1981].  
The establishment of a nationwide surveillance system more sophisticated and better than 
anything before could also be seen as a positive result from the Swine Flu affair [Neustadt and 
Fineberg 1978, Reitze 1986].  
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6. Food irradiation 
6.1 Introduction  
 
After not having given any additional approvals for the use of food irradiation for twenty 
years, the U.S. FDA in the 1980s authorised irradiation for several different kinds of food. 
U.S. FDA’s approval of food irradiation came after - and despite of - several years of 
consumer reluctance towards irradiated food in the U.S. [Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara 1996, 
Adams P 2000, Food Irradiation Campaign 2002]. Consumer resistance is seen by many as 
the main reason why food irradiation is not widely applied [Thorne 1991], and the failure and 
reluctance to approve and accept food irradiation by both regulatory agencies and consumers 
could be said to be a false positive if food irradiation is in fact safe for consumer health.  
 
 
6.2 Course of events 
Food irradiation is not a new technology. It was first applied on strawberries in Sweden in 
1916 and the first patents were taken on this technology in 1921 in the U.S. Three kinds of 
radiation are typically used to sterilize food: gamma rays, X-rays and electron beams and 
there are three main purposes of using massive doses of ionizing radiation. First in order to 
kill insect pests in grain, fruit, and spices just like a pesticide; second to delay the ripening of 
fruit and vegetables just like a preservative; and third to reduce bacterial contamination on 
meat, chicken, seafood, and spices just like a disinfectant [Grünewald 1973, Codex 
Alimentarius 1983, SOU 1983, MAFF 1986, Bloomfield and Webb 1990, Thayer 1990, 
Hackwood 1991, Urbain 1993, WHO 1981, 1999, ADA 2000, Berger 2000, SCF 2003]. 
Gamma irradiation uses radioactive elements whereas X-rays and electronic beams use 
ordinary electricity, but the idea behind all three is the same [Environmental Nutrition 2000, 
Pothisiri et al. 1991, WHO 1993] (see figure 6.1). 
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           Figure 6.1. The energy spectrum of both non-ionizing and ionizing radiation. Source: 
              http://organicconsumers.org/irradlink.html and Webb and Lang [1990] 
 
 
Serious progress in the development of food irradiation technology first began in the 1950s 
when President Eisenhower announced his “Atoms for Peace” programme and extensive 
research and funding went into food irradiation from the U.S. Department of Defence. 
Clearance for irradiation for inhibition of potato sprouting and wheat disinfestations was 
given in 1963. Permission was also given for can-packed bacon in 1963, but this permission 
was subsequently withdrawn in 1968, after a review of the research found adverse effects in 
animals fed irradiated food such as fever surviving offspring and deficiencies in the conduct 
of the experiments [Webb and Lang 1990].  
In 1983, the U.S. FDA allowed irradiation of spices and seasonings although requiring 
at the same time that irradiated whole foods be labeled as such with a statement that it has 
been treated with irradiation (see figure 6.2).  
 
 
 
   
Figure 6.2: The Radura symbol, irradiated whole food has to bear, accompanied with either the phrase “Treated 
with Irradiation” or “Treated by Irradiation” [From U.S. FDA 1986] 
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In 1986, the U.S. FDA further allowed this technology for fruits, vegetables and pork and in 
1990, the U.S. FDA approved of irradiation for poultry. Following a series of serious 
outbreaks of food poisoning resulting from dangerous food-borne pathogens, approval was 
given for red meat in 1997 and finally approval was given for eggs in 2000 [Webb et al. 1987, 
Murray 1990, Blumenthal 1990, Webb and Lang 1990, Begley and Roberts 1992, U.S. FDA 
1997, U.S. DA 1999a, 1999b, ADA 2000, Adams P 2000, Epstein and Hauter 2001, Johnson 
2001, Diehl 2002, Morehouse 2002, Public Citizen and Grace 2002]. See table 6.1 for a 
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historical overview of international regulation of food irradiation. 
 
Food Irradiation is first tested on Strawberries in Sweden  
Food Irradiation is commercially used in Germany  
1916 
1957 
1958 
Food Irradiation is banned in Germany. The Sovjet Union permits Food Irradiation 
to inhibit sprouting of potatoes  
1963 
The Americans give permission to use irradiation in order to inhibit potato sprouting, 
disinfestation of wheat grains and can-packed bacon 
1968 U.S. permission to irradiate can-packed bacon is withdrawn 
1986 
U.K. allows irradiation for animal feed and for patients needing a sterile diet 1967 
U.S. FDA approves irradiation up to 1 kGy for fruits, vegetables, shelf-life 
extension and pork and 30 kGy for spices  
U.S. FDA approval expanded to include poultry  
1990 
1997 
U.S. FDA approval is expanded to include red meat  
U.S. approval was given for eggs 
 
U.S. FDA authorises irradiation of several spices and seasonings at dose up to 10 kGy  1983 
The U.S.DA releases specifications for the purchase of 
irradiated ground beef for donation through the National 
School Lunch Program [USDA 2003] 
2000
2003
 
Table 6.1: An overview of the course of events in the case of Food Irradiaiton 
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6.3 Scientific background   
 
Proponents of food irradiation argue that the technology is safe and could help save some of 
the 6,000 to 10,000 people who die as a result of food-borne pathogens in the U.S. every year 
and prevent some of the estimated 60 million people who get sick [Whelan 1994, Fumento 
1993, Huber 1993, ADA 2000, Neyssen 2000, Morrone and Lohner 2002]. Furthermore they 
complain that the approval was not given earlier because “scare mongers and fellow travelers 
in regulatory agencies” would not allow it [Huber 1993] and that the attacks on the 
technology are unscientific [Kilcast 2000]. 
Besides arguing that food irradiation is at best an unnecessary technology, because you 
still have to handle your food in a proper way, opponents of food irradiation argue that there is 
something wrong with food if it needs to be irradiated [Webb and Lang 1990]. They further 
argue that food irradiation 
 
1. Leaves an off -taste and color change in meat;  
2. Destroys the nutrients in the food;  
3. Produces microbial toxins by selective destruction of microorganisms and 
potential mutations;  
4. Creates radiolytic biproducts, which could be mutagenic and carcinogenic; 
5. And that eating irradiated food has deleterious consequences like for instance 
cause cancer [Murray 1990, Webb and Lang 1990, Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara 
1996, WHO 1999, Food Irradiation Campaign 2002].  
 
Several international and national committees have evaluated the safety and “wholesomeness” 
of food irradiation [U.S. FDA 1986, WHO 1981, 1999, SOU 1983, MAFF 1986, NFA 1986, 
SCF 1998, 2003]. In the following, the opinions of these different committees will be 
presented and reviewed regarding the issues mentioned by opponents of food irradiation.  
 
6.3.1 Selective destruction of micro-organisms 
 
Concerns have been put forward that irradiation would just select for irradiation-resistant 
bacteria, which would then grow exponentially after the food has been irradiated and it has 
been agued that the consequences of this are unknown [Murray 1990, Tritsch 2000]. A British 
governmental Advisory Committee on Irradiated and Novel Foods [MAFF 1986] found no 
evidence of selective destruction and potential development of mutations for doses below 10 
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kGy9. This conclusion was also reached by the WHO [1981, 1994] and the potential 
development of mutations is considered to be of less importance for doses above 10 kGy 
[WHO 1999]. The European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Food (SCF) [2003] 
argue that no evidence has been found that indicates that irradiation leads to the occurrence of 
mutations leading to virulent radiation resistant strains. On the contrary the WHO [1994] and 
the SCF [2003] state that irradiation has been found to cause loss of virulence and infectivity, 
as mutants are usually less competitive and less adapted.  
 
6.3.2 Radiolytic products  
 
Irradiation produces chemical changes in the food that could result in a wide variety of so-
called radiolytic products. Some of these changes resemble those occurring in other forms of 
food processing, whereas other are unique for irradiation [SOU 1983, U.S FDA 1986]. 
Besides arguing that some of these chemical changes are known for being both mutagenic and 
carcinogenic, opponents of food irradiation further argue that free radicals - believed to be 
cancer promoters - are produced during the irradiation process [Webb and Lang 1990, Public 
Citizen and Grace 2002, Epstein 2002]. 
It was originally thought that these new radiolytic compounds could and should be 
tested according to the accepted protocols for food additives. However this would require that 
all the chemicals were identified, isolated and fed separately to laboratory animals. Because of 
the difficulties of isolating and purifying the numerous radiolytic products this approach was 
simply impossible [Bloomfield and Webb 1990, WHO 1994]. Attempts to apply a safety 
margin by giving animals food irradiated at high radiation doses were also unsuccessful, 
because the animals simply refused to eat the unpalatable food [U.S. FDA 1986, Bloomfield 
and Webb 1990]. Because of these problems, the safety of irradiated food has never been 
rigorously tested according to Bloomfield and Webb [1990] and testing without safety-
margins may miss the underlying or long-term safety hazards according to Webb and Lang 
[1990]. 
A large number of toxicity studies on all kinds of animals (mice, rats, quails, dogs, 
chickens, pigs and non-human primates) have been performed with a wide variety of different 
kinds of irradiated food, dose and endpoints and have demonstrated no harmful effects [WHO 
1994, 1999]. 
In 1981, the WHO did a review of the studies performed with doses below 10 kGy and 
found that all the toxicological studies had produced no evidence of adverse effects as a result 
of irradiation and they further stated that further toxicological testing of treated foods was no 
longer required [WHO 1981]. Following this report the U.S. FDA began a systematic review 
                                                 
9
 The Gray (Gy) is the unit of absorbed dose of ionizing energy. 1 Gy is equivalent to 1 joule/kg [WHO 1999] 
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of the over 400 toxicological studies on mice, rats, dogs, pigs and monkeys available up to 
1982. Only five studies were considered to have been properly conducted in accordance to 
1980 toxicological standards and able to stand alone in support of safety [U.S. FDA 
1986:13378, WHO 1994].  
Some of the studies that have received considerable attention and have been a source of 
controversy are the studies on mutagenesis carried out by the Indian National Institute of 
Nutrition (NIN) and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) [Meeker-Lowry and 
Ferrara 1996, Thayer 1990, WHO 1994]. Vijayalaxmi [1976] and Vijayalaxmi and Rao 
[1976] from the NIN found an increase in dominant lethal mutations in mice and rats feed 
wheat irradiated 0.75 kGy. However, according to the WHO [1994] it is most unlikely that the 
reported effect was due to the wheat since other studies using much higher doses were 
negative. In a study of malnourished Indian children, Bhaskaram and Sadasivan [1975] found 
that a 0.8 and 1.8 % of cells showing polyploidy in the group of five children fed freshly 
irradiated wheat for 4 or 6 weeks. A lower effect was observed in children fed stored 
irradiated wheat whereas no effect was observed in children fed non-irradiated wheat. WHO 
[1994] argues that the study had low power, wide variability among the children in each 
group, that the number of polyploid cells was not unusually high and finally that the slight 
differences was probably most likely due to chance. Other studies by Vijaylaxmi [1975, 1978] 
from the NIN have also reported an increased incidence of polyploid cells in rats and 
monkeys feed freshly irradiated wheat. An expert committee was established by the Indian 
Ministry of Health in 1987 in order to review the studies performed by the NIN and BARC to 
settle the controversy. The committee concluded that neither the design of the studies nor the 
results were such as to demonstrate a treatment-related induction of polyploidy [U.S. FDA 
1986, Thayer 1990, WHO 1994).  
Few studies have been performed on humans, but the WHO [1999] mention three 
human clinical studies, all of which show no clinical abnormalities on between 10 to 18 
volunteers. Although a human feeding study in China found no effects over a period of 90 
days, besides an unexplainable increase in polyploidy in both controls and the group feed 
irradiated food [WHO 1994]. Why this happened is unclear and furthermore no significance 
can be attributed to polyploidy in terms of any specific disease [WHO 1994].   
In 1999, the WHO did another reviewed and this time for doses above 10 kGy (high-doses 
radiation) a total of 128 studies were reviewed and 5 were judged to indicate a “Possible 
Effect of High-Dose Irradiation”. All five indicated an effect in mutagenicity studies in vitro. 
One study indicated an effect of 2-DCB (Cyclobutanones) on rats and human colon cells, two 
studies indicated chromosome changes on humans and Vicia faba when feed sucrose solution. 
Finally mutagenic effects were observed in two studies on salmonella when feed sucrose, 
fructose, etc. [WHO 1999].  
 72 
In summary, WHO [1994] stated that no effects were seen showing any consistent 
pattern or trend, and the studies were overwhelmingly negative indicating that irradiated food 
had no toxicological effect.  
Clearance up to 1 kGy has been given in the U.S. on the basis that the concentration of 
radiolytic products is too small to be of toxicological significance [U.S. FDA 1986]. The 
WHO [1981, 1999, 1994] and the MAFF [1986] concluded that virtually all the radiolytic 
products found in both low and high dose irradiated food were either naturally present in food 
or produced in thermally processed food. 
 
 
6.3.3 Cyclobutanones  
 
One class of chemicals that have gotten much attention in the discussion about the safety of 
food irradiation are cyclobutanones and the question of whether or not they are carcinogens 
[Epstein 2002, Public Citizen and Grace 2002, Public Citizen and Cancer Prevention 
Coalition 2002]. Cyclobutanones are created only when food is radiated and have never been 
found in natural food [Delincée and Pool-Zobel 1998, Delincée et al. 2002]. Both the reports 
by the U.S. FDA and the WHO have been criticized heavily for ignoring the issue of 
cyclobutanones [Epstein 2002, Public Citizen and Grace 2002]. Delincée and Pool-Zobel 
[1998] and Delincée et al. [1999] found that 2-Dodecylcyclobutanone (DCB) was genotoxic, 
but they state that in order to assess and quantify this “minimal risk” in relation to irradiated 
food, additional studies would have to be performed and that these were in progress. In one of 
these subsequent studies, they mention that the identity and purity of the compound used in 
the study by Delincée and Pool-Zobel [1998] and Delincée et al. [1999] had not been verified 
before tests were conducted, which cast doubt on the results originally optained. In 2002 
Delincée et al. [2002] tested the cytogenity and genotoxicity of 2-TCB and did not find any 
effect, but did find a cytotoxic effect at very high concentrations (> 50 M) after prolonged 
incubation time (1-2 days compare to just 30 min. in the tests that found no effect). 
 
6.3.4 Macro- and micronutrients  
Fatty acids and macronutrients like proteins, fats and carbohydrates are not significantly 
altered in terms of nutrient value and digestibility by irradiation treatment [WHO 1981, 1994, 
1999, SCF 2003] whereas loss of micronutrients increases with radiation doses. The rate of 
loss differs substantially between different foods. Some nutrients are very stable to irradiation 
and show no important losses even at high doses of irradiation, while others are more 
affected. Therefore these losses must be assessed for each food and for each vitamin 
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specifically. Factors like packaging atmosphere, temperature during radiation and post-
irradiation storage also affect vitamin loss [Bloomfield and Webb 1990, Diehl et al. 1991, 
Thayer et al. 1991, WHO 1994, 1999, SCF 2003] According to the WHO [1999] Thiamine 
(B1) is the only vitamin which should be considered in terms of dietary intake because it is 
both radiation sensitive and the main contributors in the diet (e.g. pork) are candidates for 
high-dose irradiation. Other vitamins like for instance vitamin C are radiation-sensitive, but 
since fruits and vegetables, which are the main source of vitamin C, is not suitable for high-
dose irradiation and therefore the dietary intake of vitamin C would be less affected [WHO 
1981, 1999]. Symptoms like poor reproductive performance and muscle wasting in rats due to 
vitamin deficiency has been reported in experimental animals fed an irradiated diet. When fed 
with supplements of the missing vitamins symptoms did not develop [Bloomfield and Webb 
1990]. 
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6.4 Analysis of food irradiation 
 
In the following the questions put forward in chapter 2 will be answered in regard to the case 
of food irradiation. 
 
6.4.1. When and why was it believed that the false positive risk was real? 
 
The main reason why the U.S. withdrew the permission to irradiate can-packed bacon in 1968 
was because it was realized that the research, used to get clearance, had been flawed. For 
instance misconduct of some of the experiments and significant adverse effects had been 
observed in animals fed irradiated food, such as fewer surviving offspring from animals fed 
irradiated food [Webb and Lang 1990, Pauli 1991]. 
 
6.4.2 When and what were the main actions (or inactions) taken by regulatory 
authorities or others to reduce the risk? 
 
The main actions were to put a hold on the approvals of food irradiation and to support further 
research through the WHO/FAO/IAEA and the International Food Irradiation Project 
established in 1970 to undertake and sponsor research into the wholesomeness of irradiated 
food [MAFF 1986].  
 
6.4.3 Were alternative courses of action considered and why was one preferred to 
another? 
 
The obvious alternative, which was considered, was to allow food irradiation, but there seems 
to have been a number of reasons why this alternative was not preferred. There were some 
outstanding safety issues after the U.S. FDA had found that the studies they previously based 
their approval on were flawed. This could partly explain why it took twenty years before food 
irradiation was allowed for pork. Another reason could be, as opponents of food irradiation 
often state, that good food does not need irradiation [Webb and Lang 1990, Food Irradiation 
Campaign 2002] and that focus should be on sanitation - not irradiation [Meeker-Lowry and 
Ferrara 1987, Epstein and Hauter 2001, Epstein 2002].  
Both the WHO [1981, 1993, 1999], and the European Commission’s Scientific 
Committee of Food [2003] put great emphasis on that food irradiation is not a substitute of 
good quality food and good manufacturing practices. These organizations also stated that food 
irradiation must not be used to cover negligence in handling foodstuffs or to mask their 
unsuitability for use as food. The question is whether or not food irradiation is necessary if 
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these guidelines are kept and followed, as they should be according to the law. The main 
problem concerning human pathogens is that even though these guidelines are well known, 
they are not followed and food irradiation provides an obvious opportunity of abuse and 
misuse of this technology to cover poor hygiene practices [Bloomfield 1990, Webb and Lang 
1990, Epstein and Hauter 2001]. This is what has happened numerous times in the past for 
instance in the case of Malaysian prawns which were found to be unsaleable in the United 
Kingdom. These were then exported to the Netherlands and irradiated for then to be re-
imported illegally into the United Kingdom in 1986. Another example concerns mussels 
rejected by Danish authorities because of Escherichia coli contamination which were illegally 
re-imported into Denmark after having been irradiated in the Netherlands10 [Bloomfield 1990, 
Webb and Lang 1990]. But the WHO [1994] argues that this concern is unfounded because 
irradiation cannot destroy off-odors, off-taste or the off-appearance of spoiled food.  
Educating the public about the safety of food irradiation could also be an alternative course of 
action. Several authors have mentioned that the consumers are reluctant towards buying 
irradiated food and therefore processors and retailers are also reluctant to apply food 
irradiation [Reilly et al. 1993, Henkel 1998, Buzby and Morrison 1999, European 
Commission 2001]. This has made others argue that the public needs to be convinced and 
educated about food irradiation in order to have them accept this technology [Grünewald 
1973, Thorne 1991, Feenstra and Scholten 1991, Kilgen 1993, Moretti 1993, Padsal-Desai 
1993, Reilly et al. 1993].  
Another alternative would be to educate the public in proper food hygiene and thorough 
cooking which would eliminate microbiological agents. According to Todd [1993], the 
manufacturing companies generally have had a good record of providing safe processed food 
whereas the food prepared in food service operations and homes have frequently been 
undercooked or re-contaminated after cooking. According to Todd [1993], education has had 
a limited impact because of the lack of government commitment to long term and widespread 
exposure to the public of basic food safety principles, and therefore Todd [1993] sees food 
irradiation as a proper alternative. If lack of education in proper food hygiene at home is the 
problem, food irradiation in the manufacturing process is not the answer.  
The EU policies could also be seen as an alternative approach. In Europe irradiated 
foods are regulated by the framework Directives 1999/2/EC and the implementing Directive 
1999/3/EC of the European Parliament and Council. Directive 1999/2/EC covers general and 
technical aspects for carrying out the process, labelling of irradiated foods and conditions for 
                                                 
10
 For additional examples see Webb and Lang [1990]. 
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authorising food irradiation. Directive 1999/3/EC establishes a Community list of food and 
food ingredients authorised for treatment with ionising radiation, this positive list contains 
only a single food category: “dried aromatic herbs, spices and vegetable seasonings”. A 
reason may be that the Directive requires or provides specifically that food irradiation may 
only be authorised if 
 
• There is a reasonable technological need;  
• It presents no health hazard and is carried out under the conditions proposed;  
• It is of benefit to the consumer;  
• It is not used as a substitute for hygiene and health practices or for good 
manufacturing or agricultural practice;  
• Food irradiated as such or containing irradiated food ingredients has to be 
labelled [Directive 1999/2/EC, European Commission 2004]. 
 
One source to confusion though is that national authorities of member states can allow or 
maintain the irradiation of certain foods until the completed positive list enters into force. And 
that member states may also maintain restrictions or bans of irradiated foods until the 
completed positive list enters into force, as long as these are in compliance with the Treaty 
[Directive 1999/3/EC , European Commission 2004]. Only six European Union member states 
had given approval to irradiate foods to facilities on their territory in 2002 and the European 
Commission considers that a broader debate is opportune at this stage [European Commission 
2001a, 2002].  
 
6.4.4 When and why was it realised that the risk was not real or was smaller than 
believed? 
 
It seems that 1981 was the year when it became generally accepted that food irradiation does 
not impose a risk of consumer health both internationally and in the U.S. Internationally, the 
WHO published the Joint FAO/IAEA/WHO Expert Committee review on the Wholesomeness 
of Irradiated Food [1981]. This document states that irradiated food has been conclusively 
demonstrated to be safe from the standpoint of toxicological, nutritional or microbiological 
risks to human health and this document has later been described as the culmination and 
turning point in the scientific evaluation of the safety of irradiated foods [Urbain 1993, WHO 
1993, 1994].   
In the U.S. the U.S. FDA announced in early 1981 that it was considering proposing a 
regulation to permit irradiation of any food at a dose not exceeding 1 kGy following a report 
by the Bureau of Foods Irradiated Food Committee. Furthermore the U.S. FDA considered a 
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policy that would permit irradiation (up to 50 kGy) of a food class comprising only a minor 
portion of the diet, based upon minimal biological testing that demonstrated efficiency in 
killing microorganisms [Pauli 1991].  
 
 
6.4.5 What were the resulting monetary costs and benefits from the actions or inactions, 
including their distribution between groups, and across time? 
 
Complete estimates of cost and benefits of irradiated food are not available, but in 1999 Buszy 
and Morrison examined the effects of irradiated ground beef for pathogen control. The 
medical costs and the productivity losses related to just two food borne illnesses (salmonella 
and E.Coli O157:H7) associated with ground beef was examined. Social benefits are 
dependent on the amount of irradiating ground beef and the extent of the food borne illness 
prevented through irradiation. If 25 % of the ground irradiated beef is assumed to prevent 25 
% of food borne illness, the ERS researchers estimate that the annual benefits would range 
from minus $57.5 to plus $174.5 million. Medical costs and productivity losses were 
estimated to be between $127 and $812.2 million, all depending on the estimated annual cases 
of salmonella and E.Coli O157:H7 [Buzby and Morrison 1999]. But the question Buzby and 
Morrision [1999] did not discuss any further is whether the correlation between irradiated 
beef and the number of prevented cases of illnesses can be said to be linear.  
In a review of the economic losses caused by food-borne parasitic diseases Robert and 
Murrell [1993] estimated that the economic losses in the U.S. from these diseases are up to 
U.S. $ 5.3 × 109 annually, and they state that irradiating pork and beef could reduce the cases 
of food-borne diseases. Cost-benefit estimates for the U.S.A done by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (U.S. DA) indicated that the benefits would be likely to exceed cost by a ratio of 
2.2-2.8 to 1 and that the irradiation of just 10 % of the U.S. poultry production would produce 
annual savings of up to US $ 50 million [WHO 1993]. 
Reilly et al. [1993] calculated the costs and benefits of irradiation of poultry in Scotland 
using two previous outbreaks of Salmonellosis to give a range of costs per case. The costs of 
poultry-borne Salmonellosis are estimated to be between £ 270.000 and £ 6.962.000. Reily et 
al. [1993] considered these estimates to be the potential benefits since the costs could be 
avoided by irradiation. Costs of irradiation are estimated to be in order of £ 2.600.000 per year 
over a period of 15 years, assuming an 8 % discount rate - equivalent to 2.21 pence pr. 
kilogram of poultry meat. Reilly et al. [1993] state that the case of food irradiation of poultry 
meat is persuasive, but there are a number of assumptions in this study which influence 
especially the estimation of the potential benefits. First of all the assumption is made that all 
poultry meat in Scotland is irradiated, something, which seems highly unlike that it, would 
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ever be. Second the large majority of costs of poultry-borne Salmonellosis are due to 
unreported cases of Salmonellosis, which either Reilly et al. [1993] or anybody else know the 
exact number of, or for that matter the costs of [WHO 1993]. A total of 57 % of the low 
estimate (£ 270.000) and 96 % of the high estimate (£6.962.000), Reilly et al. [1993] mention, 
are due to unreported cases.  
Reilly et al. [1993] is a good example of how a number of factors affect the estimated 
costs, for instance the number of estimated cases and estimated deaths, the severity of the 
illness, the type of food borne disease, etc [Todd 1993]. Both, the costs of food-borne diseases 
in health and in economic terms, and the potential role of food irradiation in reducing those 
costs, are not well documented [WHO 1993]. 
Several cost-benefit analyses have been carried out, concerning feasibility for so-called 
developing countries, and most of these seem to show large benefits of food irradiation 
(differing from country to country and food products to food products) especially because of 
the increase of shelf-life and the reduced post-harvest losses [Grünewald 1973, Pothisiri et al. 
1991, Al-Bachir 1993, Khan [1993], Moretti [1993], Nketsia-Tabiri et al. 1993]. But as Xu 
and Sha [1993] argue there is a big difference between discussing costs and benefits in the 
developed and developing countries. The choice in the developing countries is between 
treated food and no food at all. Untreated food is spoiled to a high degree due to the hot 
climate accelerating the ripening of fruits and sprouting of vegetables, spoilage 
microorganisms, pathogenic microorganisms and insect infestation [Goresline 1973, Pothisiri 
et al. 1991, Khan 1993, Xu and Sha 1993]. WHO [1993] mentions that the estimated storage 
loss of cereals, grains and legumes is at least 10 %, and with non-grain staples, vegetables and 
fruits, the post-harvest loss is believed to exceed 50 %. Food irradiation would not prevent all 
these losses, but it could in theory help increase the supply of certain foods. There are, 
however, a number of problems which would have to be solved, before the developing 
countries could benefit from food irradiation. It requires, for instance, that the necessary 
infrastructure is established so that this technology can be used efficiently [Moy 1973, WHO 
1993]. 
The statement that food irradiation will lead to the use of less chemicals is often used as 
one of the potential benefits of food irradiation. Many countries require disinfestation before 
accepting products from exporting countries. Food irradiation could also be used as a 
substitute for the chemicals used for controlling insect infestations in food and agricultural 
commodities [Grünewald 1973, Hackwood 1991, WHO 1993]. But whether this argument is 
plausible or not is unclear [European Commission 2001, Randall cited in Kapp 2003, Piccioni 
1987, Webb and Lang 1987].  
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6.4.6 Were there indirect benefits or negative unintended consequences from the false 
positives? 
 
Public reluctance to accept food irradiation has helped keep focus on sanitation, which could 
be seen as an indirect benefit. One could hope that this again has lead to improved hygiene in 
the manufacturing process, but whether or not this has been the case is unclear. No matter 
what, food irradiation would take the main incentive away from the manufactures to improve 
their hygiene - public outrage in case of an outbreak. And the consequences of an outbreak 
can be severe, as Adams state 
 
 “The economic consequences of even a single outbreak can cripple a company, 
 destroy a product brand name, and cause the closure of several companies” 
 [Adams P 2000:233]. 
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7. Saccharin  
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the late 1970s it became required to label products containing saccharin in the U.S., after it 
had been found that saccharin causes bladder cancer in two-generation rat studies. In 1991, a 
scientific hypothesis was put forward about the mechanism for why saccharin causes bladder 
cancer in rats, and lately WHO’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
[1999b] and the National Toxicology Program (NTP) [2002] have revised their classification 
of saccharin arguing that this mechanism was not relevant to humans. As a consequence, in 
2000, President Clinton lifted the labelling requirements.  
 Thus it can be argued that the labelling requirements had been unnecessary, and that 
saccharin therefore is a false positive [Lieberman and Known 1998, Wildavsky 1995, 
Marchant 2003, Graham 2004]. 
 
 
7.2 Course of events 
 
In 1977, initial steps were taken by the U.S. FDA in the U.S.A to ban saccharin after a 
Canadian study had shown that saccharin caused bladder cancer in rats. The public responded 
against the proposed ban and Congress put a moratorium on the ban requiring instead that a 
warning label (see figure 7.1) should appear on all product labels and in conspicuous places in 
retail establishments where saccharin-containing foods are sold.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: The warning label that had to appear on all products containing saccharin [From 
http://members.aol.com/chigaya3/photo/saccharin.jpg]  
 
At first the moratorium only postponed the action proposed by the U.S. FDA for eighteen 
months to await further studies, but it was extended several times [OTA 1977, SSLA 1977, 
NAS 1978, NIEHS 1997, CalEPA 2003].  
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Scientific research on saccharin continued since then and it focused mainly on two 
aspects: First whether or not saccharin causes cancer in humans, which was investigated 
through epidemiological studies, and second what specifically happens in the bladder of the 
rat, which seemingly makes it the only species to develop bladder cancer after consuming 
saccharin. In 1991, a hypothesis that saccharin causes bladder cancer in rats by mechanisms 
under very specific urine physiological conditions was offered by Cohen et al. [1991a] and 
these mechanisms appeared to be species-specific and hence not relevant to humans [Chappel 
1992, Whysner and Willliams 1996b, SCF 1997, IARC 1999b, NTP 2002].  
In 1999, IARC downgraded saccharin from being “…a possibly carcinogenic to humans 
(Group 2B)” [IARC 1987a] to be a “not classifiable as to their carcinogenicity to humans 
(Group 3)” [IARC 1999b], referring specifically to this hypothesis of mechanisms, which is 
seen by some as an acquittal of saccharin. Following that, a number of agencies have also 
changed their classification of saccharin for instance NTP in the U.S. delisted saccharin in 
their tenth report on carcinogens in 2002 [IARC 1987a, 1999b, Huff 2002, NTP 2002].  
Finally President Clinton removed the requirement to label saccharin in the U.S. in 2000 
[SWEETEST Act 2000, CalEPA 2003], which could be interpreted as if the precautionary 
action initially taken had been unnecessary making saccharin a false positive by definition.  
Internationally, saccharin has never been prohibited. It is allowed in Europe and in Canada 
saccharin is allowed as table-top and in pharmaceuticals, but not in food and beverage [NAS 
1978, Cohen et al. 1998, Takayama et al. 1998, Weihrauch et al. 2001, Arnold et al. 1983, 
IARC 1999b]. For an overview of the course of events in the case of saccharin see table 7.1. 
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FDA proposes ban of saccharin 
Congress puts a moratorium on the ban 
IARC downgrades saccharin 
NTP delist saccharin in their 10th report on carcinogens 
President Clinton removes the requirement to label saccharin 
Canadian study indicates that saccharin causes cancer in rats 
Saccharin is removed from FDA’s Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS)-list 1972 
March 1977 
March 1977 
June 1977 
1999 
2000 
Cyclamates, another artificial sweetener is are banned by the FDA 1970 
2002 
Table 7.1: An overview of the course of events in the case of saccharin 
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7.3 Scientific Background  
 
The question of the safety of saccharin has throughout history been characterized by scientific 
uncertainty. Since 1977, it has been unclear whether or not saccharin causes cancer, especially 
bladder cancer, in humans [Merrill and Taylor 1985]. Data about saccharin is available from 
epidemiological studies and numerous studies performed on laboratory animals and finally 
from short-term tests. 
 
7.3.1 Epidemiological studies 
Often a combination of saccharin and another artificial sweetener, cyclamate, was sold and 
used in a ratio of one to ten, so a lot of studies have been performed on the use of artificial 
sweeteners in general, which makes the matter even more complicated. The combination of 
saccharin, cyclamate and other additives was sold as “Sweet’n’Low” in the 1950s and 1960s 
[Weihrauch et al. 2001] (see figure 7.2). Since individuals consuming artificial sweeteners 
would in fact not always know whether they had taken saccharin or cyclamate, or both, any 
scientifically valid conclusion directly related to either of the two sweeteners cannot be drawn 
[Arnold et al. 1983]. Still they can be used as an indication. 
      
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Howe et al. [1977] were the first to report a positive association between artificial sweeteners, 
particularly saccharin, and bladder cancer in a case-control study performed in Canada. In a 
study of 632 cases of bladder cancer and 632 non-hospitalised controls, they found an 
increased relative risk (RR) of 1.7 (P=0.012) in males, but found no effect in females. The 
study was criticized for being methodological flawed in the Lancet [1977] partly because of 
 
Figure 7.2: Packages of “Sweet’n’Low” [From http://earthrenewal.org/_borders/sweet2.gif] 
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inadequate reporting concerning the confounding factors and partly because the conclusions 
were drawn concerning subgroups. Some argue that it is problematic to focus on subgroups of 
study populations in epidemiology because the number of people exposed in subgroups is 
often small and it is frequently possible to find subgroups that depart from the overall pattern - 
especially in large studies [The Lancet 1980, Elcock and Morgan 1993]. A re-analysis of the 
data obtained by Howe et al. [1977] did not change the overall results although it did reveal 
an excess relative risk among females with consumption at the highest dose levels [Howe et 
al. 1980]. A more recent study [Risch et al. 1988] on saccharin by the same authors did not 
confirm these findings.  
The largest study to date, done by Hoover and Strasser [1980] involved 3010 cases of 
bladder cancer and 5783 non-hospitalised controls, and indicated no overall increase relative 
risk of bladder cancer in relation to the use of artificial sweeteners. This confirms the over-all 
conclusions drawn in other studies on artificial sweeteners11. However the data from the study 
by Hoover and Strasser [1980] did indicate an increased risk in different subgroups - mainly 
heavy-users, non-smoking women and heavy smoking men. But contrary to these results 
Risch et al. [1988] found a relative risk of 1.06 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.52-2.17] for 
non-smoking women and Wynder and Stellman [1980] found that the amount of cigarettes 
smoked per day did not significantly change the relative risk. Wynder and Stellman actually 
found decreased risk in long-term smoking men who had smoked for more than 10 years 
[Wynder and Stellman 1980]. 
Using a different statistical method Walker et al. [1982] did an independent analysis of 
the results and conclusions obtained by Hoover and Strasser [1980]. Walker et al. [1982] 
concluded that the data provided little evidence that artificial sweeteners increased the risk of 
bladder cancer among subgroups of users even though the relative risk was still higher. Even 
though the study by Hoover and Strasser [1980] is the biggest study to date, the number of 
study subjects who meet the criteria for the subgroups is still limited, something which is 
reflected in the large confidence intervals [Walker et al. 1982].  
A number of studies show an increased relative risk with the use of saccharin, but 
considering the different aspects one should be careful when interpreting these12. Finally there 
                                                 
11
 See for instance Burbank and Fraumenti [1970], Morgan and Jain [1974], Kessler [1976], Wynder and 
Goldsmith [1977], Connolly [1978], Morrison [1979], Morrision and Buring [1980], Ohno et al. [1985], Piper 
[1986], Slattery et al. [1988]. 
12
 A case-control study by Yu et al. [1997] in China showed a relative risk of 3.9 between consumption of 
Saccharin and bladder cancer, but this study failed to show any increased relative risk between smoking risk 
and bladder cancer [Weihrauch et al. 2001]. A relation, which has been well-established in the past  [IARC 
1987, NTP 2002]. Najem et al. [1982], Mommsen et al. [1983] and, Momas et al. [1994] also found an 
increased risk, but these studies were based on a limited number of cases, have wide confidence intervals and 
furthermore Mommsen et al. [1983] has been criticized for being methodological flawed [Elcock and Morgan 
1993, Morgan and Wong 1985].  
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are a number of studies that have failed to find an increased relative risk of bladder cancer in 
users of saccharin for both sexes [see Kesssler 1970, Armstrong and Doll 1974, Simon et al. 
1975, Armstrong et al. 1976, Kessler 1976, Kessler and Clark 197813, Jensen and Kamby 
1982, Møller-Jensen et al. 1983, Iscovich et al. 1985, Risch et al. 1988, Nomura et al. 1991].  
For an overview of all the different epidemiological studies on saccharin see IARC 
[1999b] or CalEPA [2004]. 
Morgan and Wong [1985] did a statistical power analysis of 8 of the previous case-
control studies and found that the relative risk combined was close to one for males, females 
and both sexes combined. They stated that they are 95 % certain that if the true relative risk of 
bladder cancer, as a result of using artificial sweeteners, were 1.13 or more, the studies 
reviewed in their report would have detected such a risk as statistically significant.  
In a meta-analysis, Elcock and Morgan [1993] found a relative risk of 0.979 (95 % 
confidence intervals, 0.92-1.04) and concluded that saccharin should not be considered a 
human carcinogen. 
It has often been questioned whether or not epidemiological studies are likely to be able 
to detect a small increase in cancer risk in persons consuming high doses of sodium saccharin, 
even if humans and rats should be equally sensitive to its carcinogenic effects [Hertz-
Pocciotto and Neutra 1994, Walker et al. 1982, NTP 2002, Silverman et al. 1992]. Normally 
epidemiology is considered useful for identifying relative risk in excess of 1.3, and according 
to Elcock and Morgan [1993] a risk estimate between 0.7 and 1.3 is generally thought to be 
consistent with the absence of risk. 
 
7.3.2 Animal studies  
  
Several studies have been performed on different kinds of animals in order to investigate 
whether saccharin causes cancer or not.  
One-generation studies on rats show no effect in general14 (see for instance Munro et al. 
1975 and Hibino et al. 1985] whereas two-generation studies on rats have consistently shown 
that especially male rats develop tumors in the bladder when fed high doses of saccharin 
[Taylor and Friedman 1974, Tisdel et al. 1974, Taylor et al. 1980, Arnold et al. 1980, 
Schoenig et al. 1985]. 
                                                 
13
 This study has been critized by Goldsmith [1982] for being biased, but Goldsmith states that their conclusion 
of no association between saccharin and bladder cancer appears to be justified. 
14
 According to Whysner and Williams [1996b] and Weihrauch et al. [2001] only one out of twenty studies has 
shown an effect in one-generation rat studies (i.e. Fukushima et al. 1983]. Fukushima et al [1983] used a 
different strain of rats which furthermore was infected with a bladder parasite which is known to induce 
bladder tumors [NAS 1978, Renwick 1993, Whysner and Williams 1996a, 1996b, Weihrauch 2001].  
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The study by Schoenig et al. [1985] on 2500 rats showed a clear dose-response 
relationship (Non-significant and equivocal effect when the rats were fed a diet consisting of 
3.0 % sodium saccharin, but increased in the incidence of transitional-cell papilloma or 
carcinoma at the 4.0, 5.0, 6.25 and 7.5 % level) and the presence of a no-effect level (1 %)15 
(see figure 7.3). Whether or not there is a “threshold” between 1 % and 3 % for which 
saccharin in the diet causes bladder cancer is a matter of dispute and Bell et al. [2002] argue 
that it is only a theory not supported by available data. 
 
Dose-response relationship reported by Schoenig 
et al. (1985)
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                Figure 7.3: Dose-response relationship in two-generation rat study drawn on the basis of  
                Results reported by Schoenig et al. [1985]. Background incidence is reported to be 0.8 %  
 
In addition to causing cancer in two-generation rat studies, saccharin has been known for a 
long time to promote the effect of subcarcinogenic doses of known bladder carcinogens such 
as methyl-N-nitrosourea [Hicks et al. 1973, Hicks and Chowaniec 1977], N-[4-(5-nitro-2-
furyl)-thiazolyl]formamide [Cohen et al. 1979], N-butyl-N-(4-hydroxybutyl)nitroamine 
[Nakanishi et al. 1980] and 2-acetylaminoflurorene [Nakanishi et al. 1982]. Promotion of the 
effect of bladder carcinogens is not sex-specific and has been reported in both male [Cohen et 
al. 1979] and female [Hicks et al. 978] rats. OTA [1977], Sontag [1980], Clapp et al. [1997] 
and Bell et al. [2002] argue that the promotion abilities of saccharin is of particular concern 
because humans are already exposed to a wide variety of toxic inhibitors. 
Another debated issue is whether or not saccharin might cause cancer elsewhere in the 
rat and Clapp et al. [1997] and Bell et al. [2002] argue that it does. In a meta-analysis of four 
                                                 
15
 See also Squire [1985] who re-examined the results obtained by Shoenig et al. [1985] 
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different statistically insignificant studies the NAS [1978] found a significant (P=0.041) 
increase in uterine tumors for the first generation of rats and an almost significant (P=0.063) 
increase for the two generations of rats combined. On the basis of that, NAS [1978] stated that 
saccharin alone is most likely to be responsible for these adverse effects but neither the 
JECFA [1993], IARC [1999b], NTP [2002], SCF [2003], nor the CalEPA [2003] mention 
this.  
Studies on hamsters16, guinea pigs17 and non-human primates18 have found no 
association between saccharin ingestion and cancer.  
Some effects have been reported in mice19, but these effects have not been replicated by 
other studies20 [OTA 1977, IARC 1999b]. Studies by among others Bryan et al. [1970] 
showed an increase in bladder carcinomas in mice implanted pellets of saccharin compared to 
controls. Because the implantation experiments do no mimic human exposure and because 
foreign bodies in the bladder cause chronic irritation it is questionable and debated in the 
literature whether or not implantation of pellets is a relevant procedure [OTA 1977, NAS 
1978, Reuber 1978, Desesso 1989, Ellwein and Cohen 1990, Clapp et al. 1997, IARC 1999b, 
Cohen et al. 2000].  
 
7.3.3 Short-term tests 
 
Short-term tests do not provide any clear answer, and there are both several studies that show 
a negative mutagenicity and DNA-reactivity and several that show a positive reaction with a 
predominance of the data being negative [Ashby et al. 1978, NAS 1978, Reuber 1978, Arnold 
et al. 1983, Whysner and Williams 1996b, SCF 1997, NTP 2002, Cohen et al. 2000].  
NAS [1978] states that this might be expected by a very weak mutagen, whereas the 
SCF [1997] state that the genotoxic studies indicate that saccharin is not a direct acting 
genotoxin. SCF further state that this is supported by the fact that saccharin has been shown to 
be a carcinogen in only one sex of one species of animals. Genotoxic carcinogens tend to be 
active at more sites and/or in more than one sex and species [Ashby and Tennant 1991]. 
Contrary to what SCF [2003] state, saccharin causes tumor in both male and females (see for 
instance Arnold et al. [1980]). For an extensive overview of the different genotoxic studies 
see for instance Whysner and Williams [1996b] and IARC [1999b].    
                                                 
16
 See Althoff et al. [1975], Fukishmia [1983] 
17
 See Fukushima et al. [1983] 
18
 See one study reported by Coulston et al. [1975], McChesney et al. [1977] and another reported by 
Takayama et al. [1998], Thorgeirsson et al. [1994], Schoeffner and Thorgeirsson [2000].  
19
 Prasad and Rai [1986] 
20
 See Homburger [1978], Fukushima et al. [1983], Roe et al. [1970], Kroes et al. [1977], Frederick et al. 
[1989]. 
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7.3.4 Hypothesis concerning mechanisms  
 
Besides the lack of consistent positive epidemiological studies and the conflicting results 
concerning subgroups, the main reason given by SCF [1997], IARC [1999b] and the NTP 
[2002] for revising their classification of saccharin was the hypothesis that saccharin causes 
bladder cancer only in rats (especially male rats) by mechanisms (cell proliferation) under 
very specific urine physiological conditions (pH of 6.5 or greater in the urine combined with 
high concentrations of calcium phosphate and protein and high urinary osmolality). This 
mechanism and these conditions appear to be species-specific and therefore not to be relevant 
to humans [Ellwein and Cohen 1990, Cohen and Ellwein 1991, Cohen 1995, Cohen et al. 
1995, SCF 1997, Cohen et al. 1998, IARC 1999b, Cohen et al. 2000, NTP 2002]. 
This hypothesis was first offered by Cohen et al. [1991a] and experiments by Imaida 
and Wang [1986] and Cohen et al. [1991b] have supported this hypothesis.  
However a cause and effect relationship between saccharin and the precipitate formation and 
tumor promotion or carcinogenicity has not been established and some argue that the 
hypothesis is not proven [Whysner and Williams 1996, Jacobsson et al. 1998, CalEPA 2003]. 
Clapp et al. [1997] and Bell et al. [2002] question the hypothesis citing studies that have 
shown that exposure to saccharin does not increase the pH and osmolality, indicating that the 
specific conditions in the bladder of the rat are not related to saccharin. Renwick [1993] and 
Huff [2002] further argue that this hypothesis fails to explain the promoter activity of 
saccharin although according to Chappel [1992] and SCF [1997] it does explain the 
promoting ability of saccharin21.  
Other possible mechanism of action have also been proposed [CalEPA 2003] for 
instance by Otoshi et al. [1993] who suggest that increased activation of Na+/H+ exchange 
might occur in initiated bladder epithelium which would lead to increased intracellular pH 
which again is associated with DNA synthesis and cell proliferation [CalEPA 2003]. But these 
hypothesis are not well investigated. 
Because saccharin could just be a weak carcinogen, because saccharin is known to be a 
promoter of cancer, because the hypothesis on the mechanisms that cause cancer in rats have 
not yet been fully proven, and because no other hypothesis has been extensively researched, it 
could be argued that “the jury is still out” on saccharin [CalEPA 2003].  
                                                 
21
 Refering to Chappel [1992] the SCF [1997:3] state that ”Many bladder tumour promotion studies, using well 
known indicators of bladder carcinogenesis, have shown that both increased urinary sodium ion content and a 
high urinary pH are essential for the promotion of bladder tumours in the male rat by sodium salts of several 
different organic acids, including saccharin”. 
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On the other hand it could also be argued that saccharin is a false positive for a number 
of reasons: 
 
• There is a lack of consistency in the results from the large epidemiological 
studies associating saccharin/artificial sweeteners with bladder cancer;  
• There are conflicting results from epidemiological studies concerning an effect 
in different subgroups; 
• There is a partly proven hypothesis which gives a plausible explanation for why 
saccharin causes cancer in especially the male rat that explains both inter-species 
differences and the promotion abilities of saccharin;  
• Finally there seems to be little doubt or conflicting view about the safety of 
saccharin between IARC [1999b], NTP [2002], JECFA [1993], SCF [1997] and 
CalEPA [2003]. 
 
Considering these reasons I find that there is “clear and convicing” evidence that saccharin is 
a false positive.   
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7.4 Analysis of saccharin  
 
In the following the questions put forward in chapter 2 will be answered in regard to the case 
of saccharin. 
 
7.4.1 When and why was it believed that the false positive risk was real? 
 
The U.S. FDA first announced their intention to propose a ban of saccharin on April 14, 1977, 
but prior to that the, U.S. FDA had announced the results of a Canadian study on March 9, 
which showed that saccharin increased the incidence of bladder tumors. During that 
announcement, the U.S. FDA stated that the “Delaney clause” of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act required the removal of saccharin from the food supply. Therefore it could be 
argued that the results of the Canadian study triggered regulation.  
The U.S. FDA did remove saccharin from the GRAS list (Generally Recognized As 
Safe) in 1972 and implemented interim regulation after preliminary results of a long-term 
feeding study [Tisdel et al. 1974] had indicated formation of bladder tumors. Because of 
concern that impurities (i.e. orthotoluenesulfonamide (OTS)) in the manufacturing process 
was the carcinogen and not saccharin, the U.S. FDA decided to await for the Canadian study 
which had started in 1974 to clarify this outstanding issue before requiring a removal [OTA 
1977, NAS 1978, Cranmer 1980, CalEPA 2003]. 
A couple of weeks after the U.S. FDA announcement the Senate Subcommittee on 
Health and Scientific Research requested that the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
should study the technological basis for the U.S. FDA ruling and report their findings in 60 
days [OTA 1977]. The OTA report was made just after the U.S. FDA proposed their initial 
ban of saccharin and it gives a great insight into what was known at that time and what the 
uncertainties where.  
OTA [1977] argued that there are several reasons for why saccharin as a weak 
carcinogen should cause concern. First, they argued that one must take the number of people 
exposed into consideration, and since saccharin was consumed in substantial amounts at the 
time, risk estimates range up to several thousands expected new cases of cancer each year - a 
large fraction of the total incidence of bladder cancer. Second, they argued that the degree of 
uncertainty in extrapolations is sizable and maybe wrong and third, that saccharin is not the 
only carcinogen to which people are exposed and the total body burden of carcinogens was of 
great concern [OTA 1977]  
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7.4.2 When and what were the main actions (or inactions) taken by regulatory 
authorities or others to reduce the risk? 
 
U.S. FDA’s decision to remove saccharin from the GRAS list in 1972 and the decision to wait 
five years for the Canadian study before announcing that they considered banning saccharin - 
must be said to be one of the main actions taken. The announcement promptly leads Congress 
to put a moratorium on further U.S. FDA action and to require that products containing 
saccharin carry a warning label instead. This action must also be considered to be one of the 
main actions taken, especially when considering that this moratorium was extended several 
times and first removed by President Clinton in 2000 [OTA 1977, SSLA 1977, SWEETEST 
Act 2000, CalEPA 2003]  
 
7.4.3 Were alternative courses of action considered and why was one preferred to 
another? 
 
During a hearing held in June of 1977, the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Health and 
Scientific Research discussed the proposed ban of saccharin by the U.S. FDA and the record 
shows that alternatives were considered and discussed [U.S. Senate 1977]. During the hearing 
Robbins [1977] outlined four different courses of action: 1) Ban saccharin use altogether, 2) 
No restrictions, 3) Free availability with appropriate warning of risk and 4) Regulate saccharin 
as an over-the-counter drug. So alternatives were definitely considered although no 
conclusion was reached during the hearing.  
Broad support and consensus was reached quickly in Congress to delay any ban of 
saccharin. According to Merrill and Taylor [1985] the reasons given were the substantial 
scientific uncertainty as to whether or not saccharin posed a risk to humans and whether any 
risk outweighed the claimed benefits of saccharin.  
Two different bills where proposed in the House and the Senate and these were debated 
hotly in Congress. In the House, the “Rogers bills” would require the posting of warning 
notices in retail establishments where saccharin or saccharin-containing foods where sold. 
Whereas the bill proposed by Senator Kennedy in the Senate would also require that 
additional warnings appear on the product labelling and in advertising, including the 
electronic media [Merrill and Taylor 1985].  
Proponents of broad warning requirements and the Kennedy proposal argued that 
Congress could not conscientiously stand in the way of U.S. FDA regulation if it did not give 
the consumers “the freedom of choice” and ensured that consumers were fully informed about 
both the risks as well as the benefits of saccharin [Merrill and Taylor 1985]. Opponents 
argued against requiring notices in television advertisements.  
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Senator Kennedy’s proposal prevailed and the saccharin Study and Labelling act 
(SSLA) was signed into law on November 23, 1977 by President Carter [Merrill and Taylor 
1985]. The act postponed U.S. FDA action in eighteen months, required the Secretary of U.S. 
HEW to arrange for two studies by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and a warning 
label to appear on all saccharin-containing foods.  
The popular support of saccharin, attributable in part to a large industrially sponsored 
advertising campaign, was instrumental in Congress’ decision to prevent U.S. FDA’s 
proposed ban as well as the fact that no other permitted alternative was available in the U.S. 
[Rhein and Marion 1977, OTA 1977, Parker 1978, Arnold et al. 1983, Merrill and Taylor 
1985].  
The two NAS reports did not significantly illuminate the outstanding issue concerning 
the safety of saccharin and Congress justified repeated extension of the moratorium for the 
same reasons they implemented it - uncertainty about both the risks and benefits of saccharin 
[Merrill and Taylor 1985].  
 
7.4.4 When and why was it realised that the risk was not real or was smaller than 
believed? 
 
As mentioned already IARC downgraded saccharin in 1999 from being a possibly 
carcinogenic to humans (Group 2B)” to be a “not classifiable as to their carcinogenicity to 
humans (Group 3)”. The NTP delisted saccharin in their 10th report published in 2002 and 
finally the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), California 
Environmental Protection Agency removed it from the Proposition 65 list of chemicals known 
to the state to cause cancer in 2001 [IARC 1987a, 1999b, NTP 2002, CalEPA 2003]. Before 
that, both the JECFA [1993] and the SCF [1997] had re-evaluated the safety in use of 
saccharin and changed their Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) for saccharin from a temporary 
of 0-2.5 mg/kg body weight to a full ADI of 0-5 mg/kg body weight.  
 
7.4.5 What were the resulting monetary costs and benefits from the actions or inactions, 
including their distribution between groups, and across time? 
 
According to the U.S. FDA’s estimate at the time of their proposed ban the losses for the 
dietetic food processing industry would range from $ 600 million to $ 1.96 billion a year in 
addition to at least $ 97.8 million in increased production costs. The impact on consumers 
would be at least $ 97.8 million a year and in addition to that $ 10 million due to increased 
consumer costs for drugs and cosmetics [Rhein and Marion 1977]. 
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Contrary to what one might expect, supermarkets were stripped bare of saccharin and 
diet foods in the days and weeks following the March 9 decision and manufacturers of 
saccharin products were doing record business even though they had thought they would have 
to shut down. People were “panic buying” and demands could not be met [Rhein and Marion 
1977]. Obviously people did not consider saccharin as a carcinogen they had to worry about. 
Some argued that saccharin has different health benefits for people with diabetes, 
obesity or unusual degree of tooth decay [OTA 1977, Cohen 1978a, 1978b, Merrill and 
Taylor 1985]. According to Kalkhoff and Levin [1978] this amounted to 30 % of the 
American population in 1978. One could easily imagine that the availability of artificial 
sweeteners could make the quality of life better for these people, but these benefits are largely 
unsubstantiated, and untested. Furthermore no sound evidence was/is available at the time, 
concerning whether or not non-nutritive sugar substitutes have greatly improved the ease of 
management of these patients or on, what the impact of a saccharin withdrawal would be on 
this group [OTA 1977, NAS 1978, Kalkhoff and Levin 1978, Smith 1978, Arnold et al. 1983, 
Merrill and Taylor 1985] . Industry was given an opportunity to provide proof of the 
proclaimed medical case of saccharin illustrated in the U.S. FDA commissioner, Dr. Kennedy 
comment cited in Rhein and Marion [1977:12],  
 
 “The burden of proof to demonstrate that saccharin indeed does have medical 
 benefits rests with those who want to market it. We will give them every 
 opportunity to make a medical case for saccharin” 
 
Industry obviously failed to provide this medical evidence.  
A survey of individuals with diabetes mellitus reports that if saccharin were banned, over 80 
% would revert to using nutritive sweeteners to satisfy their desire for foods and beverages 
with a sweet taste [Mehnert 1971]. The benefits for obese patients are also questionable since 
it is assumed that the obese patients are using saccharin as a substitute for other sweeteners 
(e.g. sugar) to reduce their calorie intake. An obese person might merely use saccharin to 
increase his consumption of sweets with no accompanied decrease in calories consumed 
[Merrill and Taylor 1985].  
In general there seems to be a lack of well designed studies on the benefits of saccharin 
both for patients with diabetes, obesity and dental caries [Merrill and Taylor 1985]. Merrill 
and Taylor [1985] speculate on reasons for this lack of studies on benefits. One of several 
explanations is that the belief in the health benefits was so strong, widespread and prevalent 
that scientific confirmation was politically unnecessary. Although doctors agree that saccharin 
use is not ordinary necessary to obtain most of the health benefits it is claimed to provide. 
Another reason given by Merrill and Taylor [1985] is that proponents of the use of saccharin 
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have no incentive to document their case and that failure to do so would materially weaken 
their case.  
 
7.4.6 Were there indirect benefits or negative unintended consequences from the false 
positives? 
 
According to Parker [1978], research into the chemical basis of sweetness was boosted in the 
late 1960s because the ban of cyclamates and the proposed ban of saccharin. According to 
Walter [1974] the ban on cyclamates and the limitations on the use of saccharin (which has a 
bitter metallic aftertaste [Parker 1978, Weihrauch et al. 2001]) had probably intensified the 
search of lower-cost sweeteners and a large number of new discoveries had been made. These 
had relatively little commercial significance though, partly because they had not completed 
the toxicity tests required by the U.S. FDA and partly because undesirable side-effects like for 
instance persistent aftertastes [Walter 1974, Weihrauch et al. 2001]. Another artificial 
sweetener, aspartame was approaching completion of the required tests and Walter [1974] 
speculated that it would probably be marketed in the not-too-distant future, which it was in 
1981 [Weihrauch et al. 2001]. If indeed saccharin had been banned within the next year or 
two, Walter speculated in 1974, it appeared that it would take a while before another non-
caloric sweetener could take its place. This was due to limitations in the ways in which 
aspartame can be used. On the other hand Walter [1974] argued that the course of current 
research in the field the situation appeared likely to change considerably in the somewhat 
longer run. Walter [1974] also noted that the presence of saccharin had in fact been a major 
deterrent to the development of other, more costly non-caloric sweeteners. 
The substitute for saccharin does not necessarily have to be a sweetener, but could also 
be syrups and in 1974, even before the labelling requirements for saccharin, momentum had 
increased in the development and marketing of high-levulose suryps. These were said to be 
comparable in their sweetening properties to sucrose and could be used as a complete 
substitutes for liquid sucrose which would have a huge impact on the US sweetener marked in 
the not-too-distant future according to Walter [1974].  
We now have a hole new generation of artificial sweeteners and there seems to be little 
doubt that the innovation within industry was sparked by the proposed ban and labelling 
requirements of saccharin [Weihrauch et al. 2001, Parker 1978, Newell 1981]. 
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8. The Southern Corn Leaf Blight 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In early 1971, the U.S. Department of Agriculture decided 
to let farmers produce 20 % extra corn in an anticipation of 
that the Southern Corn Leaf Blight (SCLB) would return 
and destroy large parts of the harvest (see figure 8.1). The 
blight did return, but the impact was not as severe as it had 
been the previous year and there was a huge 
overproduction of corn. Since the action taken by the U.S. 
DA turned out to be unnecessary it could be argued that the 
case of the SCLB is a false positive. 
 
 
8.2 Background 
 
The SCLB (or fungus H. maydis) had only been known since the 1920s as a minor disease of 
U.S. corn, which was troublesome in the south, in years with prolonged hot humid conditions 
[Ullstrup 1972, Lawless 1977]. But since almost 70-80 % of the corn (T-cytoplasm) in the 
United States had the same genetic susceptibility to the SCLB, in 1970 the blight spread 
rapidly throughout the States [Lawless 1977, Mann 1997].  
Before the 1950s seed corn companies and others had produced new seeds by crossing 
different strains of corn with desirable characteristics, in order to develop inbred strains and 
seed suitable for a large variety of soil and weather conditions. This involved careful selection 
and hand pollination and was very costly. In order to reduce the need for hand labor in the 
development of hybrids seeds a new technique was developed by seed corn companies. 
Through genetic engineering they incorporated the so-called Texas male-sterile T-cytoplasm 
into one of the inbred strains used in the crossing. The benefit of this was that the tassels 
would not produce fertile pollen and would therefore not have to be removed manually in 
producing hybrid seeds. The use of T-cytoplasm has been estimated to give farmers an 
average gain of 25 % in yields [Lawless 1977].  
In 1969, a greater-than-normal susceptibility to SCLB was noted in seed fields and in 
hybrid test fields by corn company experts and some agricultural college scientist. In the fall 
of 1969, A.L. Hooker of the University of Illinois had demonstrated in greenhouse studies that 
  
Figure 8.1 Crop infected with the SCLB. 
From 
http://www.ns.msu.edu/genetics/ResearchAre
as/plantmicrobe.htm 
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the T-cytoplasm corn was extremely susceptible to SCLB [Lawless 1977], but this 
information came too late. In February 1970, the susceptibility became even more evident 
during the winter seed-growing season in Florida and in spring and early summer, the blight 
appeared in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. In July, the blight had spread into Kentucky, 
Ohio, Indiana and Illinois and in August, it had spread into Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
Canada. The only known effective chemical fungicide, Zineb, was far too expensive for 
anything but special seed-corn uses and the one that was used came too late to be effective - 
so the farmers were completely helpless [Ullstrup 1972, Lawless 1977]. In the South, many 
fields of corn were totally lost. Some were plowed under and planted to other crops when it 
became apparent that the corn crop would fail. In the Corn Belt, yields per acre were reduced 
by 50 % and besides that the ears and stalks of corn continued to rot until harvest. 
Fortunately infected corn was not toxic to animals and could there be used normally [Ulstrup 
1972, Lawless 1977], but the prices still shot from $1.30 per bushel to $1.58 per bushel, on 
the Chicago Board of Trade. By August 24, the price had dropped to $1.46 per bushel and 
continued to fluctuate thereafter as various spokesmen raised or lowered the estimates of 
blight damage [Ullstrup 1972, Lawless 1977]. This was the first time a disease had seriously 
affected the price of corn [Ulsstrup 1972].    
The U.S. DA had predicted a record harvest of 4.8 billion bushels on July 1 and still 
predicted 4.7 billion on August 1, and when the story broke in the newspapers the U.S. DA 
estimated that at least 10 % of the crop would be destroyed. On September 11, they forecasted 
the harvest to be 9 % down to 4.4 billion and a month later, they lowered their estimates 
another 5 % to 4.2 billion. The actual yield was about 4.0 billion bushels equal to a 15 % loss.  
By late 1970, worry began to develop on whether the blight might return and many dire 
predictions were made that the blight would be even worse in 1971. Seed supplies in the U.S. 
were estimated to consist of 25 % normal-cytoplasm hybrids, 25 % T-cytoplams hybrids, 40 
% blends, and 10 % of other kinds of seed. The demand for normal-cytoplasm seed was far 
beyond the supply and despite efforts to reduce the amount of seed corn being T-cytoplasm 
corn, nearly 40 % was of the T type when planting time approached [Lawless 1977].  
The U.S. DA was also concerned and announced in March 1971 that farmers would be 
allowed to plant 20 % more acreage in corn than normal while still being eligible for price 
supports, something which made Midwestern farmers concerned about not only the 
reoccurrence of the blight, but also about overproduction if the blight did not return [Lawless 
1977]. 
The blight did return in 1971, but the level of infection was light and it did not prove to 
be much of a problem. The reason might have been that the weather conditions were not as 
favourable for the blight in 1971 as they had been in the previous year. The U.S. DA 
forecasted an all-time record corn harvest at 5.3 billion bushels on August 24 and prices 
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immediately fell reaching $ 1.11 per bushel when farmers were ready to take their crop to 
market, compared to $1.38 per bushel in the spring. The final harvest turned out to be 5.55 
billion bushels, a 35 % increase compared to 1970. As a consequence the U.S. DA decided to 
purchase 1.4 billion bushels of corn from the Midwestern markets in order to reduce the 600 
million bushel surplus slightly [Ullstrup 1972, Lawless 1977].  
The case of the SCLB caused tremendous concern and directed much needed focus on the 
dangers of genetic engineering without adequate foreplanning and study, because of the 
unsuspected side effects of wholesale genetic engineering. The National Academies of 
Sciences and the National Research Council (NRC) started a broad study of the possible 
genetic vulnerability of other important agricultural crops. In their report, they noted that 
society was demanding a great uniformity in food and fiber crops for ease and economy in 
growing, harvesting, processing, handling, and marketing. And the report concluded that the 
crops applied in the States were acquiring a great genetic vulnerability to disease because this 
physical conformity was attained through genetic uniformity and that this should be avoided 
by a return to more genetic diversity [Lawless 1977].  
There had been some early warnings. In 1961, scientists on the Phillippine Islands 
reported on the susceptibility of the corn line with T-cytoplasmic male sterility and in 1965, 
they provided conclusive evidence of its extreme susceptibility to the fungus, which causes 
SCLB [Lawless 1977]. 200,000 pounds of corn seed was lost in the Midwest in 1968 because 
of an ear rot, which is now thought to have been the SCLB, but it was not recognized at the 
time.  
Subsequent studies revealed that the blight had been present in the Midwest in 1968 and 
1969 and that it had been known at Pennsylvania University since 1955 so the blight had not 
just popped out as reported by some news accounts [Lawless 1977, Ullstrup 1972]. 
 
 
8.3 Analysis of the Southern Corn Leaf Blight 
 
It is not clear when and why it was generally believed that the false positive risk was real, but 
the U.S. DA announced in March that farmers should be allowed to produce 20 % more 
acreage in corn than normal, while still remaining eligible for price support.  
No information has been available concerning whether alternative courses of action 
were considered and why one alternative was preferred over another.  
By July 1971 the U.S. DA reported that the blight had appeared in 581 counties and in 
28 U.S. states but that the level of infection was light [Lawless 1977], and therefore this could 
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be said to be the time when it was realized that the risk was not real or less serious than 
thought. 
In this case the costs were only economic costs and it should be noted that it was the 
seed growers’ use of the T-cytoplasm corn to avoid detasseling costs that permitted the blight 
to develop in the first place [Lawless 1977]. With that said, it is estimated that the outbreak 
cost the nation/farmers $1 billion in 1970 despite the higher prices for corn (Ulstrup 1972 says 
“the nation” and Lawless 1977 says “the farmers”). In 1971 the U.S. DA decided to purchase 
1.4 billion bushels of corn from the Midwestern markets, but the costs of this are not reported 
directly [Ullstrup 1972, Lawless 1977].  
The main lesson to be learned from this case is how important it is for a society not to 
rely only on a few crops, and how important it is to diversify agricultural production and 
maintain adequate genetic diversity in major crops. Moulding crops into such uniformity as it 
happened in this case leaves not only the crop, but also society, which depends on the crop, 
universally vulnerable to attacks by a pathogen, an insect, or environmental stress [Ullstrup 
1972].  
According to Mann [1997], the stark evidence of the dangers of genetic uniformity 
provided in the case of the SCLB led to an international effort to conserve crop diversity and 
today collections hold more than 6 million germ plasm samples, covering some 100 crop 
species and their wild relatives [Mann 1997]. This could be seen as one possible benefit 
resulting from the SCLB. 
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9. Discussion  
 
In this part of the thesis the Precautionary Principle and unnecessary precautionary action will 
be discussed. First different aspects of the proclaimed false positives will be discussed. Then 
it will be argued that the debate concerning false positives and false negatives is far more 
nuanced than most seem to realize. The six questions put forward and answered in each of the 
specific cases will be answered more generally, considering all of the four cases in search for 
characteristics that could be useful for future policy making. In none of the four cases were 
regulatory action taken with specific reference to the Precautionary Principle. Therefore it will 
be discussed whether or not the decisions made were made in the spirit of this principle. 
Opponents of the Precautionary Principle often use proclaimed false positives to argue that 
the principle is anti-technology, anti-science and anti-innovation. It will be discussed if this is 
true in the four cases identified as false positives. This will lead to a discussion of whether 
false positives are worse than false negatives or vice versa.  
 
 
9.1 Proclaimed false positives  
 
There are a lot of proclaimed false positives mentioned in the literature as illustrated in 
chapter 4 - in total about 80 different cases were mentioned. An initial screening showed that 
they are not all false positives, but actually fall into a wide variety of different risk categories. 
If these cases are divided into the different categories these cases mainly fall into the 
categories of “the jury is still out” or real risks (see figure 9.1).  
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Figure 9.1: Distribution of the proclaimed cases into the identified risk categories.  
 
27 cases mentioned in the literature as false positives, scares, etc. where found to be real risks 
in which the potential adverse effect has been well-established and where preventive 
regulatory action is justified.  
Considerable scientific uncertainty, known-unknowns and continuing scientific debate 
were characteristics for the category “the jury is still out”. Because the Precautionary 
Principle states that scientific uncertainty should not be used as an excuse for postponing 
regulatory action, it could be argued that precautionary action in theory is justified in these 
cases. But deciding whether or not action should be taken in the specific case has to take the 
specific circumstances into consideration like for instance the availability of alternatives.  
A limited number of cases fell into the category “non-regulated proclaimed risks”. These 
cases do not present a reasonable argument against the Precautionary Principle, because no 
regulatory action was ever taken. But with that said these cases are definitely undesirable and 
could have unfortunate consequences like for instance causing unnecessary public anxiety.  
It was only possible to identify four cases were it could be argued at present time that 
unnecessary precautionary action was taken. Even in some of these cases, (e.g. saccharin and 
food irradiation), there are still reputable minority opinions that raise concern about their 
safety. 
Although the cases mentioned by known opponents of the Precautionary Principle were 
investigated and the literature on the Precautionary Principle was skimmed, it cannot be ruled 
out that there are additional false positives not identified in this thesis.  
With that said, there are three aspects that strike the eye and that is  
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1. The number of false positives is so low (four) compared with the high number of 
proclaimed false positives (80) in the literature; 
2. There seems to have passed 20 years since the last identified false positive 
described in this thesis;  
3. All of the identified cases were in the U.S. 
 
It is surprising that there are so few identified false positives given the vast amount of 
literature which raise concern about precaution and false positives. A possible explanation 
could be that it is a deliberate strategy to denounce any risk as being real as a sort of first 
automatical response or first barrier of defense in risk communication. Several references and 
leaked documents have shown that some regulated parties have consciously recruited 
reputable scientists, media people and politicians who could be called upon in the case that 
their products were being linked to a possible hazard. These scientists, media people, etc. 
would then be located at different news sources and denounce any risk, no matter whether the 
risk is real or not (Rampton and Stauber 2001).     
Appendix B provides a recent example of a leaked memo where the American 
Chemistry Council was recommended by its California office to hire the public relations 
company Nichols-Dezenhall to carry out an ambitious California campaign against the 
Precautionary Principle. One of the firm’s proposed tactics would for instance be to  
 
“Fund a documentary and associated media blitz that examines “shocking” negative 
past consequences of the PP [Precautionary Principle], in the context of present-day CA 
[California] situations if possible. Possible topics include: the Peruvian outbreak of 
cholera; African nations’ battle with malaria without DDT, vis-à-vis the possible spread 
of West Nile virus”. 
  
The Peruvian outbreak of cholera and “African nations’ battle with malaria without DDT” are 
definitely not cases where the Precautionary Principle has gone wrong and DDT is not the 
right answer to the problems with the West Nile Virus in the U.S. (see chapter 4 for 
information on DDT, Appendix A for information on the Peruvian outbreak of cholera, and 
Tickner [2002] for information concerning the West Nile Virus). 
The leaked memos show that proclaiming cases to be false positives is a deliberate 
strategy applied by some industry groups and think tanks with the purpose to undermine use 
of the Precautionary Principle.  
Sanderson et al. [2004] argue that industry wish to avoid false negatives whereas 
regulators wish to avoid false positives. Considering the number of false positives identified 
in this thesis one could question whether this has been true in the past. According to Shrader-
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Frechette [1991a], there are several reasons for why risk assessors prefer false negatives rather 
than false positives, for instance, because it appears to be more consistent with scientific 
practice. Furthermore many risk assessments and impact analyses are done by those closely 
associated with the technology being evaluated and who are therefore sympathetic to it and to 
those who implement it. In such cases Shrader-Frechette [1991a] argues that assessors 
typically underestimate risk probabilities at least in part, because it is difficult to identify all 
hazards and because unidentified risks are usually assumed to be zero [Shrader-Frechette 
1991a].  
It is not quite clear why so much time has passed since the last identified false positive, 
although a number of events could help explain it. According to Tickner [2001] and 
Christoforou [2004] much of the early precautionary nature of U.S. environmental and 
occupational safety and health legislation was lost during the 1980s in the Reagan 
administration’s drive towards deregulation. Furthermore a U.S. Supreme Court case 
involving occupational health standards for benzene required that agencies demonstrate that a 
hazard represented a significant risk before establishing an occupational health standard. This 
inherently postpones precautionary action and hence favors false negatives [Cranor 1993, 
Tickner 2001]. Finally the NRC [1983] published “Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process”, the so-called “Red Book” proposing a strict distinction 
between the risk assessment and risk management process [Shrader-Frechette 1995]. This 
gave birth to quantitative risk and cost-benefit analyses in environmental and occupational 
health management (many have since then endorsed this distinction between risk assessment 
and risk management, for instance the European Commission in its Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle [European Commission 2000]). The question is if these two elements 
of risk assessment and risk management can and should indeed be separated [Cranor 1993, 
Shrader-Frechette 1995]. There are several inherent unavoidable value judgements in risk 
assessment and a separation from risk management would tend to underemphasize these. 
Furthermore it would overemphasize the role of technical experts and hence disenfranchise 
the general public who ought to be involved and have a voice in risk assessment as well as 
management [Shrader-Frechette 1995].   
Given that risk assessors and therefore risk assessment inherently favour false negatives 
(mentioned by Shrader-Frechette 1991) and given the strict distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management, this preference for false negatives could unavoidably and 
unconsciously have been transmitted to the risk management process.  
Shrader-Frechette [1993] argues that societal decision-making (i.e. risk management) 
involves legal rights, duties and ethical consequences that affect the welfare of persons, 
whereas purely scientific decision-making involves largely epistemological consequences. 
Therefore the decision whether a society should prefer false negatives or false positives 
 103 
should not be left to the risk assessors/scientists, but it should be left to the politicians who 
have the democratic mandate to make such decisions. This does of course not mean that 
politicians should be allowed to manipulate risk assessment to promote their own agenda, but 
it means that value-based decisions in the risk assessment process should be left to the 
political decision-makers. 
The early precautionary nature of U.S. environmental and occupational safety and health 
legislation could also help explain why the four false positives were identified in relation to 
U.S. regulation, but it fails to explain why none seem to have taken place on European soil. It 
is interesting to note that in none of the identified cases was the same “mistake” made on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The Spanish flu killed 40-50 million people worldwide and one would 
think that a possible return of the swine flu would cause international concern, but instead it 
seems that the American approach was questioned internationally [Silverstein 1981]. In the 
case of saccharin, the EU never regulated saccharin and in the case of food irradiation, the EU 
chose a very different approach than the Americans. They required that there is a reasonable 
technological need and invited for a broader debate.  
According to Jasanoff [1991], cultural variation could be a possible explanation for 
these different views. In situations of high uncertainty the analysis of the evidence can be 
influenced by multiple factors. For instance the participation of different classes of 
professionals in the administrative process, the composition and power of scientific advisory 
committees and the legal ad political processes by which the regulators are held accountable 
to the public. Therefore it should be no surprise that the same scientific information is 
interpreted in different ways in different countries. According to Jasanoff [1991] these 
differences can be expected, as policymakers fall back on established, possibly nation-
specific, repertoires of institutional and procedural approaches to secure political legitimacy.  
 
 
9.2 The nuances of false positives 
 
As illustrated in this thesis, the terms “false positives” or “false negatives” have far more 
nuances than the current terminology allows. First of all, there are several different risk 
categories as illustrated in chapter 4 and discussed above.  
Second, even within the cases identified which theoretically could be argued to be false 
positives there are important and interesting nuances. Some of these nuances affected the 
decision-making process and therefore they are important to discuss.  
In the case of food irradiation there are three different kinds of beamers, which can be 
used to irradiate food and one of these apply radioactive material (Cobalt-60 or Caesium-137) 
whereas the other two apply electric energy [Murray 1990].  
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Issues like workers’ health and safety, adequate disposal of radioactive material and 
transportation of radioactive material becomes far more relevant if the first beamers are used 
compared to the last two. These issues do not seem to be well-explored [SOU 1983, Shrader-
Frechette 1993]. No report concerning workers’ health and safety have been found in relation 
to the literature review done in this thesis which could either mean that there are no health and 
safety hazards or that no one has looked. Whereas, consumption of irradiated food might not 
be dangerous, ioinizing radiation from Cobolt-60, Caesium-137 and X-rays are [EEA 2001], 
and several serious irradiation accidents have happened in the past [Shrader-Frechette 1993, 
Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara 1996, Webb and Lang 1990].  
Furthermore, providing adequate security against terrorism would also have to be 
considered since these irradiation plants are highly vulnerable to sabotage [Food Irradiation 
Campaign 2002, Epstein and Hauter 2001, Epstein 2002].  
Another important nuance in the case of food irradiation is the potential misuse of this 
technology and the fact that it might deter from good food hygiene. Even though food 
irradiation has only been applied in a small scale until now, it has already been misused 
several times [Webb and Lang 1990]. It could be argued that the potential misuse of a 
technology should not in itself be an argument for not allowing a technology, which could 
potentially have large benefits, because all technologies can potentially be misused. It could 
also be argued that the misuse of food irradiation in the past was at the early stages of this 
technology and that proper regulatory control would be enough to prevent this from 
happening in future. But the same could have been said about food pathogens in general and if 
control had been enforced we would not have needed food irradiation in the first place. Before 
food irradiation can be universally accepted, it must first of all benefit the consumer, involve 
few risks to the public and for workers, and an effective system enforcing regulations must be 
in place to prevent abuse, i.e. covering up contaminated food [Hackwood 1991]. Unless these 
are provided, consumer resistance will continue to be a problem. [Pothisiri et al. 1991]. 
 
 
9.3 Answering the Questions  
 
In the analysis of the four false positives, a number of questions were used as a framework for 
learning more about each specific case. In the following, these questions will be discussed in 
more general terms in order to reveal if there are similarities which make it possible to draw 
parallels and to identify characteristics with false positives that can be used constructively in 
future decision-making.  
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9.3.1. When and why was it believed that the false positive risk was real?  
 
It does not seem possible to draw any parallels between the four cases for when and why a 
given false positive risk was believed to be real. In the Swine flu affair, concern was mainly 
raised because an “early warning” of an outbreak fit perfectly into the three generally believed 
scientific theories of the returning cycles of flu. In the case of saccharin, concern was 
triggered by new scientific knowledge, whereas in the case of food irradiation, it was not new 
knowledge that caused concern, but instead recognition that the existing scientific knowledge 
had been flawed. In the case of SCLB the available information was very scarce and it is 
unclear when and why it was generally believed that the risk was real.  
It is unclear why the risk was thought to be real and why precautionary action was taken 
in these cases when considering all the false negatives (analysed by the EEA 2001), where 
risks were ignored and actions were postponed again and again. With SCLB as an exception 
both the false positives and the false negatives involved potential severe harm and high 
uncertainty concerning both human and economical costs.  
 
9.3.2 When and what were the main actions (or inactions) taken by regulatory 
authorities or others to reduce the risk?  
 
The choice of regulatory actions or measures differed substantially in the different cases, as 
one might have expected, considering the substantial differences in the circumstances in the 
specific cases. 
In the case of saccharin and food irradiation it could be said that long-term effects were 
initially feared and in both these two cases, an initial proposed ban was later changed to 
labelling requirements.  
In the two other cases, the Swine Flu affair and the SCLB, it was more an immediate 
hazard, that was feared and in these two, precautionary measures were taken to prepare the 
society for the possible impact, should it occur.   
 
9.3.3 Were alternative courses of action considered and why was one preferred to 
another? 
 
Alternative courses of action were considered in all of the four cases, but a “better-safe-than-
sorry”-approach, considerations concerning a fair risk distribution in society and a belief in 
the public’s ability to choose for themselves seem to have been the main reasons for the 
course of action taken, if one considers all the cases as a whole.  
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A “better-safe-than-sorry” approach seems to have guided the decision-makers in the case of 
the Swine Flu affair something, which is seen in the attitude towards vaccinating people 
immediately, rather to store the vaccine in some warehouses. In the case of the SCLB, this 
approach is also apparent since the U.S. DA rather wanted to take the risk of overproducing 
than the risk of being unable to fulfil the demands for corn.  
Considerations concerning a fair risk distribution in society were eminent in the Swine 
Flu affair. For instance a government sponsored program was chosen rather than leaving 
production and distribution to the market, something which would leave poor and elderly out 
[U.S. HEW 1976a, Neustadt and Fineberg 1978, Silverstein 1981]. In the case of saccharin, 
the decision-makers ensured that the consumers would be warned by product labelling and 
trusted that they would be able to decide for themselves whether or not to use saccharin in the 
face of scientific uncertainty about risks and benefits [Degnan and Flamm1995]. 
 
9.3.4 When and why was it realised that the risk was not real or was smaller than 
believed? 
 
With food irradiation as the only exception it would have been impossible for scientists, 
regulatory agencies or decision-makers to have known or to foresee that the potential risk was 
not real.  
The mechanisms by which saccharin causes cancer in rats are so specific, that no one 
could have known that these would be irrelevant to humans and even today these mechanisms 
are disputed and only proven to some extent. 
In the case of the Swine Flu affair everyone involved in the decision-making process 
considered it impossible to put a specific number on the probability of whether or not the flu 
would return. There were some early warnings which fit perfectly into the three theories 
mentioned already, but these theories could be labelled hypotheses since they had not been 
proved and were based on a limited number of data-points. Side-effects of the Swine Flu 
vaccine were anticipated and the public could definitely have been informed better about 
these, but there is no way by which the outbreak of the Guillian-Barré Syndrome could have 
been anticipated since only one study had indicated such a link, and that was in only 1 vaccine 
related incident out of 1100 cases of GBS. Furthermore other flu vaccination programs since 
1977 have not found an increased relative risk anywhere near the high relative risk of 7.1, 
identified during the swine flu vaccination program. 
In the case of SCLB, the U.S. DA did the right thing in anticipating that the SCLB 
would return because it did actually return, but it did not have the same devastating effect in 
1971 as it had had the year before. The reason for this might have been a change in the 
weather conditions, which could not have been anticipated.  
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Food irradiation stands out because it seems that 1981 was the year that a general 
consensus as to the safety of the technology occurred after the WHO had published a review 
of the existing literature. But before that, the WHO and others had endorsed and applied food 
irradiation as a technology.  
Soskolne [2003] has an interesting comment, i.e. that false positives are quickly caught, 
but looking at saccharin and food irradiation this can hardly be said to be the case. The 
requirements to label saccharin were implemented in 1977 and first eliminated in 2000 and 
additional approvals of food irradiation were not given in 20 years. In the case of the Swine 
Flu affair and SCLB there was an upper limit of a year to resolve whether the flu/blight would 
return or not and hence Soskolne's comment does not make so much sense in these two cases. 
 
9.3.5 What were the resulting monetary costs and benefits from the actions or inactions, 
including their distribution between groups, and across time? 
 
Costs of committing false positives were mainly economic, but in the case of the Swine Flu 
affair, it did lead to some unintended deaths and some human suffering and it did divert 
resources from other serious risks because of bad planning.  
Through the implementation of the Swine Flu Program, the people who were supposed 
to receive the vaccine (i.e. “the entire American population”), were the ones who were 
supposed to benefit. Not the manufacturers of the vaccines and not the government. 
According to Dowdle [cited in Bernstein 1985] most involved in the decision-making 
process thought that the vaccine had no risks. This makes the decision about whether or not to 
stockpile less important which again puts the decision to vaccinate into a new perspective. If 
people had received the vaccine and the swine flu had not returned, no harm would have been 
done, whereas if the flu did return human deaths, suffering and economic expense would have 
been prevented. This discussion between stockpiling and relying on production capacity is not 
limited to just the Swine Flu affair, but is still going on with regard to flu planning in general 
(see for instance Cox et al. 2003 and Senior 2001). 
In the case of saccharin, it was again the public who stood to gain and the primary 
manufacturers of saccharin and the secondary manufacturers who applied saccharin (for 
instance producers of diet drinks and conserved fruits) who primarily stood to loose. The 
reason is that they would have had to go back to more expensive substitutes like sugar or use 
resources to find another artificial sweetener. Secondary losers could have been diabetes and 
obesity patients and patients suffering from severe dental carries. It remains, however, highly 
unclear whether this would have been the case in practice, had saccharin been banned.  
In the case of food irradiation the manufacturers are the ones that primarily stood and 
still stand to gain most from this technology. It is often argued that food irradiation could 
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prevent many cases of human death and suffering as well as medical expenses and that it 
therefore would benefit society. There is no doubt that society could benefit substantially from 
preventing the numbers of food pathogens, but the question is whether food irradiation is the 
right answer. Another alternative could be to improve sanitation in the manufacturing 
processes and application of good hygiene, something manufacturers already are required to 
provide by law. The FAO/IAEA/WHO, the EU and the U.S. FDA state that food has to be of 
proper quality and that food irradiation does not free manufacturers from having to enforce 
good food hygiene. The problem is that food irradiation could take away from the 
manufactures the main incentive to improve their hygiene - public outrage in case of an 
outbreak would be the consequence.  
Furthermore the public would have no benefit from food irradiation, but would bear all 
the potential risk [Begley and Roberts 1992, Tritsch 2000]. From a public perspective, food 
irradiation as a false positive had little impact because there are alternatives available. Hence 
it seems that the availability of alternatives minimizes the total impact of the false positive in 
question.  
 
9.3.6 Were there indirect benefits or negative unintended consequences from the false 
positives? 
 
The negative consequences of committing false positives seem mainly to have been 
economic, but in the case of the Swine Flu affair it did lead to some unintended deaths and 
some human suffering.  
Contrary to the arguments often made by opponents of the Precautionary Principle, it 
actually seems that the four false positives sparked innovation within industry and not the 
least within government. For example, the labelling requirements of saccharin led to extensive 
research into the development of new artificial sweeteners, resulting in the production of a 
new generation of sweeteners.  
In the cases of the Swine Flu affair, the false positive resulted in an unprecedented 
nationwide disease surveillance program and government learned how to mobilize resources 
quickly in the face of an apparent public health threat [Langmuir 1979] - this is very important 
for the new concerns related to bioterrorism.  
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9.4 Were decisions made in the cases in the spirit of the Precautionary 
Principle?  
   
The analysis of the answers to the 6 questions above shows that actions were only taken partly 
in the spirit of the Precautionary Principle when considering the four different elements the 
principle often is said to entail in the literature: 1) taking preventive action in the face of 
uncertainty, 2) shifting the burden of proof onto proponents of potentially harmful activities, 
3) exploring a wide range of alternatives to possibly harmful actions, 4) increasing public 
participation in decision-making [Raffensperger and Tickner 1999, Raffensperger et al. 2000, 
Kriebel et al. 2001, Tickner 2001, 2003, Martuzzi and Bertollini 2003]. 
In all four cases preventive action was taken in the face of uncertainty and it seems that a wide 
range of alternatives were explored in three of the four cases (SCLB being the exception). 
However it does not make much sense to talk about reversal of the burden of proof onto 
proponents of potentially harmful activities in the cases of the Swine Flu and the SCLB; it 
could be argued that the burden of proof was reversed in the case of food irradiation. In this 
case, it was the FAO/IAEA/WHO, the U.S. FDA and the U.S. Department of Defense that 
lifted that burden. According to Raffensperger et al. [2000] precaution places a “speed bump” 
in the way of technological development to prevent harm from occurring and it could be 
argued that this is what happened in the case of food irradiation, although the “speed bump” 
seems to have become a mountain.  
In the case of saccharin, industry was given the opportunity to provide evidence for the 
proclaimed benefits of saccharin, but this can hardly be said to be a reversal of the burden of 
proof because it did not require industry to provide evidence of safety [U.S. FDA 
Commissioner Kennedy cited in U.S. Senate 1977].  
Some argue that the Precautionary Principle lowers the standard of proof for the 
regulator proclaiming possible harm [Harremoës 2003], which could be said to be the case in 
saccharin. It can hardly be said that there was a proof of harm “beyond a shadow of doubt” or 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” concerning saccharin. There was “clear and convincing 
evidence” that saccharin caused cancer in rats, especially in two-generation studies. The 
evidence that saccharin also causes cancer in humans was therefore closer to being 
“substantial” and “more likely than not” than “clear and convincing”, all depending on how 
valid extrapolations from animals to humans are considered to be.  
The fourth element of the Precautionary Principle (i.e. increasing public participation in 
decision-making] seems to have been only partly present in one of the four cases. There are 
several different ways to involve the public for instance consensus or “layperson” 
conferences, scenario workshops and science shops [Sclove and Scammell 1999, Tickner 
1999, McGarity 1990], but in the case of food irradiation, a “due consideration” model was 
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chosen. Normally this would involve that the agency (e.g. the U.S. FDA) takes a position in 
advance of public hearings and invites public comments on its position. Afterwards the U.S. 
FDA would then be obliged to give due consideration to all relevant facts and arguments and 
explain why it chose the option that it finally adopted [McGarity 1990]. These methods have a 
number of limitations, for instance that the regulatory decisions already have been made, so it 
cannot be said that the public is involved, but rather that it is allowed to comment on the issue 
and that they do not really reflect the call for a more transparent and democratic decision-
making process [Sclove and Scammell 1999, Tickner 1999, Ashford 2003, Grandjean 2003, 
Ozonoff 2003, Martuzzi and Bertollini 2003].  
Even though mass immunization against the Swine Flu virus involved the entire 
American population no members of the public were asked whether or not they considered the 
Swine Flu Program to be a good idea. In the case of saccharin the public did indirectly have 
some influence on the decision-making process since the large public response is one of the 
reasons often mentioned for why Congress chose to place a moratorium on U.S. FDA’s 
proposed ban. This shows that under the right circumstances, public perceptions and reactions 
can override the customary workings of the regulatory process [Merrill and Taylor 1985].  
The support for saccharin, which in a large part was attributed to large industrially 
supported advertising campaigns, could also be seen as an indirect stakeholder involvement or 
influence by one big stakeholder (i.e. industry). It does not seem that stakeholders like for 
instance diabetes- and obesity patients, etc. were involved in the process, and their interests 
were definitely not clarified. This is illustrated by the lack of studies actually showing the 
proclaimed benefits of saccharin for diabetes- and obesity patients and patients with severe 
dental carries. 
In the analysis of possible alternatives, clarification of all stakeholder interests is 
essential [Martuzzi and Bertollini 2003]. In the case of food irradiation, there were a number 
of stakeholders - the public, and the primary and secondary manufacturers. Primary food 
manufacturers are the ones who would potentially gain from this technology and they have 
been very keen in promoting it. Some argue that the U.S. Department of Energy and the IAEA 
is also a stakeholder in the case of food irradiation with big interests in the development, 
acceptance and implementation of food irradiation. The reason being, that the technology 
would be a way of reducing disposal cost of spent military and civilian nuclear fuel by 
providing a commercial market for Caesium nuclear wastes [Meeker-Lowry and Ferrara 1996, 
Epstein and Hauter 2001].  
The public on the other hand is and has been very reluctant towards food irradiation and 
partly because of this secondary manufacturer have also been reluctant to adopt food 
irradiation. Some argue that the public needs to be convinced and educated about food 
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irradiation in order to have them accept this technology. This approach is bound not to work 
for several reasons. 
First, it assumes that the experts know the true risk and as Shrader-Frechette [1990] 
argues, often they do not.  
Second, it assumes that the perception of risk of laymen is wrong. Although they may 
lack some certain basic information, their conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of 
the expert. It just includes other factors than just probability of fatalities, such as for instance 
considerations about uncertainty, controllability, the benefits of taking a specific risk and 
threats to future generations [Shrader-Frechette 1990, Slovic 1982, 1991, Kasperson and 
Kasperson 1991, Peters 1994]. Actually experts may be as prone to go beyond to 
overconfidence when they have to go beyond their data as laypeople [Slovic 1982]. 
Kahneman and Tversky [1982] have discovered that experts do not necessarily make more 
correct judgements about uncertainty than laymen do, due to heuristics and biases.   
Third, when proponents of food irradiation call for “public education”, it seems to be 
public persuasion rather public information they are talking about. This is problematic 
because it does not only assume that the communicator knows what is true, but also that he 
knows what is good and right [Peters 1994].  
Instead, the public should be seen as a legitimate partner and be involved in both the risk 
assessment and the risk management process [Covello et al. 1991]. Past experiences have 
shown that the public even contribute substantially to a scientific decision-making process 
[Tickner 2000]. This is supported by the results of an old survey done by the European 
Commission in 1979 in nine member states on consumer acceptance related to technological 
develoments. The main lesson learn was that the anxiety shown (by Europeans) about some 
consequences of scientific and technical development is neither undifferentiated nor blind to 
reasoning. This was especially true in relation to considerations of the risks that may 
sometimes be run by playing safe i.e. being precautious [Report by the Commission from 
1979 cited in Feenstra and Scholten 1991].   
 
 
9.5 The main arguments against the Precautionary Principle 
 
Because opponents of the Precautionary Principle often argue that it is anti-technological, 
anti-science and anti-innovation, in relation to false positives it is interesting to discuss and 
investigate whether it is possible to see parallels or tendencies of anti-technology, anti-science 
or anti-innovation through the different cases, assuming that the false positives by definition 
represent the “worst” aspects of the Precautionary Principle.  
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9.5.1 Anti-technology  
 
In the case of the Swine Flu affair a lot of trust was put into in the hands of the manufacturers 
and their ability to mass-produce enough vaccine for the entire American population in just 4-
5 months, something which must indeed be said to trust the technological capabilities of the 
manufacturers. 
In the case of saccharin and the SCLB not much technology was involved. Maybe the 
fact that farmers were allowed to produce 20 % extra could be seen as a trust in their ability to 
do so, but in general these two cases do not support the general argument of the Precautionary 
Principle being especially anti-technology.  
The reluctance to accept and approve food irradiation could be seen as anti-technology. 
One reason that the public has not embraced food irradiation in the way some want them to, 
could be that people automatically associate the term irradiation with something bad because 
of incidents like the Three Mile Island (see Appendix A) and Chernobyl. [Thorne 1991]. 
Another reason could be that we are talking about irradiation and that experts have been 
wrong about irradiation before. They were e.g. wrong when they said that x-raying feet to 
determine shoe size was harmless, and when they said that witnessing A-bomb tests at close 
range was harmless [Shrader-Frechette 1990]. Several studies in risk perception have shown 
that people fear the uncontrollable, dreaded and involuntary risks and these studies have also 
shown that radiation in general is perceived to be one of these risks. On the other hand, 
saccharin and vaccines are considered to be controllable, not dreaded and voluntary risks (see 
for instance Slovic 1982, 1991).  
In general it could be said that acceptance has to do with a positive attitude towards new 
technological developments on the one hand and a negative attitude because of unknown side 
effects of new technologies and their applications on the other hand [Feenstra and Scholten 
1991]. The sources of these positive and negative attitudes arise often from different sources, 
inside as well as outside the public [Feenstra and Scholten 1991]. Nonetheless, Kriebel et al. 
[2001] ask if a clearly safer alternative exists, why accept even a small, highly uncertain risk? 
Martuzzi and Bertollini [2003] raise concern of the danger that the Precautionary 
Principle might be used, or misused against technological development and scientific 
advancement. But generally this does not seem to have been the case in any of the four cases. 
 
9.5.2 Anti-Science 
 
Making decisions under uncertainty involves more than just scientific knowledge. Because the 
scientific knowledge is uncertain other aspects such as legal, cultural and social values 
become major and important factors [Shrader-Frechette 1991a]. With that said, there are two 
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ways in which the decision to apply the Precautionary Principle can be anti-science. The first 
is, if the scientific knowledge at the time of the decision is totally disregarded and the second 
is, if the decision is not reconsidered or re-evaluated in the light of any new scientific 
knowledge relevant to the risk in question.  
In the case of the Swine Flu affair the scientific knowledge at the time was definitely 
considered and maybe even too much faith was put on science - for instance the hypotheses of 
11-year cycles, a 60-year cycle and the assumption that as one virus was on its ebb another 
new one would appear [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978].   
It is not clear whether the Swine Flu program was reconsidered or re-evaluated for 
instance when the English study on six volunteers and the American study on monkeys were 
published and had indicated that the Swine Flu virus might not be especially virulent and 
infectious. According to MWN [1977b], the results of the British study were known to the 
program scientists, and according to Sencer the program was reconsidered three times: after 
the field trials; just before the President's push for money; and finally when the program was 
suspended [Neustadt and Fineberg 1978]. This could indicate that the decision to mass 
immunize was not re-evaluated in the light of new relevant scientific knowledge, but it could 
also mean that the new knowledge was not found to be relevant or in contradiction to the 
purpose of the program.  
In the case of saccharin, scientific evidence that showed that saccharin causes cancer in 
two-generation studies on rats provided the initial basis of U.S. FDA’s proposed ban. This can 
hardly be said to be disregarding science and in fact this decision was delayed for more than 
three years in order to resolve some outstanding scientific issues. Since the OTA report [1997] 
was produced on the request of the Senate to study the technological basis of U.S. FDA’s 
decision, this report could be seen as the scientific foundation of the Congress’ decision to put 
a moratorium on the ban and instead require labelling. The OTA report goes through all the 
available scientific knowledge on animal-, epidemiological- and short-term studies and it 
discusses the unresolved questions and the problems of extrapolating from animals to humans. 
Again this can hardly be said to be ignoring or disregarding science in an unnecessary 
precautionary manner. Actually, there are aspects of Congress’ decision that could be 
interpreted as disregarding science in a non-precautionary manner. Congress had access to the 
first epidemiological study by Howe et al. [1977] which indicated that saccharin was related 
to an elevated incidence of bladder cancer. This study had not been available to the U.S. FDA 
because it was published in the intervening period, but the study was commented in the OTA 
report in an addendum. Congress still chose to put a moratorium on the U.S. FDA’s decision. 
The labelling requirements were terminated by President Clinton in 2000, because the 
mechanism by which saccharin causes cancer in rats was found not to be relevant for humans. 
It would be wrong to argue that the requirements should have been lifted earlier because this 
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hypothesis was first proposed just ten years prior by Cohen et al. [1991a] and had only just 
been accepted by IARC in 1999. Furthermore, even though it has been supported by some 
additional studies, some reputable scientists still argue that it has not been proven and they 
question this hypothesis, referring to studies that contradict it.  
Epstein [2002] and others argue that scientific knowledge has been systematically 
disregarded in the approval process of food irradiation by the U.S. FDA. Since the approval of 
food irradiation has been given step-by-step, it is hard to know whether or not scientific 
knowledge was disregarded and therefore the indirect reason for the reluctance of regulatory 
agencies to approve food irradiation. It does not seem that large reviews of the scientific 
literature by the WHO/FAO/IAEA in 1981 and in 1999 and by the U.S. FDA in 1986 directly 
were followed by approvals given by national agencies like for instance the U.S. FDA. Thus 
there is also no doubt that the safety of food irradiation was re-evaluated by the U.S. FDA.  
Early scientific warnings about the SCLB were either unknown or disregarded, but there 
is not enough information available concerning the specific decision making process to make 
a qualified guess on whether or not new knowledge was reconsidered by the U.S. DA during 
the course of events.  
In all the four cases an interesting note concerning science is that regulatory action 
indirectly sparked a large amount of scientific research within these different fields of science 
previously unexplored. Saccharin and food irradiation are often mentioned as being some of 
the most tested issues ever and the Swine Flu affair gave a new and far better understanding 
of a previously not well understood disease - GBS. And the case of SCLB sparked research 
concerning gene diversity and gene vulnerability. Hrudey and Leiss [2003:1580] state that  
  
 “If a hazard is important enough to invoke precaution as a justification to 
 priory action, it must also be important enough to understand better” 
  
This definitely seems to have been the case in these four cases.  
 
9.5.3 Anti-innovation 
 
As already mentioned, the four false positives seem to have sparked innovation not only 
within government and science, but also within industry. This is in contrast to the arguments 
often made by opponents of the Precautionary Principle and the remarks made by for instance 
Wildavsky [1995] and Mazur [2004] concerning technological innovation (cited in chapter 4). 
It has been known for almost 30 years, that regulation may result in technological 
innovation because stringent regulations indirectly cause dramatic changes in technology and 
often allow new firms or entrants, thereby displacing the dominant technologies. This aspect 
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can be observed in the case of saccharin where the presence of saccharin was in fact 
mentioned as a major deterrent to the development of other, more costly non-caloric 
sweeteners. Thus, strong changes in the market conditions stimulate innovation [Ashford 
1985, 1993, Porter 1991].  
What this study shows to some extent is that any regulation - even unnecessary 
precautionary regulation - sparks innovation. Boissier [2003] argues that the Precautionary 
Principle tells us that innovation is a precautionary duty and several have called for decision-
makers who take this fact into consideration when they consider regulating an existing 
potentially harmful technology [Ashford 1994], but they have seemed reluctant to do so in full 
scale. 
One problem is that current regulatory decisions often take considerable account to the 
dominating industry before issuing a new regulatory standard and hence it cannot be too much 
of a surprise that that does not spur much innovation. The dominating industry is of course not 
interested in new ideas or disruptions of their current dominating status on the market. 
Normally they do not need to innovate and often they are also not able to innovate themselves 
because they cannot abstract from the technological path that has led them to their success, 
which indirectly puts a halt on innovation [Ashford 1979, 1993].  
 
 
9.6 False positives or false negatives - Which are worse?  
 
As described in chapter 3, there has been some discussion whether false positives are worse 
for society than false negatives. Several scholars have argued that society as a whole should 
generally prefer false positives to false negatives because false positives only hurt one 
producer whereas false negatives hurt both other producers, the public health and the 
environment. On the other hand, others have argued that false positives hurt society just as 
much as false negatives. 
As mentioned already, the costs of committing false positives were mainly economic, 
but in the case of the Swine Flu affair it did lead to some unintended deaths and human 
suffering. The consequences and the costs for society of committing false negatives have 
previously been analyzed by the EEA [2001].  
A comparative analysis of the study by the European Environment Agency [EEA 2001] 
and this thesis lead to the following observations: First, although the EEA [2001] just picked a 
number of false negatives without doing a systemically analysis of the literature, they were 
able to identify 14 cases. This has to be compared to only four identified false positives in this 
thesis, meaning that the number of false negatives could substantially outnumber false 
positives (in this case by at least three to one). This can possibly be explained by the 
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conservative attitude of scientists, risk assessors, and regulators towards regulating potentially 
unknown and uncertain hazards before there is extensive scientific evidence for an effect. 
EEA has shown that conservatism leading to false negatives can have high costs for public 
health and the environment. 
Second, it is interesting to note that the costs of just one false negative - asbestos - 
substantially outweigh the sum of health costs in all of the identified false positives. 
Admittedly the Swine Flu vaccine did unintentionally cause the death of several dozens of 
humans, and this is very unfortunate. However, the potential implications of an epidemic 
would have been much greater and it is clear that the lack of precaution as applied to asbestos 
alone has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, which could have been prevented.  
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the risk that an original precaution-
based decision later turns out to have been unnecessary is a risk that decision-makers have to 
be willing to take. The reason is that the potential consequences of being wrong about 
something harmful can be far more severe than the consequences of being wrong about 
something being harmless.  
It is true that a greater application of precaution may lead to a higher risk of false 
positives, but some false positives would have to be tolerated, at the price of controlling false 
negatives [Page 1978]. If a greater emphasis on minimizing false negatives was to happen, the 
number of false positives could provide an indirect measure of how and whether or not the 
Precautionary Principle is implemented in the regulation of public health and the 
environment. Nonetheless, it may be possible to minimize both types of errors through 
consideration of a wide range of alternatives, a broader approach to scientific analysis and 
great public participation in decision-making.  
In the end, the risks associated with committing more false positives is not that they are 
anti-science, anti-technology or anti-innovation, but instead that an accumulation of false 
positives could undermine public support of the precautionary approach [Salzman and 
Thompson 2003]. But this assumes that the current approach does not undermine public trust 
and as Graham [2001:22] argues 
  
 “Waiting for scientific certainty of harm prior to taking protective action is a 
 prescription for new epidemics as well as continued declines in public trust in 
 government, industry and technology” [Graham 2001:22]. 
 
Both false positives and false negatives undermine the credibility of the regulating authority 
and politicians, but whereas false negatives by definition hurt public health and the 
environment, false positives tend not to have such impact, instead they spark innovation 
within government, science and industry and result in harm to the public in only a limited 
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number of cases (1 out of four) where the “unknown-unknowns” imply unpleasant surprises 
i.e. the unsuspected association between the Swine Flu vaccine and the GBS.  
Ashford [1999] argues that policy makers first must choose whether to err on the side of 
caution or risk. Considering the above it could be argued that policy makers should choose to 
err on the side of caution. A commitment to be more precautionary in decision-making would 
likely increase the number of false positives but it would also make the regulating authorities 
and society more prepared on identifying false positives and willing to accept these, and 
reverse the decision made in light of new knowledge. 
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10. Conclusion 
 
There are numerous proclaimed false positives in the literature but a great deal of these is not 
actually false positives in the light of present knowledge. Instead they fall into a wide variety 
of different risk categories like for instance real risks and cases there “the jury is still out”.  
Despite a detailed analysis, it was only possible to identify four false positives: The 
Swine Flu affair, food irradiation and Consumer Health, saccharin, and the Southern Corn 
Leaf Blight. Nonetheless, some other analyst might have reviewed the science and come to 
different conclusions as to the number of true false positives. The analysis of these four cases 
showed that action was generally taken in order to prevent a potentially severe harm, but the 
probability of it materializing was unknown. Alternative courses of action were considered in 
all cases, but a “better-safe-than-sorry” approach, concerns about a fair risk distribution and 
trust in the public’s ability to choose for themselves seem to have been the main reasons for 
the courses of action taken - if all the cases are considered. The costs of committing false 
positives were mainly economic. An exception is the case of the Swine Flu affair because of 
some unintended deaths and the fact that resources were taken away from other serious risks 
because of bad planning. On the benefit side false positives sparked innovation within 
government, science research and industry.  
It can be concluded that there only are a few true false positives and that the ones that 
have occurred have had some beneficial impact on society. This leads to the conclusion that 
fear of false positives is not a reasonable argument against future application of the 
Precautionary Principle.  
Nine valuable lessons can be learned for future policymaking concerning public health 
and the environment:  
 
Lesson 1: The number and the costs of false negatives appear to outweigh the number and 
costs because of false positives. This indicates that policy makers should choose to err on the 
side of caution and focus on minimizing the number of false negatives and the potential Risk-
risk tradeoffs of committing false positives. 
Lesson 2: Unnecessary precautionary action can lead to innovation within industry just like 
regulatory action in general. Decision-makers should to take this into consideration when they 
consider regulating an existing potentially harmful technology and choose regulatory 
measures that can spark innovation.  
Lesson 3: Politicians and the public should be involved in both the risk assessment and the 
risk management process. The public’s general aversion against dreaded, uncontrollable and 
involuntary risks should not be confused with the public being anti-technology. Neither the 
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public nor the risk assessor can claim to know the “true risk” and whereas the risk assessors 
prefer false negatives the public prefer false positives. The public would help the decision-
maker in finding the appropriate regulatory measure. 
Lesson 4: More scientific research and scientific certainty could not have prevented the false 
positives from happening and actually in some of the false positives too much trust was put on 
scientific capability to demonstrate effects. Therefore initiating and funding research to gain a 
better understanding and reduce uncertainties should only be seen as a supplement to other 
risk-reducing regulatory measures and not as a regulatory measure in itself.    
Lesson 5: It is important to be transparent about what is known and about uncertainties and 
make sure that these are made clear in the communication between the scientists, the 
regulating authorities, the politicians and the public. Alternative courses of action should be 
considered with an open mind and bounds should not be put on the range of alternatives in 
advance.  
Lesson 6: It is important to be open and honest about disagreement and not portray it as if 
there is consensus when there is not. Even though scientists and others might think that 
reaching consensus is a goal in itself, disagreement can be quite good to provide the decision-
maker with a broad picture about what is at stake and which options/alternatives he has 
available before making a decision. 
Lesson 7: The availability of alternatives seems to minimize the total impact of the false 
positives, but a proper impact assessment is important to avoid Risk-risk tradeoffs. To reduce 
the potential negative impact of committing false positives, adequate resources should be 
made available so that resources are not diverted from one risk to another.  
Lesson 8: It is necessary to be extra careful when implementing a new substance, technology, 
etc. in a large scale because of the risk of unknown-unknowns. In two of the four cases, the 
precautionary action initially taken had unintended consequences because of events that could 
not have been anticipated and which had severe consequences because of wide spread use 
(The Swine Flu affair and The Southern Corn Leaf Blight).  
Lesson 9: It is necessary to be Flexible. The decision-making process should be designed in a 
way that re-evaluation is a key component so that decisions can be altered in the light of new 
knowledge. If lesson 1 is taken seriously there may be a shift in regulatory practices towards 
being more precautious and hence more false positives could occur. It is important that the 
regulatory decision-makers are prepared to alter their initial decisions about risks in the light 
of new knowledge in case a hazard is indeed fiction.  
Combining a more precautionary approach with proper impact- and alternatives 
assessment in a more flexible management process could result in a decision-making process 
that minimizes the number of false negatives and maximizes society’s benefits from 
committing false positives. 
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Introduction  
 
In the following all the proclaimed false positives identified in the literature will be 
presented and it will be argued that these are not indeed false positives, but instead fall into a 
wide variety of other risk categories. 
 
1. Genetically Modified Organisms  
 
The issue of Genetically Modified Organisms or Crops (also known as biotechnology, 
Genetically Engineered Organisms (GEOs), Gene-Splicing, DNA technology, transgenic 
crops) is a very complex and disputed issue probably more in Europe than in the U.S.A [NRC 
2000]. 
Although concern has been raised about potential human health risks [Royal Society 
2002], most concern has been about the potential negative environmental impact of GMOs.  
Miller and Conko [2001] argue that international biotechnology regulation (i.e. the Biosafety 
Protocol) illustrates some of the perverse effects of applying the Precautionary Principle and 
that the regulation has vastly increased the paperwork and costs of field-testing plant varieties 
created with biotechnology. They further argue that international regulation offers cover for 
overly risk-averse, incompetent, or corrupt regulators, and have thus become potent 
disincentives to research and development in many countries [Miller and Conko 2001]. 
From a American perspective Conko and Prakash [2002] argue that the scientific 
evidence does not support the alleged risk of GMO’s and that the U.S. FDA’s regulation of 
biotechnology is actually far more stringent than necessary to ensure that bioengineered crops 
are safe. Gonko and Prakash [2002] further argue that gene flow between crops and wild 
plants has been going on for a long time and is by no means unique to biotechnology. This has 
not been a problem in the past because most genes that are introduced in to crop plants, 
conventional or biotechnology, have little value in the wild. 
 According to the NRC [2002] transgenic crops do not present new categories of 
environmental risk compared to conventional methods of crop improvement, but NRC further 
state that specific traits introduced by either approach can pose unique risk [NRC 2002].  
Contrary to what Conko and Prakash [2002] argue the NRC [2002] found that small and 
large genetic changes have had substantial environmental consequences in the past. Although 
the consequences of biological novelty depend strongly on the specific environment 
(including the genomic, physical, and biological environments) into which they are 
introduced, the introduction of a biological novelty can have unintended and unpredicted 
effects on the recipient community and ecosystem [NRC 2002]. According to the NRC [2002] 
this argues for a cautious approach to the release of any crop that bears a novel trait and a 
cautious approach to any extensive change in agricultural practices. NRC argues that with few 
exceptions, the environmental risks that will accompany future novel plants cannot be 
predicted. Therefore, they should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with consideration for 
the organism, trait, and environment [NRC 2002]. 
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There are three often mentioned areas of concern about the potential negative impact of 
GMOs - 1) resistance evolution, 2) transfer of genes/ gene flow and 3) impact on non-target 
animals and plants [Ervin et al. 2003, Levidow 2003]. Each of these three will shortly be 
addressed in the following. 
 
Resistance evolution 
 
Resistance evolution entails three elements herbicide tolerance, virus resistance and insect 
resistance.  
Current commercial transgenic crops emphasize effective pest control via the increased 
use of certain pesticides, such as Bt crops bred to resist herbicides, viruses, and insects. There 
is a concern that the genes from herbicide tolerant crops will flow to wild relatives or other 
crops and thereby lead to the development of weed populations which are resistant to 
particular herbicides [NRC 2002, Ervin et al. 2003]. Some observations of this effect have 
already been reported in the U.S. [Ervin et al. 2003].  
There is also a concern that virus-resistant crops might promote diseases in 
neighbouring plants and that it might alter the methods through which viruses are transmitted. 
This could lead to the development of stronger genetically unique viruses that may be difficult 
to control [Royal Society 1998, Ervin et al. 2003]. In 2000 the NRC concluded that U.S. DA’s 
assessment of the potential for virus-protective transgenes in cultivated squash to affect wild 
populations of squash was not well supported by scientific studies [NRC 2000a] and in 2002 
the NRC [2002] found it to be “scientifically inadequate”.  
Finally there is concern that insect populations may adapt to the pest protection 
mechanism of insect-resistant crops and studies done under laboratory conditions show the 
potential for resistance to develop according to Ervin et al. [2003]. Actually the NRC [2002] 
considers such an evolution of insect resistance to Bt crops inevitable. Supporting this 
statement a field study has found that level of resistance development in pink bollworm larvae 
collected from Arizona Bt cotton fields is far above what was expected [Ervin et a. 2003]. 
 
Transfer of genes/ gene flow 
 
There is little doubt in the scientific community that genes will move from crops into the 
wild [Ervin et al. 2003, NRC 2004]. The question is whether they will thrive in the wild, and 
whether they have an advantage over wild plants which makes them more difficult to control. 
Generally the risk of gene flow is higher the closer the areas of GM crops are to their 
wild relatives. Gene flow could become a problem if the transferred genes have a deleterious 
effect on the wild crops or if they provide it with an ecological advantage. There is some 
evidence of this already as gene flow has led to an increased weediness or invasiveness of 
certain weedy species [NRC 2000a, 2004, Ervin et al. 2003].  
Another concern is gene flow within specific crop. It has been reported that “triple-
resistant” canola had developed at a field of three different canola varieties designed to resist 
each of three herbicides. According to a Canadian expert panel herbicide-resistant volunteer 
canola plants are beginning to develop into a major weed problem in some parts of Canada 
[RSC 2001]. The expert panel expressed concern about the potential for resistance to multiple 
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herbicides, which again could force farmers to use older classes of herbicides often more 
harmful to the environment than newer classes [NRC 2000a, RSC 2001, Ervin et al. 2003].  
 
Impact on non-target animals and plants.  
 
There is concern that the toxins produced by herbicide resistant crop may harm non-target 
organisms, including animals and plants that are not pests. One example is the production of 
Bt toxins in corn pollen which could pose a unique airborne toxin-exposure that was never 
found in conventional corn varieties [Royal Society 1998, NRC 2002, 2004, Ervin et al. 
2003]. Laboratory studies confirm that resistant crops could have negative impact on non-
target organism whereas some field studies find no adverse effect. This leads to the 
conclusion that the effects on non-target organisms are unclear [Ervin et al. 2003]. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
In summary the potential environmental impact of GMOs depends on a number of different 
factors like plant species and genetic trait. This makes it problematic to talk about GMOs in 
general and the lack of long-term studies makes an adequate assessment of the potential 
environmental effects impossible at present [Ervin et al. 2003]. It seems clear that there are a 
number of concerns some of which have been supported by scientific observations either in 
the laboratory or in the field, but as a Canadian expert panel [RSC 2001] concluded “…the 
quantity and quality of research on the potential environmental impact of GMOs is 
insufficient to address many of the pressing questions that concern the environmental impact 
of GMOs” [RSC 2001].  
Another problem with largescale planting of not only GMOs, but any crop with new 
traits is that the ability to monitor possible environmental impact is hampered by the lack of 
baseline data and comparative data on environmental impact of previous agricultural 
practices. According to the NRC [2002] the United States does not have in place a system for 
environmental monitoring that allows for adequate assessment of the status and trends of the 
nation's biological resources. Without an adequate monitoring system in place biological 
resources could be shattered without anybody noticing before it is too late.  
This lead to the conclusion that this case falls into the category “the jury is still out” 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
2. Monarch Butterfly and Bt corn  
 
In 1999 Losey et al. published a study in the journal Nature that showed that Bt corn pollen 
was a potential hazard to monarch butterflies. Losey et al. [1999] had applied large amounts 
of Bt pollen from Bt corn to milkweed leaves and found that larval mortality was higher, 
development was slower, and size was smaller in larvae fed the leaves with Bt pollen 
compared to leaves with non-Bt pollen or no pollen. The authors suggested that Bt pollen 
 155 
could dust the leaves of milkweed in the wild and monarch butterflies could eat them and 
suffer adverse effects [NRC 2000].  
The study by Losey et al. [1999] raised a lot of concern about the widespread planting of 
Bt corn in the U.S., but Conko and Prakash [2002:204] call the case an “antibiotech scare 
story” and Marchant [2003] mentions it as a case of excessive precaution.  
A number of studies have been done since Losey et al. [1999] published their study. 
Hansen Jesse and Obrycki [2000] found that the level of natural deposition of Bt pollen on 
milkweed leaves in cornfields was sufficient to kill monarch larvae and hence confirmed the 
findings by Losey et al. [1999].  
The study by Losey et al. [1999] led to a joint research project funded by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and the industry group, Agricultural Biotechnology Stewardship 
Technology Committee (ABSTC). The results of this research were published in a series of 
articles in 2001 and suggested that the impact of Bt corn on monarch butterfly populations is 
negligible [Sears et al. 2001].  
In 2002 the NRC did a review of the Environmental Effects of Transgenic Plants and 
referring to the studies mentioned above the NRC [2002] concluded “…a lack of significant 
risk of acute toxicity to monarchs” had been established. But the NRC [2002] further found 
that the research raised a number of questions which should be addressed in follow-up 
research. 
Because there are a number of unresolved questions this case falls into the category “the 
jury is still out”.  
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out”  
 
 
3. Global warming  
 
Several authors have questioned different aspect of the issue of global warning. Some 
question whether it is occurring, whereas others question whether human activities are 
responsible and the potential consequences of an increased in temperature should it occur 
[Martin 1990, Bast et al. 1994, Wildavsky 1995, Beckerman 2000, Goklany 2000, Milloy 
2001, Christy 2002]. 
According to the National Research Council, the Earth’s surface temperature has risen 
by about one degree Fahrenheit in the past century, and an accelerated warming has occurred 
during the past two decades [NRC 2001]. The 10 warmest years of recorded history all 
occurred in the last 15 year of the 20th century with 1998 being the warmest year ever 
recorded (See figure A1).  
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The snow cover in the Northern Hemisphere and floating ice in the Arctic Ocean have 
decreased and the global sea level has risen 4-8 inches over the past century. Worldwide 
rainfall over land has increased by about one % and the frequency of extreme rainfall events 
has increased throughout much of the United States [IPCC 2001a, U.S. EPA 2004d]. 
According to the IPCC [2001a] and the NRC [2001] most of the warming over the last 
50 years is attributable to human activities which have altered the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere through the build-up of primarily carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. The 
heat-trapping property of these gases is undisputed but it is not easy to say to what extent the 
human-induced accumulation of greenhouse gases since pre-industrial times is responsible for 
the global warming. This is due to incomplete scientific understanding of the several natural 
and human factors like natural climatic variations, changes in the sun's energy, and the 
cooling effects of pollutant aerosols that affect the earth's temperature [IPCC 2001a, U.S. 
EPA 2004d]. 
It is furthermore difficult to say exactly how much the global temperature will rise. With 
that said the IPCC estimates that the temperature could rise between 0.6-2.5 °C in the next 
fifty years, and that it could increase by 1.4-5.8 °C by the year 2100 with significant regional 
variation. This range results from uncertainties in greenhouse gas emissions, the possible 
cooling effects of atmospheric particles such as sulfates, and the climate's response to changes 
in the atmosphere and hence any prediction is marked with substantial uncertainty [IPCC 
2001a, NRC 2001]. But even the low end of this projection would probably be greater than 
any seen in the last 10,000 years according to the IPCC [2001a].  
Another disputed issue is the consequences of an increase in overall global temperature. 
On a global scale evaporation will increase as the climate warms, which will increase average 
global precipitation. Soil moisture is likely to decline in many regions, and deserts may 
 
Figure A1. Global temperature changes (1880-2000). From: U.S. EPA 2004d. Climate. 
Available: Http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html 
[Accessed 23 September 2004]. 
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expand into existing rangelands. Intense rainstorms are likely to become more frequent. Snow 
cover in the Northern Hemisphere and floating ice in the Arctic Ocean will continue to melt 
and sea levels will rise. It is hard to tell what will happen on a regional level, but changing 
regional climate could alter forests, crop yields, and water supplies and it could also affect 
human health, animals, and many types of ecosystems. Contrary to what Burnett and Matthew 
[1997] and others argue there is a serious possibility for spread of tropical diseases since 
global warming could led to an extension of the range of vector borne diseases [IPCC 2001b, 
NRC 2001, U.S. EPA 2004d].  
The above leads to the conclusion that global warning is occurring and hence a real risk 
although the jury might still be out on how fast the temperatures will rise and the 
consequences of increased temperatures.    
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
4. Asbestos in Schools 
 
In 1973 the U.S. EPA banned the use of asbestos in schools and in the late 1970s the U.S. 
EPA started formulating regulations that would reduce the asbestos exposure of 
schoolchildren [Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. The U.S. EPA guidelines only required removal 
of asbestos if the asbestos-containing materials were significantly damaged, but according to 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] several schools misunderstood the guidelines taking them as a 
mandate to remove all asbestos. On one occasion the New York Board of Education decided 
to close the schools in New York just before the fall semester of 1993, because of public 
concern and demands from parents that their children’s schools were “absolutely safe”. 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that this led to unnecessary expense and to the diversion 
of already scarce school fund from other needs. Wildavsky [1995] argues that the excess risk 
for children exposed to asbestos in school buildings was so small that it did not justify the 
resources used to remove it. Furthermore, Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that the post-
removal levels were often significantly higher than pre-removal levels.  
When using a linear no threshold model, the U.S. EPA calculated that life time exposure 
to asbestos dust containing 0.0001 fibers > 5 m in length per mL of air could result in about 
2-4 excess deaths per 100.000 people. There are no measurements available on the pre-
removal levels of asbestos in the school buildings in which asbestos was actually removed. 
Some estimates are available from other school buildings. In one study where 398 air samples 
were taken in 48 school buildings the mean average fiber level was found to be 0.00051 fibers 
per mL (90th percentile reached 0.0016 fibers per mL). In another study, where 1008 air 
samples were taken in 171 school buildings, the mean average fiber level was found to be 
0.00011 fibers per mL (90th percentile reached 0.0005 fibers per mL) [Wilson et al. 1994].  
If it is assumed that a mean average of 0.00011 fibers were present in the schools prior 
to removal this would led to between 2-4 excess deaths according to the U.S. EPA’s 
conservative estimates. Even though 2-4 excess death per 100.000 by conservative estimates 
could be said to be a small risk, it is still a risk that cannot and should not be ignored. 
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Furthermore there is some evidence that short-term exposure should not be disregarded 
as a public health concern [ATSDR 2001].  
 
Main risk category: Real risk  
 
 
5. Asbestos in Hair Dryers  
 
In 1978 it was found that some hair dryers containing asbestos sprayed this asbestos when 
used. Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that asbestos in hair dryers is unfounded health 
scares.  
It has been known for a long time that asbestos is a serious health hazard, but whether or 
not hair dryers containing asbestos pose a health risk is unclear.  
It is certain that adequate and non-toxic alternatives were available at the time and that 
asbestos-containing dryers were pulled of the markets voluntarily before any regulatory action 
was taken. Since no regulatory action was taken in this case it falls into the category of “non-
regulated proclaimed risk”.  
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”   
 
 
6. Dioxin  
 
Gough [1994] argues that there is no convincing evidence that dioxin (i.e. 2,3,7,8-
Tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin or 2,3,7,8-TCDD) has caused any human disease except a 
serious skin disease known as chloracne, which only occurs in highly exposed persons. 
Whelan [1993] adds that “scaremongers” and environmentalists “need” dioxin to be a hazard 
in order to justify future regulation based on evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental 
animals.  
According to IARC [1997] 2,3,7,8-TCDD is “carcinogenic to humans (Group 1)” based 
on limited evidence in humans and sufficient evidence in experimental animals. According to 
NTP [2002] dioxin (TCDD) “…is known to be a human carcinogen based on sufficient 
evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans… ”. 
Thus there seems to be little doubt that 2,3,7,8-TCDD is a real risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
7. Agent Orange 
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During the war in Vietnam the U.S. used Agent Orange as an herbicide to 1) suppress 
vegetation around base camps, 2) uncover North Vietnamese bases and 3) destroy crops of the 
enemy [Wildavsky 1995]. Agent Orange consisted of equal portions of 2,4-D (2,4-
dichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and 2,4,5-T (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid) and contained 
dioxin, TCDD as a contaminant [Tickner 2001].  
Several Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange have complained about various 
health effects after returning to the U.S. A class-action lawsuit was filed and final settlement 
was reached, and approved in 1985 [Wildavsky 1995, Tickner 2001].  
According to Milloy [2001] the alleged link is “junk” for many reasons, including lack 
of correlation between troop deployment in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and soldiers’ 
blood levels of dioxin.  
In relation to the Agent Orange Act of 1991 (PL 102-4) the NAS’ Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) reviewed the literature on Agent Orange [Tickner 2001, Young 2002]. The IOM was 
by law required to discuss the evidence and determine the existence of a “statistical 
association” rather than a “cause-effect relationship”. The IOM is not required to review only 
studies of veterans, but can review studies from all over the world.  
The first IOM Committee report was released on July 27, 1993 and the IOM Committee 
found “sufficient evidence of an association” for five different diseases and conditions: soft 
tissue sarcoma, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, Hodgkin’s disease, chloracne, and porphyria 
cutanea tarda [IOM 1994, Tickner 2001]. 
Several updates of the first IOM report have since then been published and in 2000 the 
IOM [2001c] found “limited/suggestive” evidence of an association for among others the 
following health outcomes: Respiratory cancers, prostate cancer, and Type 2 diabetes. In 2004 
the Committee [IOM 2004] found that the increased risk of respiratory cancer occurs within 
10 years of exposure and that it was still increased several decades after.  
Therefore Agent Orange must be considered to be a real risk 
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
8. Times Beach, Missouri 
 
In 1983 the U.S. EPA and the State of Missouri announced that they would buy-out all the 
residents of Times Beach, Missouri because it was contaminated with 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin). 
Action was taken after the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had completed a soil analysis 
and had found that the hazard posed by dioxin contamination was a continuing threat to the 
health of citizens in the community. Wildavsky [1995] and Lieberman and Kwon [1998] 
argue that Times Beach was an overreaction and that there is no evidence of increased illness.  
There is some disagreement about exactly how contaminated Times Beach actually was. 
According to the U.S. EPA levels of dioxin was greater than 1 ppb and less than 5 ppb of the 
some 255 samples taken in a few yards and in one home. Sample taken in the streets, on 
shoulders and in ditches show levels from non-detectable up to 100 ppb. [U.S. EPA 1983, 
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Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. The ATSDR [1998] state that contaminated soil at Times Beach, 
Missouri, had levels of 2,3,7,8-TCDD ranging from 4.4–317 ppb.  
There is little doubt that dioxin is a carcinogen [NTP 2002, IARC 1997], but the 
question is how much dioxin the residents were exposed to and how much the “safe dose” is 
considered to be if such a dose can be said to exist at all.  
A “virtually safe dose” between 0.006 and 0.028 pg/kg body weight per day has been 
calculated by applying mathematical models to the cancer data. The biological relevance of 
such models is questionable according to the United Nations Environment Programme, the 
International Labour Organisation, World Health Organization’s International Programme on 
Chemical Safety (IPCS) [1989] because the TCDD has not been shown to be genotoxic, and 
because dioxin has been found to be a strong promoter of liver tumours in a two-stage pre-
carcinogenesis study. Using safety factors in the range of 100 to 1000 to avoid the use of 
mathematical models, several evaluations have calculated the “tolerable daily intakes” have 
been calculated for human beings in the range of 1-10 pg/kg body weight [IPCS 1989a]. 
It could be argued that people normally do not eat soil, but children often do during their 
first years of life and because of the high amounts of dioxin present in the soil compared to 
the tolerable daily intake, this case falls into the category real risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
9. The “Cranberry Scare” of 1959  
 
Several authors have mentioned the “Cranberry Scare” of 1959 as a case of unnecessary 
regulation [Martin 1990, Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman & Kwon, 1998, Mazur 2004].  
In 1959 the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in the U.S. Arthur Fleming 
issued a warning against cranberries grown in Oregon and Washington (just before 
Thanksgiving) because they had been found to be contaminated with Aminotriazole (better 
known as Amitrole), a weed killer that the U.S. FDA had found to cause cancer in the Thyroid 
of the rat [Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. 
Amitrole had not been approved for use on crops in 1959, but growers had been using it 
anyway. It is not quite clear how much Amitrole that was found on the cranberries, but 
Wildavsky [1995] cites that it was less than 1 ppm. This has to be compared with the 
conditional acceptable daily intake (ADI) for Amitrole of 0-0.00003 mg/kg body weight 
established by the FAO/WHO in 1975 [IPCS 1994].  
In 1994 the IPCS [1994] stated that Amitrole does not present a significant risk to 
human health when used according to good handling procedure which among others includes 
restrictions to non-crop use ensuring minimum human exposure.  
In 2001, IARC found that there was “inadequate evidence” for the carcinogenicity of 
Amitrole in humans, but that there is “sufficient evidence” for the carcinogenicity of 
Amitriole in experimental animals. In their overall evaluation IARC [2001] stated that 
Aminotriazole is “not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans (Group 3)”. The NTP 
[2002] states that Amitrole is “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen” based on 
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sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals and according to the European 
Chemical Bureau there is limited evidence of a carcinogenic effect [European Chemical 
Bureau 2004].  
There seems to be some disagreement about whether or not Amitrole is a carcinogen and 
therefore this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. Furthermore, although the 
IPCS [1994] stated that Amitrole did not present a significant risk to human health this 
conclusion was under the condition that it was not used on crops. But in the “Cranberry scare” 
growers had been using it on crops.   
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
10. Love Canal  
 
In the spring of 1980 nearly a 1,000 families were evacuated from the Love Canal, a Niagara 
Falls neighbourhood near an abandoned toxic chemical waste dump [Wildavsky 1995, Mazur 
1998, Lieberman and Kwon 1998].  
Wildavsky [1995] argues that there was no evidence for harm and that “no illness, not 
even a cold, can properly be attributed to living next to Love Canal”. The Love Canal also 
figures on Lieberman and Kwon’s list of 25 unfounded health scares [Lieberman and Kwon 
1998].  
Several books and articles have been written about the Love Canal (See for instance 
Levine 1982, Gibbs 1998, Mazur 1998, Brown and Clapp 2002, and Fletcher 2002). There is 
no doubt that Love Canal was a heavily contaminated site and according to Mazur [2004] no 
informed observer could deny that were was a real hazard. More than 200 different toxic 
chemicals were found in air, water, and soil samples near the dumps and around the canal 
among others dioxin, toluene and benzene which are known carcinogens [Levine 1982, Gibbs 
1998]. According to the U.S. EPA these chemicals discarded at Love Canal over the past 30 
years have triggered several health problems, including miscarriages, among the area's 
residents [U.S. EPA 1979a, 1979b]. Hence this case falls into the category real risk. 
 
Main risk category: Real risk  
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11. Superfund’s abandoned hazardous waste sites  
 
In relation to hazardous waste sites, public concern has been raised about the potential adverse 
health effects of living near a hazardous waste site, especially for children [Johnson 1995]. 
But Milloy [2001] argues that there is no evidence that any child has ever been harmed by just 
living near a hazardous waste site.  
The case of the Love Canal indirectly led to the adoption of the Superfund Program. The 
purpose of the program,is and was to fund for the governmental cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites all over the U.S. [Wildavsky 1995]. The number of contaminated sites is disputed, but 
numbers mentioned in the literature range from 40, 000 [Johnson 1995] to 439,000 [NRC 
1991], but it is seems indisputed that the Superfund Program has been very expensive to date. 
Wildavsky [1995] asks whether or not it is worth investing large amounts of money in 
cleaning low-contaminated waste sites.  
Contrary to what Milloy [2001] argues there is plenty of evidence that living near 
specific hazardous waste sites is associated with adverse health effect, including low 
birthweight, cardiac abnormalities, headache, fatigue, and a constellation of neurobehavioral 
problems [NRC 1991].  
In 1991 the National Research Council concluded that the overall impact of hazardous 
waste sites in the American environment is unknown because of the limitations of identifying 
and assessing the exposures and their potential health effects. Still the National Research 
Council found that there was sufficient evidence that hazardous waste has produced serious 
health effects in some populations [NRC 1991]. 
A number of epidemiological studies have also been done in order to investigate 
whether or not there is an increased risk of cancer and adverse reproductive outcomes in 
association with living near hazardous waste sites (see for instance Croen 1997 and Dolk et al. 
1998). The evidence indicates a slight increased risk, but there are a number of shortcomings 
with this evidence for instance large confidence intervals and lack of human exposure 
information.     
Although there might be some lack of evidence of harm concerning hazardous waste in 
general, there is no doubt that a lot of specific sites have had substantial adverse health impact 
on people and children living nearby. Hazardous waste sites are therefore considered a real 
risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk   
 
 
12. Three Mile Island  
 
In March 1979 there was a severe accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station 
following multiple human and technological failures [Perrow 1984, Giere 1991, Lieberman 
and Kwon 1998, Walker 2004]. The Nuclear Station had come out of control and a substantial 
portion of its core melted leading to a radioactive outlet. Five days after the outlet the 
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Governor of Pennsylvania advised all pregnant women and preschool children living within 
five miles of the TMI to evacuate the area. In total 60 % of the residents followed the 
Governors advice [Walker 2004].  
The TMI case figures on Lieberman and Kwon [1998] list of unfounded health scares 
and they seem to question that any adverse consequences followed the outlet. Graham [2004] 
argues that there is no evidence of significant public health harm caused by the accident at 
Three Mile Island. Lieberman and Kwon state that an individual standing on the border of the 
plant site for the duration of 10-days following the accident would be exposed to about 80 
millirems and that the average likely dose to persons living within five miles of the plant was 
estimated to be 9 millirems. Both numbers are far short of the annual non-occupational 
permissible dose of 500 millirems for an individual [Walker 2004].  
A number of epidemiological studies have been done in order to investigate whether or 
not the accident had any long-term effects. In a reanalysis of data previously collected Wing 
et al. [1997] found evidence, which supported the hypothesis that radiation doses are related 
to increased cancer incidence around TMI. But large epidemiological studies recently 
published show no statistically significant increase in cancer death in the TMI population 
[Talbott et al. 2000, 2003, Walker 2004]. They do, however, show a slight overall increase in 
deaths in the TMI population primarily due to heart diseases. This condition is not believed to 
be related to radiation, but to the additional stress from living in the shadow of the accident 
[Holzman 2003]. Supporting this is the fact that there have been reports of demoralization 
among the TMI population [Dohrenwend 1981]. Demoralization defined as non-specific 
stress including feeling of sadness, depression, headaches, sour stomach, feelings of 
helplessness [Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004].  
Although it seems that no one got directly physically hurt at the accident and no long-
term effects have been observed [Walker 2004], it seems inappropriate to argue that an 
accident at a nuclear station in which the core substantially melted and which led to an 
radioactive outlet does represent a risk worth evacuating people for. As Mazur [2004] argues 
no informed observer would deny that the TMI posed a real hazard and hence this case falls in 
to the category “too narrow a definition of risk”.  
 
Main risk category: “Too narrow a definition of risk”. 
 
 
13. Perchloroethylene in a Harlem School  
 
In June and July of 1997 the air in a New York City elementary school was tested for levels of 
Perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene) also known as “perc”. The school building had 
previously been used as a dry cleaning plant and one week into the school year levels of perc 
was found to be above the 15 ppb guideline. After pressure from parents the New York 
School board shut the school down [Lieberman and Kwon 1998].  
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that even though actions was taken for the benefit of 
the children’s health, the effects of the decision will in fact be detrimental to the children 
because they will have to be scattered to others, overcrowded schools. Furthermore they argue 
 164
that the taxpayer’s money was wasted on this scare which could have been spent on such 
things as school libraries. 
Perc is and was widely used in dry-cleaning fabrics and metal degreasing operations and 
most of the information about the health effects of perc comes from studies on workers in 
these plants. The main effects of perc in humans are neurological, liver, and kidney effects 
following short-term and long-term inhalation exposure. Adverse reproductive effects have 
also been reported from occupational exposure to perc, but no definite conclusions can be 
made because of the limitations of the studies [U.S. EPA 2004a]. 
IARC [1995a] has classified perc “…as probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A)” 
based on limited evidence in humans and adequate evidence from experimental animals. The 
NTP [2002] state that perc is “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen based on 
adequate evidence from experimental animals”. According to the U.S. EPA [2004a] results 
from epidemiological studies of dry-cleaners occupationally exposed to perc suggest 
increased risks for several types of cancer.  
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that the levels of perc were so small (just above 15 
ppb) that no health effects of any kind could have been noted. Current standard and guidelines 
are listed below. 
  
Compared with these standards and guidelines 15 ppb seems to be a quite small exposure 
limit, but for a number of reasons it cannot be rejected that even low exposure could have an 
effect.  
First of all, children exposed to the same levels of perc as adults may receive a larger 
dose because they have among others greater lung surface area, body weight ratios and 
increased minute volumes. Children may also be exposed to higher levels than adults in the 
same location because of their short stature and the higher levels of perc found nearer to the 
ground [ATSDR 1997b].  
Second, studies of people living near dry cleaning facilities have shown neurological 
effects even though their exposures have been at lower concentrations compared to the 
workers. In 2003 the U.S.EPA convened a panel of experts and conducted a peer consultation 
workshop to discuss neurotoxicity of perc [U.S. EPA 2003a, 2004b]. The expert will discuss 
the question of whether or not this limited information at lower exposures is strong enough to 
Tabel A1: Current standards and guidelines [ATSDR 1997b]. 
OSHA PEL (permissible exposure limit) = 100 ppm (averaged over an 8-hour workshift) 
OSHA Ceiling for 15-minute exposure = 200 ppm; 5-minute maximum peak in any 3 hours = 
300 ppm 
NIOSH IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health) = 150 ppm; potential occupational 
carcinogen 
AIHA ERPG-2 (maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all 
persons could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or 
other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective 
action) = 200 ppm. 
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infer that low concentrations of perc is a hazard to the general population [U.S.EPA 2003a, 
2004b]. Since the opinion of the expert panel has yet to be published it could be argued that 
there is still a substantial amount of uncertainty about the long time effects of low exposure to 
perc. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
14. Chemical Mace 
 
In the 1960s chemical maze (2-Chloroacetophenone (CN)), a form of tear gas in a hand-held 
sprayer, became widely used by many police departments for riot control. The mace was 
frequently used during the disturbances of the late 1960s in the U.S. and much controversy 
developed over chemical maze when reports indicated that it can cause permanent injury 
[Lawless 1977]. At the time the U.S. FDA took the position that chemical maze did not 
present a serious hazard to the public health and safety and hence the use of the maze was 
never regulated. According to Mazur [2004) this case is a “false alarm”.   
According to Hu et al. [1989] tear gas has been documented to cause severe traumatic 
injury as well as lethal toxic injury. Whether tear gas can cause long-term pulmonary, 
carcinogenic, and reproductive effects is unknown because of data deficiency [Hu et al. 
1989]. 
Thus exposure to tear gas is not a benign phenomenon, and serious ocular morbidity can result 
[Gray 1995]. According to the U.S. EPA [2004] there have been several reports on the 
outcome of the use of CN alone or in combination with other lacrimating agents such as 
chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS), in riot control situations in prisons. In one case a 33-year-old 
male inmate died 46 hours after an initial gassing with tear gas containing CN and CS and his 
dead was later attributed to exposure to tear gas. In another case 8 inmates were hospitalised 
after CN had been sprayed into 44 prison cells and 20 other inmates suffered primarily dermal 
and ocular injuries, but all 28 patients recovered from the effects of exposure to CN [U.S. 
EPA 2004c].  
Because regulatory action was never taken by the U.S. FDA in relation to chemical 
maze and because most of injuries seem to be reversible it could be argued that this case falls 
into the category “non-regulated proclaimed risk”. But there have been reports about 
permanent injuries from the use of CN and hence it could be argued that this case fall into the 
category real risk. 
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”, Subcategory: Real risk  
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15. Radon gas in houses poses a health risk 
 
According to Milloy [2001] the evidence that radon in homes causes lung cancer is 
unpersuasive mainly because the it is based on extrapolation from uranium miners who were 
exposed to high doses for long periods of time.  
According to both IARC [1988] and the NTP [2002] radon is known to be a human 
carcinogen and several small case-control studies of people with lung cancer have suggested a 
higher risk among individuals living in houses known or presumed to have higher levels of 
radon.  
According to the U.S. EPA [2003b] radon in homes causes in the range of 3,000 to 
33,000 excess cases of lung cancer in the U.S. This makes it the second leading cause of lung 
cancer after cigarette smoking. It is correct that exposure information from miners had to be 
used to extrapolate to peoples exposure in their homes, but taking this into consideration the 
U.S. EPA estimates that 21,100 (14.4 %) out of 146,400 lung cancer deaths in 1995 in the 
U.S. were radon related. 
 
Main category: Real risk 
 
 
 
16. Risk of nuclear power   
 
According to Graham [2004] many risk specialists in the USA regret some of the prior policy 
steps taken on the basis of precaution. As an example he mentions that there has been a de 
facto moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants in the USA since the Three 
Mile Island incident [Graham 2004]. As a consequences the U.S.A has become deeply 
dependent on fossil fuels for energy and “…now precaution is being invoked as a reason to 
enact stricter rules on use of fossil fuels” Graham [2004] argues.  
Bast et al. [1994] argues that the public is being hysterical about nuclear power and has 
been since the Three Mile Island incident. Bast et al. [1994] further argue that low doses of 
radiation is not harmful and that nuclear power is a safe and clean technology, although they 
admit that accidents do happen at any large factory involving hundreds of workers. 
First of all, orders to construct nuclear plants began to decline sharply even before the 
Three Mile Island accident. By September 1974, 57 of 191 nuclear plants under construction, 
under licensing review, on order, or announced by utilities had been delayed by a year or 
more and a few had been cancelled all together. Fourteen months later, 122 of the 191 projects 
had been deferred and 9 had been cancelled. Between 1975 and 1978, U.S. utilities ordered 
only 11 nuclear units. Utilities cut back on both coal and nuclear projects, but the blow fell 
disproportionately on builders of nuclear units because of higher capital costs [Walker 2004]. 
The main reason for this is only partially public opposition to nuclear power. The energy 
crisis of the early seventies sharply and quickly drove up the price of oil and other fuels that 
utilities purchased to run their plants. This again drained their financial resources. Adding to 
this, the serious problem of inflation greatly increased the cost of borrowing money for plant 
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construction and at the same time, an economic slump and increasing unemployment, 
curtailed demand for electricity, which grew at substantially slower rate than experts had 
anticipated [Walker 2004]. As Giere (1991:184) states 
  
 “The accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl dramatized the dangers of 
 nuclear power, but the immediate cause of the demise of the nuclear power 
 industry in the United States has been economic” 
 
Supporting Giere’s statement, the costs of nuclear-generated electricity was quadrupled in the 
1980s alone and 2001 data from the U.S. Department of Energy show that nuclear fission is 
more expensive, per kilowatt-hour, than coal, natural gas, wind, and solar thermal [Shrader-
Frechette 1993]. According to Shrader-Frechette [2003] this is just another reason that no new 
nuclear plant has been ordered since the seventies.  
Second, there seem to be little doubt that a major reactor accident could release large 
amount of radiation to the environment and history has proven this in the case of Chernobyl. 
The dispute seems to be about how likely such an event is supposed to be and there seems to 
be a large disagreement between expert’s and laymen’s perception of risk. In 1975 the 
Rasmussen report assessed the Reactor safety in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. 
They found that that the probability of having an accident like the Three Mile Island is 
anywhere from 1 in 250 to 1 in 25,000 reactor-years. These estimates did not take (among 
others) the possibility of human errors into consideration. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission data indicate that there is a fifty-fifty chance of having another accident the size 
of the Three Mile Island or larger [Shrader-Frechette 1993]. 
Third, the problem may not be nuclear power in itself, but the radioactive waste it 
produces. During the 1980s the radioactive waste doubled and there is still controversy 
surrounding how to deal with it. Although large scale nuclear accidents might be rare, several 
accidents have occurred on nuclear storage facilities causing the death of hundreds of people 
and cleanup will cost hundreds of billions of dollars [Shrader-Frechette 1993].  
 
Main risk category: “Too narrow a definition of risk” 
 
17. Benzene in Perrier Water  
 
In 1990 bottles of Perrier - French mineral water - was to found be contaminated with 
benzene, at levels ranging from 12.3 to 19.9 ppb [Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] do not seem to question that benzene causes cancer in 
humans and they do not dispute that benzene was found in concentrations above the standards 
set by the U.S. EPA for drinking-water supplies [IARC 1987b, NTP 2002, ATSDR 1997c, 
U.S. EPA 2000]. They seem to question whether the concentrations found should have led 
Perrier voluntarily to withdraw 72 million bottles and halt production worldwide.  
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The source of contamination was later found to be the filters at the spring that is the 
source of Perrier mineral water. Workers had failed to shift the filters for four months, which 
led to the contamination [Lieberman and Kwon 1998].  
Considering that there are other effects (than cancer) like vomiting, irritation of the 
stomach, dizziness etc. associated with drinking water contaminated with high levels of 
benzene and considering that it turned out that the contamination was caused by Perrier 
themselves, the action Perrier took voluntarily seems both proportional and appropriate.  
 
Main category: Real risk, Subcategory: Non regulated Risks 
 
18. Ethylene dibromide  
 
Ethylene dibromide (EDB) or 1,2-dibromoethane is a pesticide, which was used to control 
insects and mold infestation of grain stored over long periods of time. The substance was 
banned in 1984 by the U.S. EPA after high EDB residues had been found in food [Lieberman 
and Kwon 1998].  
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that since the removal of EDB (also known as 1,2-
dibromoethane) from the marketplace, fruit and grain producers have had to use one of three 
alternatives to prevent insect infestation: methyl bromide, carbon disulfide mixed with carbon 
tetrachloride or phosphine.  
The first two alternatives have shown to be animal carcinogens and the third is highly 
flammable and has never been subject to chronic toxicity testing according to Lieberman and 
Kwon 1998. Something also Martin [1990] mentions.  
According to Gray and Graham [1997] EDB was used to kill a fungus, which is known 
to produce a potent carcinogen, aflatoxins which again is believed to be responsible for many 
excess incidence of cancer worldwide. They argue that the U.S. EPA should have taken this 
into their consideration when banning EDB because the public might be exposed to a much 
higher risk through Aflatoxin than through EDB. 
According to IARC [1999c] EDB is “probably carcinogenic to humans” (classified as 
“Group 2A”) and according to the NTP [2002] EDB “is reasonably anticipated to be a human 
carcinogen based on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals”.  
After considering the toxicological characteristics of EDB, the IPCS [1996] could 
neither qualitatively nor quantitatively estimate an exposure that would not cause adverse 
effects in humans. Therefore it states that “…all appropriate measures should be taken to 
eliminate or minimize human exposure to 1,2-dibromoethane” [IPCS 1996].  
It could be argued that by banning EDB and eliminating the risk of cancer caused by 
EDB residues, people got more exposed to aflatoxins, which is another cancer causing agent. 
If it is assumed that there are no other safer alternatives, which is not necessarily the case, it 
could be argued that this case falls into the category Risk-risk tradeoff.  
 
Main risk category: Risk-risk tradeoff, Subcategory: Real risk 
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19. 4-MBC in sun-lotion 
 
In the spring of 2001 the Danish EPA asked producers, importers and retailers voluntarily to 
withdraw sun lotions containing the ultra violet (UV) sunscreen component 3-(4-
methylbenzylidine)camphor (4-MBC) from the market. The editorial office from the Danish 
newspaper Politiken calls this action “an overreaction” [Poltiken 2001].  
The Danish EPA decision came after a study by Schlumpf et al. [2001] had found that 
some UV screens (among others 4-MBC) exhibit estrogenic activity in cell culture and in an 
acute in vivo test [Danish Environmental Agency 2001]. These studies have since then been 
confirmed by others [Tinwell et al. 2002].  
The safety of 4-MBC was reviewed by the European Commission’s Scientific 
Committee on Cosmetic Products and Non-food Products (SCCNFP) in 1998 and again in 
2001 after the studies by Schumpf et al. [2001] were available. The SCCNFP stated that the 
organic UV-filters used in cosmetic sunscreen products today had no estrogenic effects that 
could potentially affect human health [SCCNFP 2001].  
Despite of the SCCNFP [2001] opinion the Danish EPA found that a number of issues 
remained for instance whether or not it could be expected that 4-MBC showed synergetic 
effect with other estrogenic substances and whether or not 4-MBC can be transferred to the 
fetus and maybe affect the thyroid gland. Therefore the Danish EPA requested the industry 
only to sell sun lotions containing 4-MBC if it had a warning label for children [IMV 2003]. 
Because there is little doubt that 4-MBC has estrogenic properties and because of the 
issues mentioned by the Danish EPA have not yet been clarified it could be argued that “the 
jury is still out” on the safety of 4-MBC. Since there is an increased risk of skin cancer when 
exposed to the sun without proper protection from sunscreen, it could also be argued that there 
is a risk-risk tradeoff, but this assumes that there are no other alternatives, which is not 
necessarily the case.  
 
Main risk category: “Risk-risk Tradeoff”, Subcategory “the jury is still out” 
 
 
20. Chlormequat and Cerone (Stalk Stabilizers) 
 
Chlormequat and Cerone are two post-harvest plant growth regulators which were/are used in 
Denmark as stalk stabilizers [Granby and Wahl 2001, IMV 2003].  
In 1990 the Danish EPA put a ban on the sale of Chlormequat (CCC) and Cerone after 
studies had shown that these substances affected among others the reproduction capacity of 
pigs. This ban was retracted in 1991 after an expert panel review had concluded that the 
original studies had been properly performed, but that non-standardized toxicological tests 
had been applied and that the statistical analysis of the data results had been inadequate. The 
expert panel further concluded that the experiments had not been designed to be experiments 
that confirmed adverse effects. The results could only be used to generate hypothesis and not 
to conclude anything about potential adverse effects.   
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In 1998 the Danish Farmers Unions announced that they would voluntarily stop 
applying these substances except for rye, but this stop has not been very effective. Danish 
authorities have since then found residues of Chlormequat and Cerone in cereals numerous 
times [IMV 2003]. 
Since the original experiments on pigs in 1989 there have not been conducted that many 
studies. Andersen et al. [1999] found an estrogenic response in in vitro and in vivo short-term 
estrogenicity tests, but could not reproduce these results. Torner et al. [1999] found no effect 
of CCC on the testicular weight and number of spermatozoa in male mice, but did find a 
reduction in the functional competence of spermatozoa from CCC-fed donors, resulting in a 
significant diminished fertilization and cleavage rate in vitro. Gultom et al. [2001] found no 
significant effect of CCC on the onset of egg-laying in hens, but did observed that it 
stimulated the oestrogen concentration at 17 and 18 weeks of age at high doses and that is was 
65 % higher than controls at 18 weeks. Andersen et al. [2002] found that Chlormequat did not 
cause significant estrogenic response in vitro assays at non-cytotoxic concentrations.  
On this background a 2 million Danish kroner 3-year research project was launch in 
2004 by the Danish Food Minister in order to provide more knowledge and bring clarity on 
the issue at hand [The Danish Food Ministry 2003].  
This means that research is on-going and that it is still unknown whether or not wheat 
created with Clormequat or Cerone affects the fertility of animals and humans. Therefore this 
case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
21. Tris (tris-(2,3-dibromopropyl)phosphate)   
 
In 1997 Bruce Ames published a article concerning a study that showed that the fire retardant 
Tris (2,3-dibromopropyl)phosphate (also known as Tris) was more mutagenic than many 
known carcinogens. Tris was used in children’s sleepwear in order to meet regulatory 
standards for highly flammable clothing like polyester. Ames concluded that the risk of cancer 
was much higher than the risk of being burned and that it was unacceptable to use an untested 
chemical as an additive to children’s pyjamas [Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. Since no 
sleepwear manufacturer wanted to be accused of spreading cancer to children, all of them 
immediately stopped applying Tris one year before the garments were actually banned by 
President Reagan [Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. 
Tris figures on Lieberman and Kwon’s list of unfounded health scares and they seem to 
question whether it is carcinogenic or not.  
Tris is” probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A)” according to IARC [1999d] and 
“reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen” according to the NTP [2002]. Both these 
institutions base their evaluation on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental 
animals. Because the manufacturers were the first to stop using Tris, and the ban first came 
later it could be argued that it falls into the category of “Non-regulated proclaimed risks”. But 
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since there are no adequate human data available it could also be argued that “the jury is still 
out”.   
  
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”, Subcategory: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
22. Nitrites (Sodium Nitrite) 
 
In the late 1970s there was a discussion on whether or not to ban nitrite in the U.S. Nitrites 
were added to the food to prevent germination of the bacterial spores that cause deadly 
botulism in canned goods and other foods stored under airtight conditions [Lieberman and 
Kwon 1998]. Concern was raised because it was found that Nitrites react in the body with 
other food agents to form nitroamines - substances known to be carcinogens [IPCS 1978, 
Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. 
Thorne [1991] argues that there is a risk-risk tradeoff. If Nitrite were not permitted in 
some meat products, we might reduce the small probability of nitrosamine-induced 
carcinomas, but we would undoubtedly greatly increase the probability of botulism. 
Wildavsky [1995] also argues that there would be harm in losing nitrites as a 
preservative without a better alternative in view.  
This argument was also used by the U.S. FDA and nitrites were not banned in the U.S. 
for that exact reason [Wildavsky 1995, Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. Therefore it could be 
argued that the case of nitrites is a risk-risk tradeoff, but that assumes that there are no safer 
alternatives.  
 
Main risk category: Risk-risk tradeoff, subcategory: Real risk 
 
 
23. Hormone replacement therapy and Breast cancer 
 
According to Milloy [2001] some older women forgo the benefits of hormone replacement 
therapy (HRT) for fear of breast cancer an alarm that was encouraged by the pharmaceutical 
company Eli Lilly’s effort to scare women away from HRT towards its new drug, Elista 
according to Milloy.  
Both IARC [1987c] and the NTP [2002] classify HRT as one group of estrogens known 
as carcinogens. In their evaluation of post-menopausal oestrogen (e.g. hormone replacement 
therapy) IARC found that there was sufficient information to state that there was a small 
increase in breast cancer among users of hormone replacement therapy.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
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24. PVC blood bags and cancer 
 
In 1998 concern was raised in the news in the U.S. about the possible cancer risks associated 
with plasitv IV bags, but according to Milloy [2001] this nothing but a “health scare”. 
In 2002 the U.S. FDA issued a FDA Public Health Notification on PVC devices containing 
the plasticizer DEHP. In it the U.S. FDA state that exposure to DEHP has produced a range of 
adverse effects in laboratory animals, and that especially the effects on the development of the 
male reproductive system have caused a great concern.  
DEHP is recognized to be a teratogen and it classified as such at least in Europe 
[CERHR 2000, European Chemicals Bureau 2004]. 
The amount of DEHP that leach out of plastic medical devices (into solutions that come 
in contact with the plastic) depend on the temperature, the lipid content of the liquid, and the 
duration of contact with the plastic. The U.S. FDA [2002] had not received report of adverse 
events in humans in 2002, but since they have not received any reports to rule them out either, 
they advice that “…precautions should be taken to limit the exposure of the developing male 
to DEHP”.  
Of course in some cases the risk of not doing a needed medical procedure is far greater 
than the risk associated with exposure to DEHP, but whenever possible alternatives should be 
used according to the U.S. FDA [2002] especially when high-risk procedures are to be 
performed on male neonates, pregnant women who are carrying male foetuses, and 
peripubertal males. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out”  
 
25. Endocrine disrupting chemicals are the cause to falling sperm counts  
 
Maxeiner and Miersch [1998] seem to question whether or not there is evidence that the 
sperm counts have fallen in the last 20-30 years and that endocrine disruptors should be the 
culprit. 
There seems to be little dispute that there are falling sperm counts in the industrialized 
world, but whether or not this is due to social factors or factors - like for instance endocrine 
disrupters - is unknown at the time [European Commission 1999, OECD 2001, Kold Jensen et 
al. 2004, Sharpe and Irvine 2004]. The sperm counts seen to have fallen in the last 50 years or 
more, something which correlate with the fact that there has been an increase in two hormone 
dependent disorders in humans over the past 70 years, namely breast cancer and testicular 
dysgenensis (comprising among others low sperm counts and testicular cancer). Feeding an 
endocrine disruptor to pregnant laboratory animals has induces a syndrome resembling 
testicular dysgenesis, which could indicate that the same mechanisms are at work in humans 
[Kold Jensen et al. 2004, Sharpe and Irvine 2004].  
In a recent article by Kold Jensen et al. [2004:40] summarizes all the unknowns quite 
well: 
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• “We do not known when the current decreasing trends in fertility rates will end. 
Although we assume that the decreasing trends in fertility rates are due to social 
factor (and therefore reversible),  
• we do not actually have good scientific evidence of this assumption 
• We do not know why so many couples show up in fertility clinics due to poor 
semen quality of the male partner, and,  
• We lack information on the roles of modern lifestyle and food contaminants 
(including endocrine disrupters) on reproductive function in males as well as 
females”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
26. Formaldehyde  
 
Maxiener and Miersch [1998] argue that it is unlikely that formaldehyde is a carcinogen 
although they state that it is a health problematic substance.  
The evidence on formaldehyde is equivocal. Some epidemiological studies of people 
exposed to formaldehyde in their workplace air have found more cases of cancer of the nose 
and throat than expected whereas other studies have not confirmed this finding. In animal 
studies, laboratory rats exposed to high levels of formaldehyde in air developed nose cancer 
[ATSDR 1999]. In 1989the IPCS [1989] stated that  
 
 “Although an excess has been reported for a number of cancers, the evidence for 
 a causal role of formaldehyde is likely only for nasal and nasopharyngeal 
 cancer”. 
 
The NTP [2002] classifies formaldehyde as “reasonably anticipated to be a human 
carcinogen” and the U.S. EPA classifies it as probable human carcinogen (B1) based on 
limited evidence of humans but sufficient evidence in animals [U.S. EPA 1991b]. According 
to IARC [2004a] formaldehyde is “carcinogenic to humans (Group 1)” based on sufficient 
evidence in both humans and animals and according (for additional information on 
Formaldehyde see ATSDR 1999). 
This case falls into the category real risk because, both the IPCS [1989b], IARC 
[2004a], NTP [2002], and the U.S. EPA [1991b] agree that there is (sufficient/limited) 
evidence for carcinogenicity in humans and sufficient evidence in animals.  
 
Main category: Real risk 
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27. Second hand smoke and lung cancer   
 
Matthews [2000] and Luik [2000] questions that second hand smoking (environmental 
Tobacco Smoke (ETS)) is associated with lung cancer. Luik [2000] heavily criticizes U.S. 
EPA’s classification of ETS as a Group A carcinogen and argues that it provides a splendid 
example of junk science producing junk public policy.  
In 1986 the U.S. surgeon general reviewed 13 studies on passive smoking and lung 
cancer. 11 of these showed a positive association, and it was concluded that “involuntary 
smoking is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, in healthy non-smokers”. Similar 
conclusions have been reached by four other reports from authoritative bodies in the United 
States, Britain, France, and Australia published that same year [Davis 1997, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2001].  
In 1992 the US Environmental Protection Agency published their report on Respiratory 
health effects of passive smoking: lung cancer and other disorders. 24 of 30 epidemiological 
studies on passive smoking and lung cancer from eight different countries showed a positive 
association. This led the U.S. EPA to classify ETS as a known human carcinogen and 
estimated that ETS caused 3000 lung cancer deaths annually in American non-smokers. Other 
adverse health effects were also documented in the report like for instance lower respiratory 
tract infections, middle ear disease, and exacerbations of asthma in children [U.S. EPA 1992, 
Davis 1997].  
In 1997 the California Environmental Protection Agency published a report reviewing 
the Health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke. This report did not only 
affirm the findings of the U.S. EPA concerning ETS and lung cancer, but also concluded that 
passive smoking is a cause of among others heart disease mortality, retardation of fetal 
growth, sudden infant death syndrome, and nasal sinus cancer [CalEPA 1997, Davis 1997]. 
In a meta-analysis of 37 studies Hackshaw et al. [1997] determined that marriage to a smoker 
increased the risk of lung cancer by 26 % (95 % confidence interval 6 % to 47 %). This 
conclusion was bolstered by strong evidence of a dose-response relationship and by linear 
extrapolation of risk in smokers [Davis 1997]. Law et al. [1997] conducted a meta-analysis of 
19 epidemiological studies of ETS and ischaemic heart disease and found ETS caused a 23 % 
increase in risk of ischaemic heart disease (95 % confidence interval 14 % to 33 %).  
CalEPA [1997] estimated that ETS each year is responsible for 3000 deaths from lung cancer, 
35,000 to 62,000 deaths from ischaemic heart disease, 150,000 to 300,000 cases of bronchitis 
or pneumonia in infants and children aged 18 months and younger (causing 136 to 212 
deaths), 8000 to 26,000 new cases of asthma, exacerbation of asthma in 400,000 to 1 million 
children, 700,000 to 1.6 million visits to physician offices for middle ear infection, 9700 to 
18,600 cases of low birth weight, and 1900 to 2700 sudden infant deaths in the United States 
alone [CalEPA 1997].  
The CDC estimate that 440,000 people dye every year of tobacco-related illness. $75 
billion is spent a year in direct medical costs and $82 billion annually is lost in productivity 
[CDC 2002, Bremby 2004]. Hence the risk of developing lung cancer after being exposed to 
ETS is considered a real risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
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28. ETS and Breast Cancer 
 
Milloy [2001] seems to question whether or not ETS can be linked to breast cancer. Breast 
cancer is not associated with smoking in general. This has led several to doubt that breast 
cancer should be associated with ETS.  
The epidemiological studies have been consistent in showing that there is a small 
increased relative risk of having breast cancer after being exposed to ETS [Wartenberg et al. 
2000]. Two studies indicate no increased risk using mortality as an endpoint instead of 
incidents of breast cancer and generally case control studies seem to estimate the relative risk 
higher than cohort studies [Wartenberg et al. 2000]. In 2001 the Surgeon General stated that 
several studies suggested that exposure to ETS is associated with an increased relative risk for 
breast cancer, but that the association remain uncertain [U.S. DHHS 2001].  
Therefore it could be argued that this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”, 
but I would argue that it falls into the category “too narrow a definition of risk” because of 
several reasons.  
First, the adverse effects of ETS are well established and they have so been for a long 
time. Only focussing on breast cancer is misleading because it ignores the established adverse 
health effects from ETS e.g. lung cancer (See the case of ETS and lung cancer). Just because 
ETS might not give you breast cancer, it does not protect you from lung cancer, asthma etc. 
Second, by only focussing on the relative risk of dying of breast cancer ignores the fact 
that having breast cancer is painful and stressful despite the fact that you might end up 
surviving it in the end.       
 
Main risk category: “Too narrow a definition of risk”, Subcategory: “The jury is still out” 
 
29. ETS causing hearing problems 
 
Milloy [2001] criticizes the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) for 
publishing a study [Cruickshanks et al. 1998], which found that secondhand smoke caused 
hearing loss supposedly more than smoking. Milloy [2001] argues that this finding is 
counterintuitive since smokers are exposed to their own smoke and argues that the theory that 
secondhand smoke (also known as ETS) causes hearing problems has no merit.  
The original study by Cruickshanks et al. [1998] found an odds ratio of 1.69 to have a 
hearing loss when comparing current smokers with non-mokers (95 % confidence intervals, 
1.31-2.17) and an odds ratio of 1.94 (95 % confidence intervals, 1.01-3.74) when comparing 
non-smoking participants living with a smoker to those living with a smoker.  
Milloy does not mention that Cruickshanks et al. [1998] themselves cautious the reader 
from interpreting this as suggesting that passive smoking has a greater effect than active 
smoking, because of the broad confidence limits. Milloy [2001] also does not mention and 
discuss that several studies have found an association between smoking, ETS and hearings 
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loss (See for instance Cenker Ilicali et al. 1999, Nakanishi et al. 2000, Iribarren 2001, Palmer 
et al. 2004). 
Since several studies have found an association between smoking, ETS and hearings 
loss it could be argued that this case falls into the category real risk. But since all of these 
different studies have limitations this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
30. Diet drug combination Fen-Phen and heart value disease  
 
The diet drug combination Fen-Phen was voluntarily withdrawn from the market by the 
manufacturers after the U.S. FDA had requested them to do so, based on reports linking Fen-
Phen to heart value disease [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1997].  
Milloy [2001] argues that the claim is based on anecdotical evidence, but a number of 
studies published in scientific journals have reported an increase in cardiac valvular 
abnormalities in patients having taking Fen-Phen [Connolly et al. 1997, Weisman et al. 1998, 
Khan et al. 1998, Jick et al. 1998, Jick 2000]. Therefore Fen-Phen is considered a real risk. 
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
31. Toxins in Breast milk causing harm to babies 
 
Ross [2004] from ACSH argues that an article in the Health Journal, “Toxins in Breast Milk” 
conveys unscientific assumptions and will cause needlessly alarm among many members of 
the public, especially women who plan to breast-feed. He further argues that the assertion that 
a study subject’s body “carried 105 chemicals in measurable levels” is meaningless because 
we all have thousands of “chemicals” in our bodies, both natural and synthetic. 
There is little doubt that there are numerous chemicals present in breast milk and 
especially the presence of heavy metals (e.g. mercury, lead, etc.), pesticides and persistent 
organic chemicals has raised concern [Pronczuk et al. 2002]. Although a number of factors in 
the published literature make it difficult to estimate the total body burden to which infants are 
exposed (for instance inconsistent sampling, incomplete reporting, etc.). The fact that 
pollutant chemicals are commonly found in human milk at levels that would prevent its sale 
as a commercial food for infants is another reason of concern [Rogan 1991, Abadin 1997, 
Pohl and Tylenda 2000, Kriebel et al. 2001, Lakind et al. 2001, Landrigan et al. 2002]. 
Children are uniquely susceptible to toxic chemicals and are more vulnerable than 
adults, because pound for pound, children eat more, drink more, and breathe more than adults 
(Kriebel et al. 2001, Tickner 2000]. Children are not little adults [NRC 1993a, Tickner 2000]. 
With that said breast-feeding is the preferred nutrition of infants because it meets 
nutritional needs and has several immunologic, developmental and psychologic advantages. 
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But a better understanding of the exposure for the infants of environmental chemicals is 
crucial [Lakind et al. 2001, Landrigan et al. 2002, Pronczuk et al. 2002].  
This case represents a risk-risk tradeoff between the known and unknown risk of 
artificial feeding versus the unknown, but potential, risk of chemicals contamination of breast 
milk [Pronczuk et al. 2002]. 
 
Main risk category: Risk-risk tradeoff 
 
 
32. Homocysteine causing heart disease (Atheroschlerosis) 
 
Contrary to what Milloy [2001] argues hyperhomocysteinemia has long been associated with 
the development of the heart disease atherosclerosis [Poirier et al. 2003]. Besides that recent 
studies have also linked homocysteinemia to the development both of birth defects [Wenstrom 
et al. 2000, van der Put et al. 2001] and of cancer [Vollset et al. 2001]. Hence this case falls 
into the category real risk.  
 
Main category: Real risk, Subcategory: “Too narrow a definition of Risk” 
 
 
33. Polychlorinated biphenyls causing cancer, reproductive- and neurodevelopmental 
defects    
 
The manufacturing of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) stopped in the U.S. in 1977 because 
evidence showed that PCBs build up in the environment and may have harmful effects 
[ATSDR 2000].  
Kimbrough [1994] argues that people have overreacted to possible hazards from PCBs 
at typical environmental levels and Whelan [1993] seem to argue that neither occupational nor 
environmental exposure to PCBs causes any significant adverse health effects (cancer, 
reproductive- and neurodevelopmental defects). Whelan [1993] further argue that no reliable 
studies have reported such effects and she argues that the U.S. EPA should relax their 
vigilance, because the mere presence of a chemical does not prove a hazard. Wildavsky 
[1995] argues that the early restrictions on PCBs in food established by the U.S. FDA was a 
prudent attempt to prevent potential significant public exposures, he finds that the regulations 
on dilute soil and equipment set by the U.S. EPA was far to unnecessarily stringent and 
expensive.  
In 1987 IARC [1987d] and U.S. EPA [1997a] classified PCBs as “probably 
carcinogenic to humans placing them in “Group 2A” and “B2” respectively. The NTP [2002] 
stated that PCBs are reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen based on sufficient 
evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals. The ATSDR [2000] state that there is 
some evidence that PCBs are carcinogenic in humans whereas the evidence is conclusive in 
animals. 
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Milloy [2001] mentions that PCB is linked with impaired intelligence as an anecdote 
which works because it touches reader’s emotions. But actually there have been reports of 
impaired intelligence among 11-year old children of mothers heavily exposed to PCBs 
[ATSDR 2000, EEA 2001]. This has raised concern that PCBs disrupt the thyroid hormone 
system which is important in a normal development of the brain which again could lead to 
among others intelligence deficits [ATSDR 2000]. According to ATSDR [2000] the 
neurological effect of PCBs has been extensively investigated and there is mounting evidence 
that PCBs are important contributors to alterations observed in newborn children. Furthermore 
there is evidence that these alterations last through lifetime [ASTDR 2000].  
The reproductive toxicity is also well established in animals and humans studies 
indicated that exposure to PCBs is associated with menstrual disturbances in women and 
effects on male fertility [ATSDR 2000].  
 
Main risk category: “Real risk 
 
 
34. Polybrominated biphenyls  
 
In the summer of 1973 five hundred to one thousand pounds of Polybrominated biphenyls 
(PBBs) were mixed into animal feeds by accident. The animal feed was widely sold and 
distributed to Michigan farmers. PBBs has not been used in the states since 1976 because of 
the Michigan incident [ATSDR 2002b]. Referring to this case Whelan [1993] argues that no 
adverse health effects have been associated with the incident and she argues that although 
public fears are real and justified, they can often be traced to a lack of understanding. 
In 1986 IARC concluded that “there is sufficient evidence for the carcinogenicity of 
commercial mixtures of polybrominated biphenyls to experimental animals” but that “there is 
inadequate evidence for the carcinogenicity of polybrominated biphenyls to humans”. In 2002 
the NTP [2002] stated that PBBs are reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen based 
on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals. 
Due to the small data set and inconsistency in the results, ATSDR [2002b] argue that the 
available data do not establish or eliminate the possibility that in utero and early infancy 
exposure to PBBs might adversely effect the development of human children. But 
neurobehavioural effects have been observed in animals following gestational and lactational 
exposure to PBBs.  
In 1993 a combined UNEP, ILO, and the WHO task Group stated in 1993 
  
“that human beings and the environment should not be exposed to PBBs, in  
view of their high persistency and bioaccumulation and the potential adverse 
effects at very low levels after long-term exposure. Therefore, PBBs should no 
longer be used commercially” [WHO 1993]. 
 
Above leads to the conclusion that this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. 
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Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
35. Video Display Terminals  
 
In the late seventies and the early eighties an unusual amount of clusters of birth defect, 
spontaneous abortions, and premature births were reported in North America. Radiation from 
Video Display Terminals (VDTs) were suspected as a cause of these adverse effects, 
something which led the Federal Labour Minister of Canada to endorse that pregnant workers 
should have the right to transfer without loss of seniority to jobs not requiring the use of 
VDTs [Science News 1981, Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. Although they have no regulatory 
force these codes of practice are still in force [Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 1993].  
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that these concerns have subsequently been shown 
to have been hysterical.  
Several studies have shown that VDTs in itself is not a cause of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes (for a review see Brent et al. 1993) and recorded levels have been found to be less 
than the presently established standard [Murray 1999]. In 1998,a NIOSH-study funded by 
U.S. Government involving 2430 women and 713 eligible singleton live births showed that 
occupational VDT use does not increase the risk of reduced birth weight or preterm birth 
[Grajewski et al. 1997].  
In this thesis precautionary action was defined broadly and funding further research was 
seen as a precautionary action (see chapter 2 in this thesis). Therefore it could be argued that 
the case of VDTs is a false positive had it not been for the other health risks related to VDTs. 
Fatigue and musculoskeletal problems is a serious concern caused by sitting still for 
long periods of time usually involving small frequent movement of eyes, arms and fingers. 
Fatigue can lead to muscle pain and injury and musculoskeletal problems involves among 
others injuries to the muscles, joints, tendons or nerves caused or made worse by working in 
front of VDT for several hours each day. Visual problems such as sore eyes, eyestrains and 
irritation are among the most reported complaints from VDTs operators [OSHA 1997, Soo-
Yee et al. 1998]. Finally increased job stress has also been related to the introduction VDTs. 
Compared to peers who did not use VDTs, VDT users reported increased work pressure 
reduced autonomy and increased management control over work processes [Soo-Yee et al. 
1998]. 
Even though VDTs might not be linked to different adverse birth defects, other adverse 
health effects are well-established and therefore this case falls into the category of “too 
narrow a definition of risk”  
 
Main risk category: “Too narrow a definition of risk”  
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36. DES in Beef 
 
Lieberman and Kwon [1997] argue that the elimination of Diethylstilboestrol (DES) in cattle 
ranching occurred in the absence of any evidence that DES in beef might cause even a single 
case of human cancer.  
According to IARC [1987e] DES is “carcinogenic to humans (Group 1)” and the NTP 
[2002] classifies DES is “known as a human carcinogen” so the question is whether the 
residues of DES in beef from treated cattle would be enough to trigger cancer in human. This 
question has been subject to scientific debate since the 1970s [EEA 2001].  
According to IARC most of the population could have potentially been exposed to < 10 
ppb DES in beef and mutton when DES was used as a growth promoter for sheep and cattle 
[IARC cited in NTP 2002]. But although the amount of residues seems to be small there have 
been no toxicological grounds for identifying a residue level below which a carcinogenic 
effect would not occur and that is the reason that DES was banned in both the U.S. and in 
Europe [EEA 2001]. 
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
37. 2,4,5-T  
 
2,4,5-T was first developed and used as a herbicide in agriculture, but it is probably best 
known for its association with Agent Orange which consists of a mixture of 2,4,5-T and a 
related chemical 2,4-D. In the late 1960 a study in mice showed that 2,4,5-T was teratogenic 
and in 1970 the U.S. DA announced that it would cancel all use of 2,4,5,-T for most domestic 
food crops [Lieberman and Kwon 1998]. 
In late 1970s eight women blamed 2,4,5-T for their miscarriages and an investigation 
was commissioned by the U.S. EPA. This study showed insufficient evidence of a relationship 
between crops spraying and miscarriages. Another study was initiated which reached the 
opposite conclusion that there was an usually high number of spontaneous abortions in the 
area and that it may be related to 2,4,5-T. The U.S. EPA immediately invoked an emergency 
ban on all uses of 2,4,5-T except on range fields and rice lands and approvals for all uses were 
finally cancelled in 1985 [Lieberman and Kwon 1998). 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that there is a lack of sound evidence linking 2,4,5-T 
to harmful effects. They further argue that the ban will lead to loss of grass production needed 
for livestock, increased soil erosion, and that some areas will grow so dense that there will be 
a loss of habitat for wildlife. 
No studies on humans are available on the influence of 2,4,5-T on male and female 
fertility since most studies concerns the possible effects on children whose mothers and 
fathers had been exposed to this chemical before birth. However, most of these studies are 
inadequate because of methodological shortcomings or lack of power. Another problem is that 
people were often exposed to mixtures of different chemicals often contaminated with dioxin 
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(TCDD) which makes it hard to say anything specific about 2,4,5-T [Health Council of the 
Netherlands 2003].  
According to the German research society [Deutshes Forschungsgemeinschaft 1998] 
positive studies can only be regarded as suggestive evidence and negative studies do not 
exclude potential adverse birth effects. The same can be said in relation to carcinogenicity of 
2,4,5-T [Deutshes Forschungsgemeinschaft 1998, Health Council of the Netherlands 2003]. 
In contrast to studies on humans several studies are available on animals. Mice have 
been found to be the most sensitive species of animals with a threshold effect between 15 and 
40 mg/kg body weight. The threshold for rats, rabbits and monkeys is found to be 40 to 50 
mg/kg body weight [Deutshes Forschungsgemeinschaft 1998, Health Council of the 
Netherlands 2003].      
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
38. The Dalkon Shield 
 
In 1971 A.H. Robins placed an intrauterine birth control device (IUD) known as the Dalkon  
Shield on the market and soon after doctors began observing pelvic inflammatory disease 
(PID) among its users. The U.S. FDA asked A.H. Robins to halt sales, which they did in 1974 
[CDC 1983].  
According to Milloy [2001] the original results were never replicated by other 
researchers. Interestingly Foster et al. [1994] actually mention the Dalkon Shield as a case of 
real risk in contrast to other unproven so-called “Phantom Risk” in their book from 1994. 
According to Foster et al. [1994] several years of research confirmed that the shield increased 
the risk of PID in sexually active women by six to ten times. The reason turned out to be the 
nylon multifilament tail attached to the Dalkon shield which served as a wick for bacteria.  
The jury might still be out on whether or not the Dalkon Shield caused pelvic infections 
or not [MMWR 1983, Mumford 1992], but there is no doubt that the manufacturer (A.H. 
Robins) and not the U.S. FDA recalled the Intrauterine birth control device [CDC 1983, 
Milloy 2001]. 
 
Main category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”, Subcategory: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
39. Phenolphthalein 
 
In the late 1990s an FDA committee concluded that phenolphthalein may pose a risk of 
cancer. Phenolphthalein is the active ingredient found in many laxatives. Milloy [2001] 
argues that phenolphthalein has only been shown to cause cancer in mice and that there is no 
indication of human cancer-causing potential.  
Phenolphthalein was evaluated by IARC [2000b] as “possibly carcinogenic to humans 
(Group 2B)” and Phenolphthalein is also listed in NTP’s 10th report on carcinogens “as 
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reasonable anticipated to be a human carcinogen” [NTP 2002]. Therefore it could be 
argued that phenolphtalein is either a real risk or that “the jury is still out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
40. Amalgam Dental fillings 
 
Amalgam which consists of silver, copper, tin, mecury and zinc has been used as dental 
fillings since the 1830s. After it was found that mercury could escape into the mouth of the 
patients concern have been raised about possible ill-effects like for instance multiple sclerosis, 
Guillain-Barré syndrome and allergic reactions [Lieberman & Kwon 1998].  
The U.S. FDA found that there was no scientific basis for the removal of dental 
amalgams for the purpose of replacing them with other materials hence no regulatory action 
was taken. 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that although high levels of mercury are toxic, the 
amounts that amalgam fillings add to the overall body burden are minuscule and without 
consequences.  
It is well known that some people are more sensitive than others to mercury and in some 
individuals the mercury leaching from the amalgam filling can cause a chronic lichenoid 
reaction (See picture A1). 
  
 
Picture A1: A typical lichenoid reaction of the buccal mucosa (arrow) induced by an adjacent amalgam filling. 
From Little MC, Watson REB, Pemberton MN, Griffiths CEM, Thornhill MH. 2001. Activation of oral 
keratinogens by mercury chloride: Relevance to dental amalgam-induced oral licheniod reactions. British Journal 
of Dermatology 144:1024-1032. 
 
Studies have estimated that that between 18 % and 64 % of patients with amalgam-induced 
lichenoid reactions are hypersensitive to mercury compounds compared to only 3.2 % in the 
normal population [Little et al. 2001]. In most cases the removal or replacement of amalgam 
fillings with other material causes complete resolution or a regression in the licheniod 
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reactions [Little et al. 2001]. This suggests that amalgam-induced lichenoid reactions are due 
to sensitive or irritant properties of mercury according to Little et al. [2001]. Little is known 
about the immunological mechanisms underlying licheniod reactions, but Little et al. [2001] 
have found that oral skin cells that synthesize keratin (Keratinocytes) may play an important 
role.    
Using other materials than amalgam is a possibility, but all alternatives have one or the 
other disadvantages like lack of durability, extensive price, etc. [Lieberman and Kwon 1998].  
Although amalgam dental fillings represents a real risk for patients sensitive to mercury, no 
regulatory action was taken and amalgam dental fillings are still applied all around the world. 
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”, Subcategory: Real risk 
 
 
41. Cellular phones  
 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue that there is no evidence of serious medical effects from 
routine use of cellular phones. Graham [2004] also mentions cell phones and brain cancer as a 
scare where early studies suggesting danger were not replicated by qualified scientists. 
Several reviews of the scientific literature have been done by both international and 
national bodies22. Although most reviews conclude that cellular phones do not likely 
constitute a health hazard they still advise a “precautionary approach” and recommend further 
research into the long-term effects on health because of the prolonged latency period of many 
chronic diseases.  
According to the IEGMP 2000, the U.S. FDA [cited in U.S. GAO 2001], the Danish 
Health Agency [2000] and the Royal Society of Canada [RSC 1999] there is not enough 
information to conclude that mobile phones are without risk although research to date does 
not show that mobile phones have adverse effects. Several factors make it difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions from existing studies [U.S. GAO 2001]. Existing epidemiological 
studies on the health effects of radiofrequency in general have focussed on short-term 
exposure of the entire body, not long-term exposure to the head. In addition to that most 
research has been done on the use of analog phones instead of digital phones, which is rapidly 
becoming the standard technology. Furthermore most of the research investigates the health 
effects at different frequencies than those used in mobile phones and it is not clear how one 
frequency on the radiofrequency spectrum applies to another frequency on that spectrum [U.S. 
GAO 2001].  
Studies on animal and human cells and tissues have shown that radiofrequency 
emissions can produce measurable responses, though it is not known whether or not these 
responses are harmful [Bast et al. 1994, RSC 1999, ICNIRP 2001].  
                                                 
22
 See for instance United Kingdom Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones (IEGMP) [2000], British 
Medical Association [BMA 2001], Health Council of the Netherlands [2002], Swedish Radiation Protection 
Authority's Independent Expert Group on Electromagnetic Fields [2003], United Kingdom NRPB’s Independent 
Advisory Group on Non-ionising Radiation (AGNIR) [2003], FAS [2003], WHO [2004].  
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IEGMP [2000] found that there was evidence that suggested that radiofrequency 
radiation might influence the ion channels and other membrane proteins of neurons in the 
brain under normal condition, but again the significance of such effects for human health is 
uncertain. According to the U.S. FDA [cited in U.S. GAO 2001] one type of tests known as 
the micronucleus assay has shown changes in the genetic material which is a common 
precursor to cancer and therefore they ask for additional research into the safety of mobile 
phones emissions.  
Currently the WHO has an ongoing EMF project which coordinates and stimulates 
research and a series of work meetings has begun which are suppose to form the basis for 
three Environmental Health documents. IARC have established a series of multi-national 
case-control studies that are expected to have a greater potential to provide definitive 
information on the possible health effects of mobile phones than any previous study. Besides 
that numerous national and international research project have been initiated all over the 
world [BMA 2004]. 
There are a number of reasons why this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. 
First, several factors make it hard to evaluate exciting epidemiological studies. Second, 
although the significance for human health is unknown, different effects on cells and tissues 
have been observed when these were exposed to radiofrequency radiation. Third and finally 
there is a vast amount of on-going research and until a jury will be voting at least until the 
results of this research has been publish. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
42. Electromagnetic Fields and Childhood cancer  
 
According to Bast et al. [1994] and Milloy [2001] a panic was caused in the U.S. by the 
alleged link between electric power lines and cancer, especially childhood cancer. Graham 
[2004] also mentions electric power lines and childhood leukaemia as a scare where early 
studies suggesting danger were not replicated by qualified scientists.  
 
In a review on the epidemiological literature on EMF and health the International 
Commission for Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) [2001] found that 
  
“among all the outcomes evaluated in epidemiological studies of EMF, 
childhood leukaemia in relation to postnatal exposure above 0.4 T is the one 
for which there is most evidence of an association”. 
  
In a pooled analysis by Ahlbom et al. [2000] the relative risk has been estimated to be 2.0 (95 
% confidence intervals, 1.27-3.13) something which is hardly due to chance, but could be due 
to bias according to ICNIRP [2001].  
After reviewing the literature in 2002 three reviewers of the California EMF Program 
stated that they were inclined to believe that EMFs can cause some degree of increased risk of 
 185 
childhood leukaemia [Neutra et al. 2002]. Because of this and because of the large amount of 
on-going research into the possible health effects of EMFs by IARC and others (see the case 
of cellular phones and brain cancer) this case falls into the category “jury is still out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
43. Electromagnetic Fields and Electric Blankets  
 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] indirectly mention EMFs in their case concerning Electric 
Blankets. Cause of concern was related to EMFs from electric blankets and the risk of 
childhood cancer in relation to mother’s use of electric blankets during pregnancy.  
According to the ICNIRP [2001] two studies have reported small increases in risk 
associated with prenatal use of electric blankets, but only one of these found a dose-response 
effect. According to the ICNIRP [2001] a small number of studies and inadequate exposure 
measurements precluded any straight forward conclusion [ICNIRP 2001].   
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
44. Pesticides  
 
Whelan [1993] argues that the public has an unreasonable fear of chemicals, which has led to 
bans of useful pesticides like dieldrin, aldrin, chlordane, heptachlor and malathion. Whelan 
states that no human illness or deaths result from the standard and accepted use of pesticides 
and that there are no evidence that trace levels of pesticides in food are a human health risk.    
The reason why most chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides have been banned in the U.S. 
was primarily because of their harmful effects on wildlife and secondarily because of their 
potential threat to human beings [NRC 2000b]. There is little doubt that chlorinated pesticides 
have adverse effects on wildlife [Ritter et al. 1995], but there might be some discussion about 
whether or not they have an adverse effect on human health. Most of the chlorinated 
pesticides (dieldrin, aldrin, and chlordane) have been found to be carcinogenic in rodent 
bioassays [NRC 2000b], which is as a strong indicator for that they are potential human 
carcinogens. Epidemiological studies on people occupationally exposed to chlorinated 
pesticides have failed to find an association between exposure and cancer [NRC 2000b], but 
recently Quintana et al. [2004] found a strong association between the risk of non-Hodgkin's 
Lymphoma (NHL) and levels of several compounds measured in body fat, particularly 
heptachlor epoxide and dieldrin. According to Quintana et al. [2004] people with the highest 
body burdens of heptachlor epoxide and dieldrin had three times the risk of NHL, compared 
to people with the lowest levels of these persistent pesticide residues in their body fat. 
Chlorinated pesticides were largely replaced by organophosphate pesticides (e.g. 
malathion) that are less persistent in the environment, but much more toxic to humans. This 
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has led to increased poisonings and deaths among farm labourers. Although many of these 
illnesses and death may be related to “non-standard” and “non-accepted” use of pesticides it 
does not change the fact that it is a big problem. According to the WHO and UNEP 25 million 
agricultural workers in developing countries are seriously poisoned by pesticides each year 
resulting in estimated 220,000 deaths. In the U.S. it is estimated that 300,000 farm workers 
suffer from pesticide-related illnesses each year. At least 30,000 of these pesticide poisonings 
are acute, and it is estimated that 25 U.S. farm workers die every year from poisonings. In 
addition 20,000 Americans - mostly children - get sick from home misuse or unsafe storage of 
pesticides [Tyler Miller 1998]. 
Whether or not trace levels of pesticides in food is a human health risk is unclear at the 
present time, but according to the National Research Council [NRC 2000b] the exposure of 
humans and the environment to pesticide residues are a continuing concern. Carcinogens do 
not appear to act through a threshold mechanism in humans, which means that the presence of 
any pesticide residue in foods can increase the risk of death due to cancer [NRC 2000b]. The 
magnitude of the risk is proportionate to the frequency with which a residue is encountered, 
the concentration of the residue, and the frequency of consumption of foods containing the 
residue. Some population subgroups like infants and children are especially susceptible 
because of their exposure to a pesticide in these foods are higher, on a bodyweight basis, than 
adults [NRC 2000b]. 
This leads to the conclusion that the adverse effects of pesticides on both the 
environment and the human health are well established and hence this case is considered a 
real risk. 
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
45. BSE and vCJD  
 
Adams [Adams J 2000] seems to question that variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD) is 
caused by eating bovin spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) infected meat and he further 
questions whether the money spend to decrease the risk is/was worth it.  
No cause-and-effect relationship has been established between vCJD and BSE infected 
meat, but according to the British government’s Spongifrom Encephalopahty Advisory 
Committee [SEAC 1999], the European Commission [2001b] and the WHO [2002] there is a 
strong link and it is generally assumed that BSE is the cause to vCJD.    
Although there is a strong link it has not been definitely proven that vCJD is caused by 
BSE infected meat, and therefore this case falls into the category “the jury is still out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
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46. MMR vaccines 
 
There has been great public concern about the safety of the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) 
vaccine after Wakefield [1998] published a small study in the Lancet suggesting an 
association between the vaccine and bowel problems and autism in 12 children. In the study 
parents or doctors recalled that the first signs of autism had started within two weeks after the 
MMR vaccination and the researchers wondered whether these two were connected, however 
they never claimed to have proven this association [IOM 2001a]. The culprit was suspected to 
be a vaccine preservative known as thimerosal that contains mercury [Fields 2004]. 
According to Bate [2001] this has made some pressure groups argue that a precautionary 
approach should be taken and that the vaccines should be withdrawn, something which could 
lead to new outbreaks of for instance measles and hence have severe consequences. 
According to Bate [2001:10] “Precautionary vaccination propaganda that results in 
individual and government action harms, and sometimes even kills, children”. Guldberg 
[2000] calls this case an obvious example of scare-mongering and she argues that damage has 
been done because many parents decided not to take the one-in-a-million chance of a serious 
reaction to the vaccine. According to Guldberg [2000] this led to falling vaccination rates in 
the United Kingdom which again could lead to a measles epidemic. Marshant [2003] also 
mentions the MMR vaccine as a case in which excessive precaution was taken.  
Extensive efforts have been made to confirm the findings of Wakefield et al. [1998] and 
a number of small studies have confirmed the results, whereas a series of large-scale studies 
have found no association between MMR vaccines and autism (See among other Taylor et al. 
1999 and Smeeth et al. 2004). A number of literature reviews have also been published and 
they all concluded that the epidemiological evidence does not support the hypothesis of an 
association between the MMR vaccine and autism. They further conclude that the 
epidemiological studies that do support an association have significant flaws in their design 
that invalidate their conclusions [CSM 1999, IOM 2001a, 2001b, 2004, WHO 2003a, Parker 
et al. 2004].  
Despite of the public concern no regulatory action was ever taken in order to stop 
parents from getting their children MMR vaccinated. On the contrary health agencies all over 
the world strongly recommended MMR vaccines at the time and still do [NACI 2003, CDC 
2004, Department of Health, United Kingdom 2004, WHO 2001, 2003b] and therefore this 
case falls into the category “non-regulated proclaimed risk”.  
It is correct that the controversy about the safety of MMR vaccines has led to decreasing 
numbers of children being vaccinated in the United Kingdom, but according to the 
Department of Health, United Kingdom [2003] the numbers are currently increasing again. 
There is an outbreak of mumps at the time in England and Wales, but the Health 
Protection Agency emphasises this outbreak cannot be attributed to the to the recent drop in 
take-up of the MMR vaccine caused by parents’ fears that it may be linked to autism. The 
outbreak is actually due largely to young adults that missed out on the MMR programme 
which began in 1988 [Medical News Today 2004]. 
No regulatory action was ever taken in order to prevent parents from getting their 
children MMR vaccinated and therefore this case definitely falls into the category “non-
regulated proclaimed risk”. It could also be argued that this case is a scientific false positive 
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because recently 10 of the 12 authors of the original article by Wakefield et al. [1998] 
retracted their interpretation of the findings in the study [Murch et al. 2004].  
 
Main risk category: Scientific false positives, Subcategory: “Non-regualted proclaimed risk”  
 
 
47. Destruction of the ozone layer  
 
The ozone layer protects all life from the sun's harmful radiation because it absorbs a portion 
of the radiation from the sun especially ultraviolet light (UVB) and thereby prevents it from 
reaching the earth. UVB has been linked to various types of skin cancer, cataracts, and harm 
to some crops, certain materials, and some forms of marine life [U.S. EPA 2004e].  
In the late 1970s concern over the effect of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on the ozone 
layer led to their ban as aerosol propellants and during the early 1990s CFCs was removed 
from the production process of plastic foam products [Bast et al. 1994, Wildavsky 1995]. 
CFCs have a long atmospheric lifetime which allows them to be transported by winds into the 
stratosphere. In the stratosphere they release chlorine or bromine when they break down, 
which again damages the protective ozone layer [U.S. EPA 2004e]. 
According to Bast et al. [1994] ozone depletion is not an environmental crisis and they 
argue that the effect of CFCs on the overall ozone levels has been slight and that this effect is 
not sufficient ground for an outright ban of CFCs. Wildavsky [1995] argues that there is no 
clear evidence of global ozone depletion although he acknowledges that the theory that CFCs 
destroy the ozone layer is strong.  
According to a scientific assessment by a UNEP panel [UNEP 2002] the global-average 
total column ozone for the period 1997-2001 was approximately 3 % below the pre-1980s 
average values. Observed changes occur primarily in mid-latitudes and in Polar Regions. 
Since the early 1990s the total amount of ozone at the Antarctic in September and October has 
continued to be about 40 to 50 % below pre-ozone hole values, with up to local 70 % 
decreases for periods of a week or two [UNEP 2002]. Because the international regulations 
concerning ozone depleting compounds are working the ozone depleting gasses (among 
others) in the lower atmosphere are decreasing and the global ozone layer is expected to 
recover if present regulations are upheld. With that said the ozone layer is particular 
vulnerable and any deviation from full compliance with international protocols could delay or 
prevent recovery [UNEP 2002].  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
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48. Acid rain  
 
When exposed to bright sunshine human emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides 
can be converted into molecules of sulfates and nitrates. These particles can then interact with 
water vapour to form sulphuric or nitric acids, which return to Earth in rain, snow or fog.  
Concern was raised in the 1980s that acid rain might injure human health and the 
environment, but according to Bast et al. [1994] and Wildavsky [1995] acid rain poses little or 
no threat to forests, crops, human health, or lakes in America.  
In response to the claims about damage caused by acid rain U.S. Congress authorized a 
ten- year research effort called the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) 
[Bast et al. 1994]. NAPAP acts as a coordinating office between six federal agencies among 
others National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
[NAPAP 2002].  
In 1996 NAPAP published an integrated assessment of costs benefits and effectiveness 
of acid rain controls. NAPAP found that, although most forest ecosystems were not currently 
known to be adversely impacted by acid deposition, sulphur and nitrogen deposition had 
caused adverse impact on certain highly sensitive forest ecosystems especially high-elevation 
spruce-fir forests in the eastern United States. These adverse effects might develop in more 
forests if deposition levels were not reduced [NAPAP 2002]. 
Because acid deposition has had adverse impact on certain highly sensitive forest 
ecosystems in the eastern United States this case is considered a real risk. 
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
49. Air pollution in the U.S.A  
 
In 1993 Whelan argued against tightening the air-quality standards in the U.S. because sulfur 
dioxide is unlikely to be responsible for any significant impact on the rate of respiratory 
symptoms or disease. Whelan [1993] acknowledges that particulate matter might cause 
adverse health effect, but states that the effect of low levels of particulates has not been well 
documented.  
According to Milloy [2001] the U.S. EPA [1996] claimed that fine particulate air 
pollution kills 20,000 Americans annually. The U.S. EPA based this on a statistical study that 
compared death rates among geographic areas with varying levels of air pollution [Milloy 
2001]. Milloy [2001] argues that there is no cause-and-effect evidence behind the statistics. 
The U.S. EPA later revised their estimate from 20,000 to 15,000 [U.S. EPA 1997b] but 
all risk assessments have limitations and uncertainties something U.S. EPA [1996] also 
acknowledged. That does not change the fact that many epidemiological studies have shown a 
statistically significant association between ambient particular matter and a variety of health 
endpoints including excess mortality, hospital admissions, and respiratory symptoms. This 
association has consistently been observed with most of these endpoints for both short-term 
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(days) and long-term (years) particulate matter exposure [U.S. EPA 1996]. The U.S. EPA 
estimates that the expected respiratory mortality attributed to particulate matter is about 0.3 
deaths per day per million people for all age groups, 2.0 daily hospital admissions per day per 
million people would be expected in the whole U.S. population, 0.9 cardiovascular deaths per 
million people per day and 2.3 hospital admissions per day for cardiovascular attributed to 
particulate matter. In 1996 the U.S. EPA expected that 23.6 death per day per million of 
whom 17.0 would be age +65.  
Milloy [2001] only focuses on mortality and whether or not the number is exactly 
20,000 is besides the point that particular matter is associated with a variety of adverse health 
effects. This lead to the conclusion that particulate matter is a real risk which means that air 
pollution is also a real risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk, subcategory: “Too narrow a definition of risk”  
 
50. Busy streets tied to higher cancer risk in kids  
 
Milloy [2001] use the case “Busy streets tied to higher cancer risk in kids” as an example 
where one industry uses “junk science” to shift blame and attention to another industry. 
Milloy [2001] refers to a study done by Pearson, Wachtel, and Ebi [2000]) which found an 
elevated statistically significant odds ratio of 1.70 (95 % confidence intervals, 1.01-2.86) for 
all cancers and 2.08 (95 % confidence intervals, 1.06-4.07) for leukemia when comparing 
children who were living near streets with more than 500 Vehicles Per Day (VPD) versus less 
than 500 VPD.  
Ebi is a manager a the Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California and 
Milloy insinuates that this study was published in a peer-reviewed journal with the purpose of 
shifting attention from the suspected association between electric power lines and childhood 
cancer to auto exhaust and childhood cancer.  
There is not doubt that the study published by Pearson et al. [2000] has limitations, 
something the authors clearly state, but Milloy [2001] forgets to mention that other studies 
have also found an association between high-traffic street and increased incidence of 
childhood cancer [Savitz and Feingold 1989, Feychting et al. 1998].  
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
51. Oral Contraceptive Pill Scare  
 
In 1995 there was a so-called “Oral contraceptive pill scare” in Britain according to Adams 
[Adams J 2000]. A public warning was issued by Britain’s Committee on the Safety of 
Medicines based on evidence that suggested that the “third generation oral contraceptive pill” 
(Femodene, Femodene ED, Femodette, Marvelon, Mercilon, Minulet, Triadene and Tri-
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Minulet) caused twice as many blood clots (Venous thromboembolism (VTE)) as second 
generation pills.  
According to Adams [Adams J 2000] the evidence was “preliminary, unpublished, non-
peer-reviewed” and caused a public panic leading to estimated 8000 extra abortions.  
It has long been known that the risk of VTE is slightly higher in women taking any combined 
oral contraceptive pill compared to women who do not [Lawless 1977, Mazur 2004]. 
According to the European Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP), 
women who use third generation contraceptives are at a slightly higher risk of developing 
VTE than those who use second generation pills [CPMP 2001]. Furthermore both IARC 
[1999e] and NTP [2002] classify oral contraceptives as one group of estrogens as known 
carcinogens.  
This is considered a real risk mainly because of CPMP’s statement about women, who 
take third generation contraceptives, having a slightly increased risk compared to women who 
do not. IARC’s and the NTP’s position concerning oral contraceotives supports this 
categorisation.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
52. Acrylamide  
 
In 2001 researchers at Stockholm University found that acrylamide was formed in high levels 
during the preparation of food at high temperatures. The levels found were initially several 
thousands micrograms acrylamide per kilogram and up to 500 times more than that allowed in 
drinking water by the WHO [Löfstedt 2003]. A press conference was held in early 2002 by 
the Swedish National Food Administration and the University of Stockholm to inform the 
public about a potential health risk associated with eating fried and baked foods. After a few 
days, several thought that the press conference had both exaggerated the risk and that it had 
been ill placed.  
Subsequent studies have shown that although the public was aware of an association 
between certain foodstuffs and acrylamide this did not led to significant decrease in eating 
behaviour [Löfstedt 2003]. Löfstedt calls the case an “Alarm”.  
According to IARC [1994] acrylamide is probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A) 
based on “inadequate evidence in humans” and “sufficient evidence” in experimental animals 
for the carcinogenicity of acrylamide. Acrylamide is also listed in NTP’s 10th report on 
carcinogens as “reasonable anticipated being a human carcinogen” [NTP 2002]. According 
the European Chemicals Bureau [ECB] risk assessment of arcylamide the substance has been 
identified as a non-threshold carcinogen and classified as a carcinogenic substance [European 
Chemicals Bureau 2002, Löfsted 2003]. On the one hand it could be argued that acrylamide 
represents a real risk based on the ECB’s risk asssessment [European Chemicals Bureau 
2002], but on the other hand it could also be argued that “the jury is still out” based on 
IARC’s [1994] and NTP’s [2002] evaluations.  
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It has long been know that people find natural hazards far more acceptable than human 
induced hazards and the public’s response to the findings concerning acrylamide supports this 
theory [Renn 2003]. Although acrylamide might be a carcinogen, it is a natural by-product 
that is not related to anything added to the food by humans.  
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
53. Spermicides and Birth defects  
 
In the early 1980s concern was raised that the use of spermicides caused birth defects after 
three studies had been published that indicated such a link [Mills 1993]. This resulted in great 
public concern according to Mills [1993].  
The Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee of the U.S. FDA met in 
December 1983 to review the safety of vaginal spermicides and concluded that the presented 
information was insufficient to warrant a additional warning regarding the risk of fetal 
abnormalties and chromosomal abnormalities with spermicides use during pregnancy [Mills 
1993]. After reviewing the literature in 1986, the U.S. FDA concluded that the weight of the 
evidence did not support an association between the use of spermicides and birth defects or 
miscarriages. At that time the U.S. FDA also reaffirmed its earlier decision not to add a 
warning to products containing spermicides, which leads to the conclusion that no regulatory 
action was taken in this case [Mills 1993]. 
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”  
 
 
54. Trichloroethylene (TCE)  
Jaeger and Weiss [1994] doubt that present evidence is strong enough to classify 
Trichloroethylene (TCE) as a human carcinogen. IARC [1995b] has classified TCE as 
probably carcinogenic to humans (Group 2A) and according to the NTP [2002] TCE is 
reasonably anticipate to be a human carcinogen. Both IARC [1995b] and the NTP [2002] 
their evaluation on limited evidence in humans and sufficient evidence in experimental 
animals. This argues in favour for TCE falling into the category real risk. Furthermore TCE 
has recently is classified as a Category 2 carcinogen in Europe [European Chemicals Bureau 
2004].  
Main risk category: Real risk 
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55. Water contamination in Sidney  
 
In September 1998 a water quality crisis occurred in Sydney, Australia. High concentrations 
of two specific pathogens (Cryptosporidium oocysts and Giardia cysts) were repeatedly 
observed in the water samples collected in the distribution system [Clancy 2000]. 
Cryptosporidium and Giardia can cause diarrhoea and other gastrointestinal symptoms.  
Three boil-water advisories were issued over a nine-week period and a formal 
investigation was ordered to find the cause of the contamination. Hrudey and Leiss [2003] 
mention this case a false positive and according to Clancy [2000] reliance on poor-quality 
monitoring data created a crisis when no water quality problems or threats to the public health 
existed.  
There seems to be general agreement that no increase in diseases was observed in 
connection with the so-called crisis. One the one hand Clancy [2000] argues that the reason 
for this that the pathogens were not present at all and she argues that the laboratory 
responsible for the monitoring data had several deficiencies in the overall operational 
procedures. According to Clancy [2000] this casts doubt on the reliability of the monitoring 
data that led to the first boiling-warning being issued.  
On the other hand Cox et al. [2003] defend both the staff and the laboratory procedures 
used in the laboratory in question. Cox et al. [2003] further argues that no disease was 
observed because actions were taken promptly and that there is compelling evidence that a 
contamination did in fact take place although the origin of the contamination will probably 
never be identified conclusively. 
According to McCellan [1998], who did the government inquiry on the incidents leading 
up to the crisis, there was definitely Cryptosporidium and Giardia in raw and treated water 
although maybe not at the concentrations first identified. He concludes that the public health 
responses throughout the contamination were appropriate despite the uncertainties.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
56. Fluoridated water  
 
Since the 1950s water has been fluoridated in the U.S. to help teeth to resist decay [Lieberman 
and Kwon 1998]. Through the year’s concern have been raised on and off. Some 
conservatives have argued that involuntary fluoridation amounted to mass medication which 
they saw as a step towards socialism [Morris 2000], whereas others have argued that 
fluoridation had adverse health effects like for instance cancer and reproduction defects [NRC 
1993b].  
Lieberman and Kwon mention fluoridation of water as a “Not-quite-Great Unfounded 
Health Scare” because this “unfounded health scare” did not get much attention in its day.  
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In 1993 the U.S. EPA responded to the raised concerns and asked the National Research 
Council [NRC 1993] to looking to the matter. The NRC [1993] concluded that there was no 
evidence of adverse effects and hence the U.S. EPA took no regulatory action and the U.S. 
Public Health Service recommends fluoridation [U.S. Public Health Services 1991]. 
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk” 
 
 
57. Mercury in fish 
 
In 1970 it was discovered that deep-sea tuna fish in cans contained mercury levels above the 
0.5 ppm maximum threshold set by the U.S. FDA [Lawless 1977]. The U.S. FDA withdrew 
nearly 1million cans of tuna as a consequence. Originally it was thought that 23 % of the tuna 
packed that year was contaminated, but further testing showed that only 3.6 % of the tuna was 
actually above the safety limit. Further tests have shown that tuna always has had mercury 
levels near or above the threshold set by the U.S. FDA at the time. The U.S. FDA and U.S. 
EPA have since raised the threshold level up to 1 ppm, which Mazur [2004] sees as evidence 
for that the decision by the U.S. FDA in 1970 was “false”.  
The U.S. FDA [2004b] and other food safety authorities recommend that pregnant 
women or women who intend to become pregnant only have one average meal of tuna per 
week. Mercury is particularly toxic to the nervous system and developing brain and whether 
or not 0.5 ppm (or for that matter 0.1 ppm) constitutes a hazard for especially pregnant 
women and their offspring has been and still is a disputed issue [Lawless 1977, The Wall 
Street Journal 2004].  
According to the Scientific Panel on Contaminants in the Food Chain of the European 
Food Safety Authority the main problem is that specific intake data are not available to 
evaluate intake levels among pregnant women [EFSA 2004].  
According to the National Research Council children of women, who consumed large 
amounts of fish and seafood during pregnancy, are at the highest risk. And this risk is likely to 
be sufficient to cause an increase in the number of children who have to struggle to keep up in 
school and who might require remedial classes or special education [NAS 2000c].  
Although there might be some discussion on whether or not there is a safe threshold for 
mercury in fish, there is little doubt that eating large amounts of fish is a real risk for the 
unborn child.  
 
Main risk category: “Real risk” 
 
 
58. Cyclamates  
 
In 1969 the artificial sweetener, Cyclamate was banned in the U.S. after a study by Price et al. 
had found that 8 out of 80 rats fed a 10:1 mixture of cyclamate and saccharin developed 
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bladder cancer. According to Lieberman and Kwon [1998] subsequent studies have failed to 
verify the early result.  
As in the case of saccharin, it is hard to tell whether cyclamates is a carcinogen from 
epidemiological studies on artificial sweeteners in general since cyclamates were often used in 
a combination with saccharin.  
According to IARC [1999f] cyclamates are “not classifiable as to their carcinogenicity 
to humans (Group 3)”. This should not be interpreted as if cyclamate is not carcinogenic in 
humans since IARC has a “group 4” for agent probably not carcinogenic to humans [IARC 
2004b]. 
In contrast to saccharin not much research has been done on cyclamate and bladder 
cancer in animals or in humans.   
A small number of animal studies have been performed and according to IARC [1999f] 
there is “inadequate” evidence for carcinogenicity of cyclamates in animals. One of these 
studies found no toxic, carcinogenic, embryotoxic or teratogenic effect of sodium cyclamate 
for all dosages tested [Kroes et al. 1977]. But Kroes et al. [1999] did find that 
cyclohexylamine, the metabolite of cyclamate, led to growth retardation and embryonal death 
in the only dosage tested; 0.5 % concentration of the diet.  
The human evidence for carcinogenicity of cyclamates in humans is also “inadequate” 
according to IARC [1999f]. The epidemiological studies on artificial sweeteners (see the case 
of saccharin) shows no overall increased risk, although it does show an increased risk in 
different subgroups.  
Four small epidemiological studies have also been done in relation to cyclamates and 
bladder cancer. All four found all slight elevated risk in different subgroups: 
 
• Simon et al. [1975] found an odds ratio of 1.2 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.5-
2.6) among coffee drinkers and 1.2 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.5-2.7) among 
tea drinkers;   
• Kessler and Clark [1978] found an odds ratio of 1.1 (95 % confidence intervals, 
0.8-1.6) for men and 0.7 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.5-1.2) in women; 
• Risch et al. [1988] found an odds ratio of 1.1 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.6-
2.0) for men and 0.9 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.6-1.4) for women; 
• Møller Jensen et al [1983] found an odds ratio of 0.72 (95 % confidence 
intervals, 0.3-2.0) for men and 1.3 (95 % confidence intervals, 0.22-8.3). for 
women. 
 
In Europe concern has not been on cyclamates and bladder cancer, but on the testicular 
toxicity of cyclohexylamine.   
According to the Scientific Committee on Food [SCF 2000] studies in primates and all 
other animals, except the mouse provide cause for toxicological concern. Two 
epidemiological studies have been performed on humans. In the first, 18 workers involved in 
the manufacturing of cyclamates were studied. Only 1 had normal sperm counts and sperm 
motility which could indicate a toxicological effect, but this study is difficult to interpret since 
there was no difference between the five most heavily exposed workers and the rest of the 
group [SCF 2000]. In the second study 405, 30-50 aged male visiting a fertility clinic because 
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of > 12 month’s fertility were compared to 379 control subjects. A difference in the daily 
intake of cyclamates was observed (0.72 mg/kg bw compared to 0.55 mg/kg bw) although this 
difference was not statistically different [SCF 2000].     
Since there has not been any large scale epidemiological study concerning cyclamate 
and bladder cancer specific, because the epidemiological studies performed to date indicate a 
slight elevated risk in different small subgroups and because there is some evidence of 
testicular toxicity of cyclamate the jury is considered still to be out on cyclamate. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out”  
 
 
59. Disinfection byproducts and the Peruvian outbreak of cholera   
 
Several authors have mentioned the cholera epidemic in Peru as a case of exaggerated 
precaution or precaution gone wrong [Bate 2001, Milloy 2001, Caruba 2002].  
After living cholera-free for a century there was an outbreak of cholera in 1991 in Peru. 
Prior to the outbreak some Peruvian localities had decided to stop treating their water with 
chlorine because a report from the U.S. EPA had found an increased cancer risk associated 
with disinfection by-products. Caruba [2002] argues that the Peruvian localities stopped 
treating chlorinating their water because of a precautionary concern that chlorine poses a 
cancer risk, and that, this led to the cholera outbreak.  
Whether or not disinfection by-products are associated with cancer is unclear at the 
time. Numerous toxicological studies using high dosages have shown that several disinfection 
byproducts are carcinogenic in laboratory animals and some of disinfection by-products have 
also been shown to cause adverse reproductive or developmental effects in laboratory 
animals. 
A number of epidemiological studies have been performed in order to investigating the 
relationship between exposure to chlorinated water and cancer, but the evidence is equivocal. 
Some have suggested an increased cancer risk to those exposed to chlorinated waters while 
others have demonstrated none [U.S. EPA 2002]. Therefore it could be argued that, “the jury 
is still out” on whether or not disinfection by-product causes cancer.  
Caruba [2002] and others argue that the Peruvian localities should not have stopped 
chlorinating because of an uncertain risk of cancer and that this decision led to the cholera 
outbreak. This, however, ignores the fact that the decision to halt chlorination was not the 
only reason for the cholera outbreak, although it is often the only one mentioned. There were 
several failures that lead to the outbreak. For instance:  
 
• There was a lack of adequate facilities and infrastructure to treat and provide 
enough safe water to meet the needs of a growing population 
• There was a lack of adequate infrastructure for the proper disposal of raw sewage 
and many residents throughout Peru accessed drinking water from reservoirs 
where raw sewage was also disposed 
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• The drinking water was stored and accessed under unsafe and unsanitary 
conditions [Tickner and Gouveia-Vigeant 2003] 
• The El Niño warming effect increased the cholera-carrying plankton growth to 
levels at which humans could be exposed  
• There was a lack of Peruvian immunity to the specific strain of cholera that 
caused the outbreak. 
     
The basic public health protections were not in place to prevent the spread of cholera in Peru 
and even full chlorination of the drinking water would not have solved the problem according 
to Tickner and Gouveia-Vigeant [2003]. Because animal studies and some epidemiological 
studies have found that disinfection by-products increase the risk of cancer, this case falls into 
the category “the jury is still out”.  
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
60. The baby bottle scare 
 
Concern has been raised that bisphenol-A (BPA), a raw material in polycarbonite plastic, 
might leach out from plastic baby bottles at low levels and might cause health effects. Lamb 
[1999] argues that there is no reason for concern and that it should be ignored.  
According to the U.S. FDA about 5 % of unreacted bisphenol A leaches out of 
polycarbonate baby bottles but whether this is a health concern is uncertain at present 
[Chemical Week 1997]. In 2000 the U.S. EPA and NTP established a peer-review panel on 
low-dose endocrine disrupters. The panel concluded that there was credible evidence that low 
doses of BPA can cause effects on specific endpoints in animals, but the panel also stated that 
it was not persuaded that low dose effects of BPA had conclusively been established and 
advised additional research [NTP 2001]. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
61. Hypoxia: Dead zones in the Gulf of Mexico 
 
Hypoxia occurs when dissolved oxygen levels are below the concentration to sustain 
most animal life. Since the 1993, mid-summer bottom water hypoxia has covered an area 
larger than 4,000 square miles and in 1999 it was 8,000 square miles, about the size of New 
Jersey.  
In 1998 the Harmful Algal Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act was 
implemented, but according to Avery [1999] no problem can be found. One is believed to be 
fertilizer run-off that run into the Mississippi River System, but Avery [1999] argues that the 
expanding dead zones are not human-driven.  
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According to the National Science and Technology Council and the Committee on 
Environment and Natural Resources the hypoxia is caused primarily by excess nitrogen from 
the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin [NSTC-CEN 2000]. Since 1980 about 1.6 million 
metric tons of total nitrogen have been discharged to the Gulf of Mexico each year and it is 
estimated that agricultural nonpoint sources contribute with up to 65 of the total nitrogen 
[NSTC-CEN 2000]. 
This case falls into the category real risk because there is a hypoxia in the Gulf of 
Mexico and because human-driven activities contribute heavily to these dead zones.   
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
 
 
62. Monosodium Glutamate (MSG) 
 
Monosodium glutamate (MSG) is a flavor enhancer used in a variety of foods prepared at 
home, in restaurants, and by food processors. In the past 30 years concern has been raised 
after reports of adverse reactions in people who have eaten foods that contain MSG including 
headaches, palpitations, vomiting, and nausea. These symptoms are known as “MSG 
Symptom Complex” and the U.S. FDA requires labelling when MSG is added to the food 
[U.S. FDA 1995, Meadows 2003], but Mazur [2004] calls the case of MSG a “false alarm”.  
In 1986, an U.S. FDA Advisory Committee found that MSG was generally safe, but that 
short-term reactions may occur in some people. These findings were reaffirmed by the 
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB), an independent group 
of scientists, contracted by the U.S. FDA in 1992 to complete a review of available scientific 
data on glutamate safety to date [Meadows 2003]. The FASEB report found no evidence of 
any connection between MSG and any serious long-term reactions, but it did identify short-
term reactions known as MSG Symptom Complex in two groups of people. The first group 
includes people having symptoms after eating large doses of MSG particularly on an empty 
stomach and the second group includes people with severe and poorly controlled asthma 
[Meadows 2003].  
The Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization placed MSG in the safest 
category of food ingredients in 1987. And a 1991 report by the European Communities (EC) 
Scientific Committee for Foods reaffirmed MSG’s safety [Meadows 2003].  
Since MSG short-term reactions have been identified in two groups of people, labelling 
requirements do not seen to be an over-proportional regulatory measure and therefore this 
case falls into the category real risk.  
 
Main risk category: Real risk 
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63. BAM 
 
In Denmark there is an overall policy about only to accept clean, unpolluted and untreated 
drinking water. Lately, several drinking water supply wells have been closed in Denmark, 
because Dichlorbenzamid (BAM) has been detected. BAM is a metabolite from two 
previously widely used pesticides in Denmark. In 1997 the Danish EPA estimated that the 
Danish waterworks would spend between 3,4 and 5,4 billion Danish Kroner on preventing 
drinking water pollution over the next ten years [Andersen 2004]. 
Recently a risk assessment report on the health hazards of drinking water exposure of 
BAM was released by the Danish Toxicology Centre [Cohr and Simonsen 2004]. The report 
had been prepared for the Danish EPA and found that an adult human being would have to 
drink 1,750 l water a day before there was any kind of health risk [From 2004].  
This has lead to an on-going discussion in Denmark on whether or not to revise the 
current thresholds limits and some have argued that Denmark has wasted billions on closing 
water wheels [From 2004].  
One element, over-looked in the debate, is that the data on which the risk assessment by 
the Danish Toxicology Centre was based only included one long-term study concerning 
carcinogenicity and two studies concerning reproductive and developmental effects. 
Furthermore all of these studies were more than 30 years old; they did not comply with 
current international accepted guidelines and had not been performed in accordance to good 
laboratory practices (GLP) [Cohr and Simonsen 2004].  
Despite of their limitations the three studies actually indicate effects that raise concern:  
 
• The only study concerning carcinogenicity on rats showed an increased 
incidence of hepatoma (14 %) in females fed high dosis and this finding was 
almost statistically significant (p < 0.049), but as Cohr and Simonsen [2004] 
states the group size was to small to adequately evaluate the carcinogenicity of 
BAM;  
• A non-significant decrease in foetal body weight was observed at 90 mg/kg/day 
in one study on rabbits; 
• Decreased weight of weanlings and an increase in the liver weight was observed 
in both sexes in a reproductive study on rats [Cohr and Simonsen 2004].    
 
Although the risk might seem small, the information on long-term effects is inadequate to 
make any final judgement. Because of the lack of information on BAM’s carcinogenic 
potential and because of the lack of data on reproductive and developmental effect of 
exposure to BAM, this case falls into the category “the jury is out”. 
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out”  
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64. Red Dye Number 2  
 
In 1976 the provisional approval of Red Dye Number 2 (also known as amaranth or Red No. 
2) was revoked. According to Lieberman and Kwon [1998] the approval was revoked by the 
U.S. FDA because some studies had indicated that Red No. 2 caused tumors and reproductive 
and developmental effects and Red No. 2 figures on their list of the greatest unfounded health 
scares in recent times.  
The available evidence concerning Red No. 2 and cancer is very scarce. According to 
IARC [1975] two oral studies in rats indicated a carcinogenic effect, but do not allow a 
definite evaluation because of different deficiencies. Other oral studies in mice, rats and dogs 
gave negative results but were inadequately reported. IARC were not able to evaluate the 
carcinogenicity of Red No. 2 and hence it could be argued that “the jury is still out” because 
of lack of safety data.  
Actually, contrary to what Lieberman and Kwon [1998] argue, it was not the scientific 
evidence that indicated that Red No. 2 caused cancer that led to the decision by the U.S. FDA. 
It was the lack of evidence of safety data.  
In the U.S. it is the petitioner's burden to show the safety of a color additive and the U.S. 
FDA evaluated that the petitioner had not shown through adequate studies that Red No. 2 is 
not a carcinogen. This does not mean that Red No. 2 has been found to be a carcinogen, but 
rather that the existing studies were not sufficient to determine definitely whether or not it is a 
carcinogen [USEU 2000a.  
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
65. Bovine Somatotropin (bST) in milk production 
 
Bovine somatropin (bST) is a synthetic, genetically engineered drug that is injected into dairy 
cows to increase milk production. bST increase the level of Insulin-like Growth Factor (IGF-
I) which is a protein hormone that converts nutrients into milk. Concern has been raised that 
IGF-I is associated with different adverse effects for instance breast cancer, but according to 
Lieberman and Kwon [1998] all these accusations are unfounded. bST is not regulated by the 
FDA in the U.S. but it is banned in Europe [Council Decision 1999/879/EC]. 
There are both primary and secondary human health risks related to the use of bST 
according to the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health 
[1999]. Primary concern evolves around a possible association between circulating IGF-I 
levels and an increased relative risk of breast and prostate cancer, which has been supported 
by epidemiological studies. But it is unclear whether or not an increased level of circulating 
IGF-I has to be considered an early marker for breast and prostate cancer, rather than 
indicating a causal association [SCVMPH 1999].   
Secondary concerns are that the use of bST will cause changes in milk protein 
composition which might favour allergic reactions and that an increased use of antimicrobial 
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substances in the treatment of bST related mastitis. This again might lead to an increased risk 
of residue formation in milk and to the selection of resistant bacteria [SCVMPH 1999].  
A report concerning bST and animal health by the Scientific Committee on Animal 
Health and Animal Welfare unanimously concluded that bST should not be used from an 
animal welfare and health point of view.  
The Committee based this conclusion on the fact that bST use substantially increases 
foot problems, mastitis and injection site reactions in dairy cows. These conditions are painful 
and debilitating, leading to significantly poorer welfare of the animals [SCAWHAAW 1999]. 
Thus it could be argued that “the jury is still out” concerning whether or not bST is a 
risk to the health of humans, whereas the use of bST is a real risk to the animals.   
 
Main risk category: “The jury is still out” 
 
 
66. Laundry detergents  
 
In the 1960s detergent manufacturers developed new laundry products containing enzymes 
and sold them as regular laundry detergents. Concern that product containing enzymes might 
cause dermatitis, asthma and cancer was raised by different consumer groups. A study by the 
NAS-NRC subsequently revealed no evidence of major health hazards from enzymes 
detergents and enzyme detergents are widely used today and neither regulated by the U.S. 
FDA nor by the U.S. EPA [Lawless 1977, Mazur 2004]. According to Mazur [2004] the early 
concern about the safety of enzyme detergent was a “false alarm”. 
According to a recently published report on enzymes by European Commission the 
number of reported respiratory illnesses increased as the use of enzymes increased in the 
workplace. The report further states that there are there are a number of health problems 
associated with enzymes like for instance allergic diseases and skin irritation [European 
Commission 2002]. 
In this case no regulatory action was ever taken in order to reduce the proclaimed risk of 
laundry detergents containing enzymes, although it is well recognized that there are a number 
of helath problems associated with enzymes. Therefore this case falls into the category “non-
regulated proclaimed risk”. 
 
Main risk category: “Non-regulated proclaimed risk”, Subcategory: “Real risk”  
    
 
67. Nitrilotriacetic acid in Detergents 
 
Nitrilotriacetic acid (NTA) was introduced into detergents in 1970 in the U.S., as a 
replacement for phosphorus, which were accused of contributing to the eutrophication of 
waterways [Lawless 1977]. Exposure to NTA occurs during their production, formulation and 
use in synthetic laundry and dishwashing detergents [IARC 1999g]. NTA quickly became 
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suspected as a risk to human health and concern was raised that it might be more toxic to the 
environment than the phosphorus it was replacing. The Surgeon General suggested that the 
use of NTA be discontinued and the manufacturers agreed to halt the use. Additional testing 
was done by the manufacturers throughout 1971, which showed that NTA was not 
carcinogenic. The Surgeon General still decided to continue the ban, because he found that the 
data were still too limited and that there was a need for further research [Lawless 1977]. The 
use of NTA was resumed in 1980 after phosphorus was banned in the U.S. [NTP 2002] and 
Mazur [2004] argues that NTA was a “false alarm”.   
According the IARC [1999g] NTA “are possibly carcinogenic to humans (Group 2B)” 
and according to the NTP [2002] it is “reasonable anticipated to be a human carcinogen” 
based on sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals.  
There is little doubt that the use of phosphorus represents a risk to the environment, and 
there is some evidence that NTA could be a human carcinogen. Therefore this case falls into 
the category risk-risk tradeoff. 
    
Main risk category: Risk-risk tradeoff 
 
 
68. Taconite Pollution 
 
In the 1950-1970s the Reserve Mining Company was polluting Lake Superior with Taconite 
tailings. It is estimated that the plant discharged 67,000 tons a day of taconite tailings into the 
lake and within a few years the discharge had formed a long delta extending into the lake and 
had discoloured the water at least eighteen miles away [Lawless 1977]. At first concern was 
primarily raised the effect this discharge would have to the delicate ecosystem of Lake 
Superior. Later, it was found that taconite tailings were present in the drinking water supply of 
Beaver Bay, Two Harbors and Duluth although the health effect of this presence was 
uncertain at the time. 
Mazur [2004] argues that this case is a “false alarm” because the U.S. EPA does not 
regulate taconite in drinking water, but the main concern about taconite pollution in this case 
was not the pollution of the drinking water supply. The main concern was instead the 
environmental impact of the taconite discharged from the Reserve Mining Company. 
Therefore this case falls into the category “too narrow a definition of risk”. 
 
Main risk category: “Too narrow a definition of risk” 
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Friday, November 21, 2003 
 
Chemical industry told to get tough  
Lobbyist's memo advises hardball tactics for fighting tighter California 
regulations  
 
Glen Martin, Chronicle Environment Writer 
A leaked memo from a chemical industry lobbyist recommended fighting increased regulation in 
California by hiring an "attack dog" public relations firm to spy on industry opponents, arrange protests 
and recruit conservative talk show hosts.  
A copy of the memo was obtained by the Environmental Working Group, an environmental advocacy 
organization, which said it represents a covert attempt to undermine a growing chemical safety 
movement in California.  
But a lobbyist with the American Chemistry Council was unapologetic, saying the tactics they advocate 
are employed by environmentalists as well as industry supporters and are meant to frame a legitimate 
debate on the flaws of increased regulation.  
At issue is the precautionary principle, a policy that maintains chemicals should not be approved for 
the market unless they are proved safe. In the United States, chemicals are generally allowed unless 
they're proved unsafe.  
The precautionary principle holds sway across much of Europe and was recently adopted by the city 
of San Francisco. Other California municipalities have expressed interest in the concept, and state 
regulators have begun applying it to some chemicals, most notably flame retardants.  
The chemical industry sees the principle as a threat, and is marshalling resources to fight its increased 
implementation -- particularly in California, which is regarded by the industry as a bellwether state.  
The memo reportedly was written by Tim Shestek, a lobbyist for the California office of the American 
Chemistry Council. It recommended hiring the firm of Nichols-Dezenhall, a Washington, D.C., public 
relations company known for its aggressive tactics, to carry out an ambitious California campaign 
against the precautionary principle. 
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The memo outlined a variety of marketing tactics designed to "stigmatize'' the precautionary principle 
and "win control of the message war. " Among them, the memo suggested:  
-- Conduct "selective intelligence gathering about the plans, motivations and allies of opposition 
activists on an as-needed basis."  
-- Generate public support by recruiting conservative talk show hosts and business leaders.  
-- Establish a computer system to track all media, political and regulatory information in California with 
regard to the principle, and catalog any negative effects of implementation.  
-- Conduct and publicize an economic study that would "dramatize the potentially devastating effects 
to industry."  
-- Use humor and satire "to demonstrate how, taken to its logical extreme, application of the 
precautionary principle would set Californians back to the Stone Ages."  
Bill Walker, West Coast vice president of the Environmental Working Group, said the council's 
determination to hire Nichols-Dezenhall, a firm noted for its hardball tactics, shows it is willing to go to 
the extreme to stop the precautionary principle from being applied in California.  
"They're known for creating deceptive, phony front groups," Walker said. "They go through people's 
trash; they make a policy of hiring former FBI and CIA operatives. Their motto basically is that they're 
not a PR firm - you hire them when you want to win a war."  
The July memo envisioned spending $15,000 a month on the campaign during periods of peak 
activity, but ultimately the campaign was not funded, Shestek said. While he did not say whether he 
was the author, Shestek defended the memo.  
"We stand by the policy of creating a comprehensive effort to ensure that sound scientific principles 
remain the cornerstone of regulatory policy," Shestek said. "The precautionary principle is based on 
fear, not science. A zero-risk policy based on mere allegation clearly turns the rule-making procedure 
on its head."  
Steven Schlein, a senior vice president with Nichols-Dezenhall, defended the firm's tactics. "We may 
be aggressive in the service of our clients, but we never break the law," he said.  
"The Environmental Working Group is doing what they always try to do, which is go after every critic of 
radical environmentalism. As far as creating groups to oppose an issue, it's typical in these high-
stakes public affairs, and it's done by both sides. The groups we create are very real, composed of 
people genuinely concerned about the issues. They are not fake."  
Walker said the memo demonstrates the duplicity of the chemical industry, and indicates it will go to 
great lengths to hobble the legitimate regulation of dangerous chemicals in California.  
E-mail Glen Martin at glenmartin@sfchronicle.com 
 
[Available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/11/21/BAG2P380K51.DTL, Accessed 23 
September 2004] 
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Nichols – Dezenhall 
Precautionary Principle Campaign Proposal 
 
 
The Precautionary Principle (PP) 
 
The American Chemistry Council believes that the Precautionary Principle is a top priority 
and an emerging issue in California for two main reasons: it has affected and is negatively 
affecting a cross section of California industry in a variety of ways; and California’s political 
climate makes the state more susceptible to policy and thinking inspired by the PP than other 
geographic region. 
 
California’s business community has done little to date to counter the PP, largely allowing PP 
proponents to control the debate and spread their messages unfettered. Should this trend 
continue, industry runs the risk of allowing the PP to gain additional momentum, with 
potentially much broader and more severe implications. Moreover, California is a bellwether 
state, and any success enjoyed here could readily spill over to other parts of the country. 
 
Proposed Strategies and Tactics 
 
In order to help California industry build awareness and respond to legislative and regulatory 
attacks on an as-needed basis, the American Chemistry Council is supporting and 
recommends an aggressive awareness campaign as outlined in the following strategies and 
tactics. We also believe that in order for such a campaign to succeed, it must be deployed in 
close coordination with – and with an aim to complement and enhance – the business 
community’s current and future legislative advocacy efforts.   
 
Strategies 
 
1. Define the issues on our terms to stigmatize the PP, win control of the message war 
and build awareness of the negative consequences associated with its implementation.  
 
2. Generate support for our position by identifying, recruiting and mobilizing non-
traditional allies in the scientific, academic and activist communities to call into action when 
needed to fight, or preempt unwelcome initiatives. 
 
3. Selectively challenge our adversaries and position their demands and political agenda 
as contrary to the best interests of Californians. 
 
Tactics 
 
1. Establish a computerized issue monitoring system to track all media, political, policy 
and regulatory information flow in California with regard to the PP. ID and catalogue the 
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negative effects of the application/implementation of PP and create a database for use by the 
coalition and allies for targeted response to initiatives.   
 
2. Conduct and publicize an economic-impact study to dramatize the potentially 
devastating impacts to industry and consumers should California broadly adapt PP-based 
legislation and regulation. The study could specify threats to both innovation and technology-
development, as well as provide region-specific breakouts (e.g., LA, San Francisco, Silicon 
Valley, Imperial Valley) so as to create multiple media-pitch opportunities and to generate 
support among target audiences.  
 
3. Use satire and humor to demonstrate how, taken to its logical extreme, application of 
the PP would set Californians back to the stone ages. Tactics, through third-parties, would 
include websites, posters, bill boards, radio placements and internet communications. 
 
4. Harmonize messages through materials by developing an “information and response 
package”, including a fact sheet with substantive arguments and media-friendly sound-bites 
for use by the coalition and third party allies. 
 
5. Media outreach – Provide a steady stream of information: studies, reports and other 
media products to advance the message and agenda of the coalition. Approach and educate 
conservative columnists and talk radio hosts on the issue to stimulate debate. 
 
6. Recruit and energize the business community by creating and publicizing a coalition-
sponsored business roundtable or lecture series and/or conferences to educate potential allies 
about the PP and the consequences of its implementation. These could be held in Sacramento, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose and San Diego and done in conjunction with other 
business associations and/or California based think tanks. 
 
7. Conduct selective intelligence gathering about the plans, motivations and allies of 
opposition activists on an as needed basis. Focus on the PP “movement leadership” in the 
U.S., and in particular, California.  
 
8. Recruit and energize non-conventional third party critics. Mobilize existing critics of 
the PP while identifying, recruiting and arming new highly credible third party allies in from 
appropriate communities (e.g., the minority community, consumer activists, regulatory 
watchdogs, think tanks) to deliver messages critical of the PP concept that highlight the 
negative consequences of PP implementation. Encourage the formation of a second, non-
business led coalition that can be used to provide testimony, demonstrations, press 
conferences and other defensive and pro-active situations. 
 
9. Create an independent PP watchdog group to act as an information clearinghouse and 
criticize the PP in public and media forums. For too long the “common sense” appeal of the 
PP has gone unopposed. This group would serve as a rallying point for industry and third-
party voices in the debate and seek out opportunities to reactively and proactively raise the 
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profile of the negative consequences of the PP. It is possible that the group could be structured 
as a 501(c) (3) or 501(c) (4) tax-exempt organization. 
 
10. Mount protests timed with debate/discussion/votes on PP-related legislative proposals. 
Mobilize recruited allies and PP watchdog group to vocally and visibly air arguments against 
the adoption of the PP in public forums, e.g., outside the capitol and/or local government 
hearing room. 
 
11. Draft and sponsor ordinances/resolutions rooted in risk management and sound 
science. Just as activists convinced the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to adopt an 
ordinance requiring the PP to factor into their decision-making, industry and its third-party 
allies could propose ordinances/resolutions that call on municipalities and the state 
government requiring “sound science” to factor into theirs. 
 
12. Fund a documentary and associated media blitz that examines “shocking” negative 
past consequences of the PP, in the context of present-day CA situations if possible. Possible 
topics include: the Peruvian outbreak of cholera; African nations’ battle with malaria without 
DDT, vis-à-vis the possible spread of West Nile virus. 
 
 
PROPOSED FIRST YEAR BUDGET 
 
Based on their previous experience executing similar tactics for other clients, Nichols-
Dezenhall estimates that the communications/public affairs program outlined in this 
memorandum would cost in the range of $12,500 - $15,000 per month (not including out-of-
pocket expenses, e.g., travel costs, materials, printing, ally reimbursement, other costs listed 
below) during periods of intense activity, and $5,000 - $7,500 per month when the legislature 
is out of session. This estimate is subject to change if the proposal is trimmed or additional 
tactics added. 
 
This estimate assumes that N - D Sacramento VP Dan Kramer and N-D Los Angeles VP Ryan 
Knoll, will serve as senior project managers and that N - D will be responsible for ensuring 
proper execution of tactics and strategies as well as the coordination of on-the-ground allies 
and assets.  
   
Recruit & Mobilize Third Parties……..…………… $25,000 
Media Outreach………………….………………… $20,000 
Recruit & Mobilize Allies….……………………… $15,000 
Research and Investigation……...…………………. $10,000 
Study……………………………………………….. $15,000 
Documentary………………………………………...$20,000 
Legal………………………………………………...$15,000 
 
This cost estimate is not a retainer. Nichols - Dezenhall only charges for hours worked on 
client-authorized projects.   
 208
 
N  D will be responsible for ensuring effective execution of the strategies and tactics and for 
coordinating on-the-ground allies and resources.   
 
In the event we decide to move forward with all, or a portion, of this proposal N-D will be 
available to provide advice and counsel on a daily basis. 
